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Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics 1/2017

28.10.2015

Why Bad Things Happen to Good Organizations: The Link Between Governance and Asset Diversions in Public Charities

verfasst von: Erica Harris, Christine Petrovits, Michelle H. Yetman

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 1/2017

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Abstract

In the United States, the IRS now requires charities to publicly disclose any significant asset diversion, which is the theft or unauthorized use of assets, that the charity identifies during the year. We use this new disclosure to investigate whether strong governance reduces the likelihood of a charitable asset diversion. Specifically, for a sample of 1528 charities from 2008 to 2012, we simultaneously examine eleven measures of governance that capture four broad governance constructs: board monitoring, independence of key individuals, tone at the top, and capital provider oversight. We find consistent evidence that good governance across all four constructs is negatively associated with the probability of an asset diversion. Of the eleven governance measures, our results indicate that monitoring by debt holders and government grantors, audits, and keeping managerial duties in-house are most strongly associated with lower incidence of fraud. Our results also indicate that the likelihood of a fraud is negatively associated with a board review of the Form 990, the existence of a conflict of interest policy, and the presence of restricted donations. In addition, we document that the likelihood of an asset diversion is negatively associated with program efficiency and positively associated with growth and organizational complexity.

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Fußnoten
1
Financial statement falsification is the least frequent type of fraud but involves the largest dollar amounts (ACFE 2014). There is a growing academic literature on earnings management in the nonprofit sector (e.g., Trussel 2003; Hager and Greenlee 2004; Leone and Van Horn 2005; Krishnan et al. 2006; Keating et al. 2008; Tinkelman 2009).
 
2
We acknowledge that our governance constructs may not only reduce opportunity but could also reduce the perpetrator’s ability to rationalize the fraud. For example, an ethical tone at the top could make it more difficult for the perpetrator to justify his actions. We focus on opportunity because we can hypothesize a direct link between all of our governance constructs and reduced opportunity.
 
3
The IRS defines an independent director as one who meets the following criteria: (1) the director was not compensated as an officer or employee; (2) the director did not receive more than $10,000 as an independent contractor; and (3) neither the director nor a family member was involved in a transaction required to be disclosed on schedule L (transactions with interested parties).
 
4
Although nonprofits do not have owners in the traditional sense, they are accountable to and collectively “owned” by the public they serve. Agency problems occur when there is a separation of this collective ownership and control of the nonprofit (Hansmann 1996).
 
5
The IRS requires a charity to disclose when it uses an external party to perform management duties normally performed by or under the direct supervision of officers, directors, or key employees. These duties include, but are not limited to, hiring, firing, and supervising personnel, planning or executing budgets or financial operations, and supervising programmatic activities or unrelated businesses. These duties do not include administrative services (such as payroll processing) that do not involve significant decision-making. Management duties also do not include investment management unless the charity conducts investment management services for others.
 
6
Available at http://​www.​washingtonpost.​com/​wp-srv/​special/​local/​nonprofit-diversions-database. The Washington Post database was created with the assistance of Guidestar and includes all assets diversions that were reported on Form 990s filed from 2008 through 2012.
 
7
In the United States, there are several tax-exempt categories under IRC 501(c). Most of the organizations eliminated under this criteria are labor unions and credit unions, which qualify for tax exemption under IRC 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(14), respectively.
 
8
As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate our primary model including only the last asset diversion for each repeat charity. Results are qualitatively similar to our primary results with the exception of RestrictedDonations, which is no longer significant.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Why Bad Things Happen to Good Organizations: The Link Between Governance and Asset Diversions in Public Charities
verfasst von
Erica Harris
Christine Petrovits
Michelle H. Yetman
Publikationsdatum
28.10.2015
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 1/2017
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2921-9

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