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Economics of Governance
Erschienen in: Economics of Governance 3-4/2022

27.08.2022 | Original Paper

An artefactual field experiment of group discrimination between sports fans

verfasst von: Craig A. Depken II, Adam J. Hoffer, Abdul H. Kidwai

Erschienen in: Economics of Governance | Ausgabe 3-4/2022

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Abstract

This paper describes the outcome of an artefactual field experiment of group discrimination using sports fans. The behavior of individuals whose identity is deeply tied to a larger group or popular institution is politically important, particularly when it comes to crafting public policy. Sports fans provide a unique opportunity to study individuals who openly identify their in-group and rival groups. The study identifies within-subject group-based discrimination by quantifying the difference in dictator game takes (out of a possible $10) between fans of an individual’s self-professed team and fans of an individual’s self-professed rival. Fifty-two sports fans each participated in nine separate power-to-take dictator games with group identification spanning three levels (NCAA Division III, NCAA Division I, and professional) of football fandom. The results suggest that individuals discriminate between in-group and out-group members. The average takings ratio with same-team fans is 0.657 while the average takings ratio with other-team fans is 0.848 and the difference of 0.190 is statistically different from zero. We discuss the results in the context of team and league governance focusing on fan interactions.
Vorheriger Artikel State politics and gender diversity in sport governance

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Fußnoten
10
While public press reports about this mitigation effort were initially positive, empirical analysis by Di Domizio and Caruso (2014) suggest that the fidelity cards did not have a noticeable impact on in-stadium attendance.
 
11
The authors ran a second study with 37 dictator-game “givers,” but the authors did not include sports identity in the second study.
 
12
The framing of giving and taking does not seem to matter if the recipient is a charity instead of another person (Grossman and Eckel 2015).
 
13
Because of the experiment design, the ultimatum game required Mills et al (2018) to use a small amount of deception. Instead of being matched with another real game player, the researchers matched participants (unbeknownst to the participants) with a virtual player whose responses were randomized.
 
14
We select these teams for geographical reasons. The experiment was run in La Crosse, Wisconsin, whose students are primarily from the region. The two Division III teams are chosen because of their long-standing rivalry. The two Football Bowl Series teams were chosen because Wisconsin is the flagship university of the University of Wisconsin system and is a member of the Big 10 conference; The Ohio State University, also a member of the Big 10 conference, was chosen because the two teams have played 84 times from 1913 through 2021 with Ohio State having a decisive edge in victories. However, the game has become a focus of Wisconsin fans in the past few decades. The three NFL teams are chosen because the Green Bay Packers are located in Wisconsin and have had long rivalries with the Minnesota Vikings but especially with the Chicago Bears.
 
15
There is evidence that women are more generous than men in a power-to-take game (Chowdhury et al. 2017), economics majors keep more of the money for themselves and have a more positive attitude towards greed (Wang et al. 2011), and that political preferences (such as support for government spending and redistribution) are correlated with generosity in the dictator game (Dawes et al. 2012).
 
16
A take frame is well suited for our study because it enhances the ‘rivalry’ aspect between the fans of different teams. In addition, unlike an experiment where the dictator and recipient are both present in the lab, we only had dictators in the lab. A potential concern for making every subject the dictator is that the subjects may believe that the experimenter may not transfer the amount to the recipient to save money. To mitigate this concern, we explicitly state in the instructions that “… Person B, who will be paid in cash, after the conclusion of the experiment.” Moreover, if subjects believed that Person B is hypothetical, then they would not have left any money for Person B, and always take $10 for themselves. Only 11 of the 52 subjects took $10 from both their most favored and most rival team. Note that taking $10 coincides with own-payoff maximizing behavior, so this figure captures the upper bound of distrust regarding non-payment to Person B.
 
17
Of the 52 subjects who participated, 23 first took from an in-group and then an out-group member while the remaining 29 first took from an out-group and then an in-group member.
 
18
We present an exploratory analysis of these additional decisions in the Results section.
 
19
With a sample size of 52 subjects and the critical value of 0.05 for alpha (α), the results have the requisite power (1- β) of 0.8 to detect a medium effect size (Cohen’s d >  = 0.4) for a two-sided test of difference in means.
 
20
As a robustness check to compare our sample of participants to the general student body, we surveyed 74 random students (outside the lab, in-person, on-campus, between classes) and asked a single question related to their fanness of UWL. The results showed that our subject pool were significantly greater fans of UWL football than the sample of non-participants in the student body.
 
21
The difference-in-difference estimates are available upon request.
 
22
Note that the positive coefficient for Professional Fan—Division I Fan (A-B) is the result of a double negative. The difference between UW-Madison Fan and OSU Fan takes is -1.54 and the difference between Packers Fan and Vikings Fan takes is -1.23, for a difference of 0.41, with greater discrimination occuring between college fans.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
An artefactual field experiment of group discrimination between sports fans
verfasst von
Craig A. Depken II
Adam J. Hoffer
Abdul H. Kidwai
Publikationsdatum
27.08.2022
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Economics of Governance / Ausgabe 3-4/2022
Print ISSN: 1435-6104
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-8131
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-022-00278-x

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