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Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 4/2022

23.05.2022 | Regular Paper

A framework for leaking secrets to past instructions

verfasst von: Jacob Fustos, Michael Bechtel, Heechul Yun

Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering | Ausgabe 4/2022

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Abstract

Transient execution attacks use microarchitectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting footprints in the micro-architectural state, for example, a cache state change, from which the secret is recovered after the transient execution is completed. In this paper, we present SpectreRewind, a new approach to create and exploit contention-based covert channels for transient execution attacks. In our approach, a covert channel is established by issuing the necessary instructions logically before the transiently executed victim code. Unlike prior contention-based covert channels, which require simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), SpectreRewind works on a single hardware thread and does not require SMT. We show that contention on the floating point division unit on commodity out-of-order processors can be used to create a high-performance (\(\sim \) 100 KB/s), low-noise covert channel for transient execution attacks instead of commonly used flush+reload-based cache covert channels. We also show that the proposed covert channel works in the JavaScript sandbox environment of a Chrome browser and can be used in a Meltdown attack.
Vorheriger Artikel Differential fault analysis of NORX using variants of coupon collector problem
Nächster Artikel Fault analysis of the PRINCE family of lightweight ciphers

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Fußnoten
2
As defined in [1], latency refers to the clock cycles needed from the time the \(\upmu \)op is issued to the time the result become available to dependent \(\upmu \)ops, while throughput refers to the clock cycles needed from the time the \(\upmu \)op is issued until to the time the functional unit becomes available again.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
A framework for leaking secrets to past instructions
verfasst von
Jacob Fustos
Michael Bechtel
Heechul Yun
Publikationsdatum
23.05.2022
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering / Ausgabe 4/2022
Print ISSN: 2190-8508
Elektronische ISSN: 2190-8516
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-022-00289-8

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