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Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2021

05.01.2021 | Original Paper

An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule

verfasst von: Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 4/2021

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Abstract

Despite being a well-studied decision rule, the Slater rule has not been analyzed axiomatically. In this paper, we show that it is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, tournamental, tie-breaking, and gradual. Thereby we provide a characterization of it for the first time. We also show these axioms to be logically independent.

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Fußnoten
1
See Kemeny (1959) and Can and Storcken (2018).
 
2
Copeland (1951).
 
3
The rule introduced in Miller (1980) takes all linear extensions of the cover relation. Here at a profile p an alternative a covers alternative b,  if for all alternatives x we have that b beats x in pairwise comparison at p implies that a beats x in pairwise comparison.
 
4
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show the equivalence of strategy proofness and strong positive association hence making the connection to the impossibility results of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). Brandt et al. (2016) also introduces a monotonicity condition for tournaments only. We provide a detailed comparison between this condition and our framework in the Appendix.
 
5
We take linear orders to be irreflexive without theoretical consequences in our approach. It has however notational advantage here as now linear orders are partial tournaments.
 
6
For every two distinct alternatives a and b we can partition \({\mathbb {T}}\) in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\), \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}=\) \(\mathbb { \ T\backslash (T}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}).\) Note that complete tournaments are in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and that \( {\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}\) consists of the incomplete tournaments at which a and b are incomparable. Every elementary change from ab to ba or from ba to ab is now a connecting relation (edge) between an element in \( {\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and one in \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}.\) Further, an elementary change from xy to yx does not effect the preference between a and b in case \(\{x,y\}\ne \{a,b\}.\) Call an elementary change between a and b if it is either from ab to ba or from ba to ab. So, a path of elementary changes with an odd number of changes between a and b starting in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \( {\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) ends in \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}.\) As \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}\) consists of incomplete tournaments and both R an \(R^{\prime }\) are complete it follows that on every path of elementary changes from R to \( R^{\prime }\) there is an even number of elementary changes between a and b. As this holds for every two distinct alternatives it follows that such a path is of even length.
 
7
For instance, it is possible to deduce the same results as presented here with only marginal changes based on a condition like \(\varphi \) is gradual if for all pairs of profiles (pq) forming an elementary change from ab to ba in \({\mathbb {L}}^{N}\) there are non-negative integers k such that
$$\begin{aligned} \varphi (k\cdot p+q)\cap \varphi (p)\ne \emptyset . \end{aligned}$$
Meaning that if at such an elementary change the sets of outcomes \(\varphi (p)\) and \(\varphi (q)\) are disjoint then graduality imposes that for some (large) replica \(k\cdot p\) of p the influence of q is limited. Meaning that the outcome at \(k\cdot p+q\) has something in common with the outcome at p. This condition is related to Young’s continuity condition for scoring rules. See Young (1975).
 
8
This resembles the Fishburn’s C2 condition for choice correspondences.
 
9
See footnote 5 in Baigent and Klamler (2003), which attributes the clarification of the issue to Hannu Nurmi.
 
10
Instead of representing \(\succ \) by an additive weight function \(\omega \) as above one may choose \(\succ \) such that
(a)
\(R^{1}\succ R^{2}\) for all \(R^{1},R^{2}\in {\mathbb {A}}\), with \( R^{2}\varsubsetneq R^{1}.\)
 
(b)
\(R^{1}\succ R^{2}\) for all \(R^{1},R^{2}\in {\mathbb {A}}\), with \( R^{1}\backslash \{xy\}\succ R^{2}\backslash \{xy\}\) for some \(xy\in R^{1}\cap R^{2}.\)
Here \({\widehat{T}}_{p}\) being the best means that \({\widehat{T}}_{p}\) is that tournament in \({\mathbb {A}}\) contained in \(T_{p}\) such that \({\widehat{T}} _{p}\succ \) T,  for all \(T\in {\mathbb {A}}\backslash \{{\widehat{T}}_{p}\}\) and \(T\subseteq T_{p}\).
 
 
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Metadaten
Titel
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
verfasst von
Burak Can
Mohsen Pourpouneh
Ton Storcken
Publikationsdatum
05.01.2021
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 4/2021
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01305-8

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