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Social Indicators Research

Erschienen in:

11.01.2016

Why do People Get Married? An Inframarginal Perspective

verfasst von: Tie-Ying Liu, Hsu-Ling Chang, Chi-Wei Su

Erschienen in: Social Indicators Research | Ausgabe 3/2017

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Abstract

This paper constructs an economic model to study the emergence of marriage based on a new infra-marginal general equilibrium analysis. By depicting the commonness and complementarity of marriage, we explain how a single person shifts from being single to being married based on the division of labor. Meanwhile, reduced learning costs will make an individual more willing to abandon the single status, and the number of families in the marriage market will increase. The model reveals the necessary conditions for the existence of marriage and marital stability and explains the dynamic changes in the relative population and the prices of parties in the marriage market.

Vorheriger Artikel Family Demographic Mechanisms Linking of Socioeconomic Status to Subjective Physical Health in Rural Bangladesh

Nächster Artikel Erratum to: Measuring Stability and Change: Methodological Issues in Quality of Life Studies

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The transaction costs include material investments, learning costs and search costs.

This paper conducts the model to explain the essence of marriage, which has been general issues. We not only focus on China’s marriage phenomenon, but also other countries.

The transaction cost the must parameters in the infra-marginal analysis model not just the marriage, but it is important to consider it in the marriage model. While the other three factors are mainly for the nature of marriage.

In this paper, the attraction parameter is equal to the similarity of the two parties as the influential factor.

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Titel: Why do People Get Married? An Inframarginal Perspective
verfasst von: Tie-Ying Liu
Hsu-Ling Chang
Chi-Wei Su
Publikationsdatum: 11.01.2016
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Social Indicators Research / Ausgabe 3/2017
Print ISSN: 0303-8300
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0921
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1232-6

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