1 Introduction
2 Related work
Detection methods | Applicable environment | Communication | Identities | Simultaneity | Conspired Sybil attack | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Direct | Indirect | Fabricated | Stolen | Simul. | Non-Simul. | |||
RT [4] | 2S. network |
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| − | − |
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| × | N/A |
RSSI [11] | W. network |
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| × | − | − | − | − | N/A |
TSA [15] | MANET |
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| × | − | − |
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| × | N/A |
SNI [16] | MANET |
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| − | − |
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| × | N/A |
RRT [19] | 3S. network |
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| × |
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| × | N/A |
RKPD [19] | 3S. network |
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| × | − | − |
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| × | N/A |
CA [19] | 2S. network |
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SyiblG. [20] | S. network |
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| × | − | − | × | × | N/A |
EAM [23] | S. network | − | − | − | − | − | − | N/A |
3 Models and design goals
3.1 System model
3.2 Attack model
3.3 Design goals
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Conditional privacy preserving: vehicles use time-limited pseudonyms in the V2V and V2I communications which preserves the identity privacy of vehicles. But when a malicious vehicle is detected, TA has the ability to retrieve the vehicle’s real identity from its pseudo identity. Therefore, EBRS can prevent the malicious node from repudiating its message.
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Independent detection: the essence of Sybil attack is collaboration of multiple Sybil nodes. To prevent the potential Sybil attack from happening again, the Sybil attack detection method should be carried by vehicles independently.
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Defense against Sybil attack with multiple false identity sources: Sybil attacker can get multiple false identities using the method of forgery, theft and conspiracy, EBRS is capable of defensing and detecting all theses Sybil attacks.
4 Event based reputation system
4.1 Initialization and notation
Notations | Descriptions |
---|---|
P
I
D
v
| Pseudonym of vehicle v
|
P
K
v
/s
k
v
| Public/secret key of vehicle v
|
P
K
r
/s
k
r
| Public/secret key of RSU r
|
L
c
e
r
t
r
v//L
c
e
r
t
v
r
| Local certificate of vehicle v in the |
range of RSU r
| |
C
e
r
t
r
| Certificate of RSU r
|
T
| Fresh time of local certificate |
R
V
E
| Reputation value of event E
|
T
V
E
| Trusted value of event E
|
T
E
| Time of event E
|
L
E
| Location of event E
|
T
y
p
e(E) | Type of event E
|
4.2 EBRS process
4.2.1 Process of local certificate generation
4.2.2 Process of local certificate validation
4.2.3 Process of setting event reputation value and trusted value
5 System evaluation
Parameters | Values |
---|---|
Simulation time | 500s
|
Vehicles velocity | 10m/s−30m/s
|
Communication range | 300m
|
MAC protocol | 802.11p
|
Sending frequency | 1 per second |
5.1 Simulation results analysis
5.2 Performance evaluation
Detection | Sybil attack | Sybil attack | Conspired | Message | Privacy |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
methods | with fabricated identities | with stolen identities | Sybil attack | integrity | protection |
RSSI [11] | − | − | N/A | N/A | N/A |
TSA [15] | − | − | N/A |
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| × |
SNI [16] | − | − | N/A | N/A | × |
Our method |
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