A Study on Cyclone Aila Recovery in Koyra, Bangladesh: Evaluating the Inclusiveness of Recovery with Respect to Predisaster Vulnerability Reduction

The recovery storyline of Aila was developed from the literature review and data collected from the institutional surveys, FGD, and KII.

Diagnostic analysis is related to the performance of a system and includes an organized way of identifying problems and the causes of these difficulties (Edquist 2011). Our research examined the recovery from Aila to determine whether it was planned considering appropriate measures for pre-Aila vulnerability reduction (PAVR). To this end, pre-Aila vulnerabilities (PAV) with root causes were identified; this led to the selection of a set of PAVR indicators. A score-based approach was applied to measure the degree of inclusion of each indicator within recovery.

The government, as well as international communities, responded immediately to the cyclone damage through provision of humanitarian assistance (Table 2). The government primarily provided cash grants, rice, and food assistance (through programs for vulnerable groups) (UNDP 2010; Tada 2011; Koyra Upazila Nirbahi Officer’s Office 2010). NGOs, with help from the international community, provided emergency material relief (food and nonfood items), emergency shelter and housing, emergency water supply and sanitation, cash grants (to compensate for work and training), and emergency health support (Table 2; Roy et al. 2009; UNDP 2010; Tada 2011). Humanitarian aid-driven responses were commonly criticized for the lack of coordination among NGOs, overlapping activities, gaps in service areas, insensitivity to local needs, and corruption (Rahaman and Khan 2010; Mahmud and Prowse 2012).

Several initiatives to repair rural infrastructure by engaging local people under “cash for work” or “food for work” schemes were initiated by the GOs and NGOs. But all such programs were short-term measures (Mallick and Islam 2014; Ashraf and Shaha 2016), and were not always successful due to the delay experienced in repair of damaged coastal polders (polder 13–14/2 and polder 14/1). The embankment’s repair was urgently needed by the local people as any delay hindered the implementation of other recovery initiatives (ECHO 2009). Weather conditions during monsoon season and the shortage of emergency funds exacerbated the delay and increased storm impact on agricultural output (Tada 2011). Due to constraints in the emergency budget, the completion of urgent repair work was limited in scope. In response to this, different NGOs offered their assistance to repair the embankments, but the BWDB could not allow this due to legal barriers, and concern for the NGOs’ engineering capabilities.

Development partners and different NGOs worked together to promote recovery under a coordination mechanism—the Local Consultative Group, or LCG—jointly established by the government and the development partners. Following the cluster approach of aid coordination (IASC 2012), the LCG rolled out an early recovery cluster that led to the formation of a multidonor project entitled the Early Recovery Facility (ERF) led by UNDP. The LCG evolved into an umbrella body for enhanced financing and implementation of all aided recovery efforts (UNDP 2011). In Koyra, the major recovery efforts implemented by ERF included construction of new houses with sanitation facilities; support for education, health, and nutrition programs; support for the formulation of national disaster management plan (2010–2015) (DMB-MFDM 2010); and guidelines on emergency response procedures (UNDP 2011). Under the umbrella of ERF, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) formulated a project entitled “Improved Resilience of Coastal Communities through Rehabilitation of Coastal Embankments” (EKN and UNDP 2015). The reconstruction of a 2.92 km section of the embankment, installation of new drinking water sources (tube wells and ponds), cash grant support to certain households for alternative livelihood development, and tree planting were highlights of this project in Koyra.

Although the UNDP-ERF, along with the LCG, acted as the national-level coordination structure, local (upazila)-level coordination was maintained by an UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer, the chief executive officer of the local government). The coordination structure at upazila level suffered from a lack of resources (manpower, financial, and technical) and effective coordination and monitoring mechanisms (Sadik et al. 2017).

Cyclone Aila hit the southwestern region at a time when the government was trying to rehabilitate the area after the damage caused by a previous cyclone (Sidr) that struck in 2007. To initiate the Cyclone Aila recovery, the government first attempted to include Aila recovery initiatives in the aid that supported Cyclone Sidr recovery projects. Later the government adopted specific plans for Aila recovery followed two approaches: (1) segmenting and prioritizing the reconstruction activities under the Annual Development Plan (ADP) of the government; and (2) formulating special projects (with foreign aid) for large-scale projects. For example, rural roads were reconstructed initially by modifying the Emergency 2007 Cyclone (Sidr) Recovery and Restoration Project (ECRRP) initiated by the World Bank (2013). Later the ADP and Rehabilitation of Aila-Affected Rural Infrastructure Project (RAARIP) were formulated to complete the unfinished rehabilitation tasks (Sadik, Nakagawa, Shaw et al. 2017). A few coastal polders and allied structures were restored to predisaster design condition by modifying the World Bank-funded Water Management Improvement Project. The remaining polders were restored by the ADP and a project funded by EKN. Unfortunately, none of these projects considered the improvement and incorporation of new disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures. For the improvement of coastal polders, the BWDB initiated the Coastal Embankment Improvement Project (CEIP) in 2013, which includes one of Koyra’s polders (polder no 14-1). However, the physical work in Koyra has yet to start as the detail design is still in progress according to interviews with project officials in 2016 and 2017. Apparently, the overall recovery is very encouraging due to the joint approach of government and development partners, and a wide range of rehabilitation and development activity is soon to begin. But interviews indicate little evidence that recovery activities undertaken thus far have reduced the preexisting vulnerabilities of the community.

The poor structural condition of the coastal embankment was the most critical unsafe condition, responsible for 34 storm surge breaches within around 119 km of the embankment during Cyclone Aila (Roy et al. 2009; Tada 2011; JICA and OCCL 2012). Poor maintenance of the embankments, illegal breaching by saltwater shrimp farmers, and river erosion had already weakened the structural condition of coastal and riverine barriers (Tada 2011). In the 1960s, coastal polders were constructed to promote rice cultivation. Later, due to attractive market of shrimp, rising salinity, and adverse impact of polders (for example, water logging) large farmers shifted from rice to shrimp farming. Shrimp farmers started either installing pipes or cutting the embankment to irrigate their shrimp aquaculture ponds by salinity rich river water. Thus, reduction of these root causes of the vulnerability is linked to the improvement of embankment structure with a new design, community agreement to shift from saltwater shrimp farming to rice cultivation, a comprehensive land-use plan for zoning of shrimp farming and settlements, and an improved maintenance plan and budget according to remarks obtained during FGDs and interviews with BWDB personnel. Poorly developed road networks and inadequate maintenance investment in transportation infrastructure were other major unsafe conditions of the physical environment pre-Aila that impeded emergency evacuation and response (Mallick et al. 2011). Existing roads in poor condition were easily eroded by the storm surge. Cyclone Aila washed away 23,820 houses and partially damaged 18,620 houses (Koyra Upazila Office 2010), and finally forced around 42,000 people to migrate from Koyra (Islam and Hasan 2016). The weak house structures and scattered settlements along the river were unsafe conditions that resulted in housing-related vulnerabilities (Alam and Collins 2010). Traditional scattered settlements had grown without an integrated embankment system to protect them from the tidal flood, establishment of evacuation routes was deficient, and construction of cyclone shelters was inadequate to absorb refugees. The result was a population highly exposed to cyclone damage and storm surge (Mallick and Islam 2014). A land-use management practice that is inclusive of new settlement conception and construction, practices spatial planning, and prioritizes comprehensive land management is a key to vulnerability reduction (Mallick and Islam 2014).

The shrimp farming- and fishing-based livelihood system (with its high dependency on nature) was another PAV that resulted in a sudden drop in the local economic output due to the suspension of all agricultural-related activities in the post-Aila period (Abdullah et al. 2016). The survey undertaken by Abdullah and his colleagues in 2016 showed that economic loss, income loss, and general suffering were highest for shrimp farmers, small businessmen, and agricultural farmers. Reduction of this livelihood-related vulnerability is linked with short-term measures (for example, relief, cash for work, and cash for training). More dependable and resilient vulnerability reduction must involve long-term measures that achieve diversification of the economy, improvement of structural safety, and technological improvement of agricultural activities, for example, by the introduction of saline-tolerant rice (ECHO 2009; Abdullah et al. 2016).

Community-based organizations have limited capability to carry out emergency evacuation and response. This restricted ability is due to capital constraints, both financial and technical, and poor social networking (Islam and Walkerden 2015; Saha C. 2015). Together these deficiencies ultimately weakened the ability of community organizations to respond to a regional disaster. In both coastal and riverine areas, community participation in water management was also very vague and suffered from inefficiency, inequality, and unsustainability (Dewan et al. 2014; Gain et al. 2017). Lacking meaningful local authority and control, most communities could not prevent illegal embankment breaching. Capacity development of social organizations and linking, bridging, and networking social capital (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Islam and Walkerden 2015) are keys to promoting and achieving PAVR. Capacity development of community-based organizations to ensure participation in water management is another key measure to realize PAVR. Meaningful involvement of local governments in and management responsibility for a permanent polder maintenance fund could institutionalize participatory coastal water management (Dewan et al. 2014) and should be considered an important component in the recovery process.

Lack of appropriate fresh water supply technology for the saline coastal region, high dependency on pondwater, which was exposed to storm surge, and lack of sanitation awareness were the major pre-Aila unsafe conditions that resulted in long-term post-Aila suffering (Mallick et al. 2011; Tada 2011). Access to health facilities and the capacity of health institutions were limited, which disrupted emergency health response and caused inadequate health support post-Aila (Mallick et al. 2011; Tada 2011). Three viable measures are needed to achieve PAVR: (1) promote water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health; (2) build the capacity of health institutions to improve the medical response to disaster; and (3) introduce appropriate technology for an upgraded, protected post-cyclone water supply.

From the standpoint of disaster preparedness, the poor capacity of cyclone shelters to house evacuees, a conventional cyclone warning system that was no longer adequate, uncoordinated NGO relief efforts, and a lack of proactive disaster preparedness were major pre-Aila unsafe conditions that resulted in prolonged human suffering (Mallick et al. 2011; Tada 2011). The people in the area affected by Aila did not follow evacuation orders because of a lack of trust in the warning system, ignorance, and the challenge of low capacity cyclone shelters with no space for livestock (Saha and James 2016). Clumsy humanitarian aid and NGO coordination mechanisms at the local level were additional vulnerability conditions that hindered an efficient disaster emergency response (Sadik, Nakagawa, Rahman et al. 2017). A large number of NGOs started providing recovery support to the local people under the coordination structure of UNO office. The approach of NGO coordination was only arranging monthly coordination meetings at UNO office, which did not ensure effective coordination (Sadik, Nakagawa, Rahman et al. 2017). With no additional resources for monitoring and coordinating humanitarian organizations involved in relief and recovery, it became a very difficult challenge for the UNO office to ensure alignment of humanitarian support to local needs and national disaster management plans.

As we see in Table 3, creation of a land-use plan, increased road network, improvement of coastal embankments, and viable measures for preventing embankment breaching were completely missing in Aila recovery in Koyra. Eventually, the exclusion of four indicators and only the partial inclusion of two indicators made the degree of inclusion of the criteria, physical environment-related PAVR in the recovery, very low.

A hazard map-based land-use plan that would regulate the practice of saltwater shrimp farming inside the polder areas and the growth of scattered settlements in high risk areas is considered neither in practice nor in theory. Housing was a focus sector and the NGOs provided improved houses with a raised plinth level and measures for withstanding windstorms to many impacted families. These improved homes were provided to only 20–30% of the affected families and were planned without consulting local hazard maps or land-use plans (Sadik, Nakagawa, Rahman et al. 2017). This seemingly random process led the experts that we consulted to give only a moderate score to the contribution of housing to PAVR. Although both GOs and NGOs reconstructed damaged roads (UNDP 2011; LGED 2016), no new roads have yet been constructed to expand the road network (according to information provided by the LGED office Koyra), which was a major unsafe condition leading to vulnerability before Cyclone Aila (Mallick et al. 2011). In all cases, typical design with no hazard mitigation improvement was followed. Field observation and FGDs indicate that the lack of DRR measures is evidenced by frequent road damage from heavy rain and tidal flooding. Several of the damaged administration buildings of the upazila were reconstituted specifically to take into account the need for additional DRR measures and improvements. For example, buildings were elevated on multistoried stilt-structures, constructed with reinforced cement concrete (RCC) foundations, and built on elevated sites, among other improvements. New cyclone shelters were also constructed in compliance with improved designs and new guidelines were recommended for the coastal area (UNDP et al. 2013; LGED 2016). But only a small number of the shelters were constructed with associated livestock shelters, which discouraged experts from giving the maximum score possible during their evaluation. Coastal embankments were restored without improvement of their original design, and with neither maintenance mechanisms nor additional DRR. The only project that considered the improvement of the embankment is still in a study phase. Since no viable measures for preventing the illegal breaching of an embankment could be found in recovery initiatives, the relevant indicator was considered as missing.

As discussed in Sect. 5.2, increasing livelihood safety for marginalized populations by providing support for their present livelihood, encouraging livelihood diversification, and promoting technological improvement of conventional agricultural activities are keys to PAVR. Unfortunately, no initiative was found in recovery that addressed technological improvements to the conventional, unsustainable practices of shrimp farming and other agricultural activities. Since livelihood stability was a priority goal in the recovery process, the NGOs and GOs provided different support programs, including cash aid, cash for work and training, and training for alternative livelihoods to promote self-recovery (Walton-Ellery 2009; Tada 2011; JICA and OCCL 2012; Mahmud and Prowse 2012). These support actions were short-term measures, and the reduction of uncertainties and vulnerabilities embedded in these economic activities due to the cyclone disaster was not ensured by these support initiatives (Sadik, Nakagawa, Shaw et al. 2017). With these facts very much in mind, experts judged the immediate post-disaster economic initiatives as moderate contributors to PAVR, and this influenced the moderate scores assigned to their degree of inclusion within recovery programs (Table 3). One indicator (technological improvement of agricultural practice) was missing; thus the final score for the inclusion of this cluster of initiatives—the reduction of local economy and livelihood activity related PAV—was lowered (Table 3).

The degree to which viable measures related to social capital are included in PAVR is low. Table 3 shows that two indicators were completely missing and three were only partially considered in the recovery process. Experts’ judgment of the potential contribution made by implemented social measures to PAVR within recovery programs was at a moderate level. For example, due to the continuing uncertainty about the technological and financial capacities of the local volunteer organizations, experts considered the initiative of forming local volunteer groups to broadcast warnings and assist with emergency evacuations as a moderate contributor. Similarly, since the sustainability and continuation of disaster awareness by training programs and information campaigns were not assured, experts judged the initiative as a moderate PAVR contributor.

New groups of local volunteers, better community-NGO partnerships, and expanded community training might improve social networks, but institutionalization of these networks still needs to be resolved (Islam and Walkerden 2017). Similar to the social network expansion, building more links and bridges between social capital centers is also important (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). During Aila recovery, links and bridges between local communities and local administrations, local government institutions, academic societies, science and technological societies, and neighboring communities were overlooked. These concerns influenced the experts to give a moderate score for the contribution of network improvement to PAVR.

To ensure community participation in water management, the BWDB plans to form several water management committees comprised of local people. Taking into account examples from other coastal areas of Bangladesh, these committees are often not effective in maintaining embankment fidelity due to political and financial challenges, as well as weak legitimacy (Gain and Schwab 2012; Dewan et al. 2015). The capacity development of community-based organizations in monitoring and preventing illegal breaching of embankments is also a missing link.

The GOs and NGOs installed hand-pump tube wells, re-excavated ponds, and installed pond sand filters (PSF) and household-level rainwater-harvesting systems (RHS) in different affected villages (Tada 2011; JICA and OCCL 2012; EKN and UNDP 2015). In a few villages, ponds and PSFs were not effective due to salinity intrusion from the nearby saltwater shrimp farms (Sadik, Nakagawa, Shaw et al. 2017). Similarly, RHS suffered from maintenance issues and capacity limitation. Therefore, experts judged these promising initiatives as only moderate contributors to PAVR (Table 3).

In their promotion of WASH and health, NGOs and GOs have partnered to launch several nationwide campaigns. Sanitation was one of the priority issues in humanitarian aid. The housing units provided by NGOs for affected families were equipped with sanitation facilities. However, these facilities did not include DRR measures to ensure safety from a tidal flood. A number of campaign programs were only short-term and project-based, which reduced their impact. Experts therefore evaluated them as moderate contributors (Table 3).

Although sanitation was partially included in recovery, the improvement of health facilities was not included. No project or initiative was found that targeted capacity building of the local health institutions to enhance effective and quick response during a disaster emergency.

The degree of inclusion of PAVR measures related to disaster preparedness was judged to be somewhere between low and moderate (Table 3). Only the initiative to construct cyclone shelters was comprehensively included in recovery efforts. Twelve new cyclone shelters have since been constructed and six more are under construction (Sadik, Nakagawa, Shaw et al. 2017).

The ERF had components related to improving disaster governance that included capacity building of GOs and NGOs in disaster management, and policy and guideline formulation for emergency response and NGO coordination (UNDP 2011; UNDP et al. 2013). The government prepared a national plan for disaster management (DMB-MFDM 2010). But the practice of the plans and policies was limited because the capacity of local government to implement the new initiatives was deficient. Despite establishing a new national level coordination structure, local level coordination suffers from a lack of harmonization, difficulties with coordination among NGOs, and inexperience with proper monitoring (Sadik, Nakagawa, Rahman et al. 2017). Therefore experts judged these initiatives as moderate contributors to PAVR.

The early warning system that was designed to protect rivers and seaports of the country (Akhand 2003) has not been changed. Nonetheless the existence of a warning system and its dissemination do not guarantee that people will follow the evacuation order unless the reasons for noncompliance are addressed (Saha and James 2016). By improving the warning system in the recovery phase without addressing the root causes of why people ignored cyclone warnings during the Aila emergency, this indicator was considered excluded as a PAVR contributor. Harmonization is a product of integration, coordination, and alignment (Rahaman and Khan 2010). The integration of different sectoral recovery at a local level—for example, infrastructures, coastal embankments, and livelihoods—is still missing in Aila recovery. The coordination and alignment of humanitarian aid lack an efficient coordination structure at a local level (Sadik, Nakagawa, Rahman et al. 2017). Therefore the indicator “harmonization of response and recovery at the local level” was considered excluded from the recovery.

The diagnostic analysis clearly presents the evidence that Aila recovery is a poor vehicle by which to achieve PAVR measures. The spider diagram in Fig. 5 illustrates the overall pattern of inclusiveness of Aila recovery by comparing the degree of inclusiveness of the five indicator categories in improving PAVR.

The pattern of inclusion in Fig. 5 does not look balanced. It suggests less fruitful results from the recovery and logically indicates that physical environment, WASH and health, local economy, and livelihoods are still in a vulnerable condition similar to the pre-Aila period. The overall result of the diagnostic analysis strongly reveals the shortcomings of the attempt to include vulnerability reduction within the post-Aila recovery programs. Thus the finding implicitly states that the community in Koyra is still living in an underlying vulnerability similar to the pre-Aila period despite the recovery effort.