Auction-Based Pricing Schemes for Distributed Partner Selection in Cooperative Wireless Networks

In autonomous wireless networks, distributed and efficient partner selection is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications. However, the selfish nodes in the networks bring catastrophe for partner selection when implementing cooperative transmissions. In order to stimulate cooperation and achieve distributed partner selection for such systems, an auction-based pricing scheme that considering efficiency and fairness is proposed in this paper. Two most prevalent auction forms, i.e., the second-price auction and the first-price auction, are both considered and analyzed in the single- and multiple-relay networks. In the single-relay scenario, the Nash equilibrium strategy for each auction is characterized, based on which the expected payoff and revenue for the source and relay are derived, respectively. Conclusions show that the same expected payoff is charged for the source with different auction schemes, and so is the expected revenue for the relay. Nonetheless, things are different in the multi-relay networks. With the linear 0–1 integer programming models, it is concluded that the first-price auction is more efficient than the second-price auction. Numerical results and analysis present that the proposed auction scheme efficiently solve the noncooperation issues of selfish nodes in autonomous wireless networks.