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Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2/2014

01.06.2014 | Regular Paper

Achieving side-channel high-order correlation immunity with leakage squeezing

verfasst von: Claude Carlet, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Houssem Maghrebi, Emmanuel Prouff

Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering | Ausgabe 2/2014

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Abstract

This article deeply analyzes high-order (HO) Boolean masking countermeasures against side-channel attacks in contexts where the shares are manipulated simultaneously and the correlation coefficient is used as a statistical distinguisher. The latter attacks are sometimes referred to as zero-offset high-order correlation power analysis (HO-CPA). In particular, the main focus is to get the most out of a single mask (i.e., for masking schemes with two shares). The relationship between the leakage characteristics and the attack efficiency is thoroughly studied. Our main contribution is to link the minimum attack order (called HO-CPA immunity) to the amount of information leaked. Interestingly, the HO-CPA immunity can be much larger than the number of shares in the masking scheme. This is made possible by the leakage squeezing. It is a variant of the Boolean masking where masks are recoded relevantly by bijections. This technique and others from the state-of-the-art (namely leak-free masking and wire-tap codes) are overviewed, and put in perspective.
Vorheriger Artikel Efficient binary polynomial multiplication based on optimized Karatsuba reconstruction
Nächster Artikel Scaling efficient code-based cryptosystems for embedded platforms

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Fußnoten
1
In the context of polynomials in variables \(L_0, \ldots , L_d\) over the field \(\mathbb {K}\) (e.g., \(\mathbb {K}=\mathbb {R}\)), our definition of multivariate degree coincides with the “usual” degree of polynomials in the algebra \(\mathbb {K}[L_0, \ldots , L_d]/(\prod _{i=0}^d L_i^2-L_i)\), also called sometimes the algebraic degree.
 
2
A similar result had already been derived by Le and Berthier in [30], based on a development of the Kullback–Leibler divergence (alike Lemma 3) at order \(4\) obtained also by Cardoso in an earlier work of his [9]. Our result, given in Eq. (6), can be seen as a generalization at any order.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Achieving side-channel high-order correlation immunity with leakage squeezing
verfasst von
Claude Carlet
Jean-Luc Danger
Sylvain Guilley
Houssem Maghrebi
Emmanuel Prouff
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2014
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering / Ausgabe 2/2014
Print ISSN: 2190-8508
Elektronische ISSN: 2190-8516
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-013-0067-1

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