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Dynamic Games and Applications

Erschienen in:

19.11.2021

A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

verfasst von: Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang, Cuiyou Yao

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 2/2022

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Abstract

This study conducts a new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management under dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), in which the central government’s punishment to the local government is taken into consideration. Then, we compared the two models under the DPM. Moreover, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise tends to converge to a stable value under the basic model. Notably, when we add the central government’s punishment to the model, the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise will tend to spiral converge to a stable focus. Thus, the new evolutionary game model that we presented is more conducive than the basic model. The central government’s punishment mechanism will take an active role in dealing with industrial pollution problems.

Vorheriger Artikel -Capture in Nonlinear Differential Games Described by System of Order Two

Nächster Artikel The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics

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Titel: A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment
verfasst von: Fulei Shi
Chuansheng Wang
Cuiyou Yao
Publikationsdatum: 19.11.2021
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 2/2022
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00407-x

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