Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
MTZ-Fachkongress

Antriebe und Energiesysteme von morgen


Austausch von Automobil- und Energiewirtschaft

Am 14./15. Mai geht es in Chemnitz um die Mobilitätswende durch Elektro- und Wasserstofffahrzeuge.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
Buchtitelbild

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Blind Spots, Biased Attention, and the Politics of Non-coordination

verfasst von : Tobias Bach, Kai Wegrich

Erschienen in: The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non-Coordination

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Bach and Wegrich introduce the key theme of the volume, which revolves around understanding how routine processes of decision-making in public sector organizations potentially lead to problematic outcomes in terms of coordination and problem solving. Instead of viewing those outcomes as the result of organizational or individual pathologies, the chapter traces the origins of non-coordination within and between organizations to intentionally rational organizational behaviour. Conceptualizing blind spots as part of a larger universe of biases in organizational attention, based on established theoretical notions of bounded rationality and institutionalized organizations, the authors show how different types of attention biases provide novel insights into seemingly irrational or uncoordinated administrative behaviour.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Nächstes Kapitel Accounting for Blind Spots
Fußnoten
1
The study by Hartlapp et al. (2013) uses the theoretical language of ‘bureaucratic politics’ yet in essence tells a story of selective perception that is biased towards the problem views and solutions of the unit in charge and patterns of negative coordination as elaborated by Scharpf (1994).
 
2
Hood (1998) uses both ‘blind spots’ (p. 18) and ‘Achilles’ Heel or characteristic path of collapse’ (p. 27) when referring to those inherent weaknesses of different models of organization in public management.
 
3
Another mechanism discussed by Fligstein et al. (2017) is organizational conditions that promote ‘positive asymmetries’, or the idea that actors in specific social settings bias information towards best-case scenarios.
 
Literatur
Adolph, C. (2013). Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics: The myth of neutrality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Allison, G. T. (1997). Public and private management: Are they fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects? (1980). In J. M. Shafritz & A. C. Hyde (Eds.), Classics of public administration (4th ed., pp. 383–400). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Allison, G. T., & Halperin, M. H. (1972). Bureaucratic politics: A paradigm and some policy implications. World Politics, 24, 40–79.CrossRef
Bach, T., De Francesco, F., Maggetti, M., & Ruffing, E. (2016). Transnational bureaucratic politics: An institutional rivalry perspective on EU network governance. Public Administration, 94(1), 9–24.CrossRef
Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (2016). Regulatory reform, accountability and blame in public service delivery: The public transport crisis in Berlin. In T. Christensen & P. Lægreid (Eds.), The Routledge handbook to accountability and welfare state reforms in Europe (pp. 223–235). London: Routledge.
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. International Organization, 53(4), 699–732.CrossRef
Boin, A., & Christensen, T. (2008). The development of public institutions: Reconsidering the role of leadership. Administration & Society, 40(3), 271–297.CrossRef
Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010). The coordination of public sector organizations: Shifting patterns of public management. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef
Bovens, M., & ’t Hart, P. (2016). Revisiting the study of policy failures. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 653–666.CrossRef
Brunsson, N., & Olsen, J. P. (1993). The reforming organization. London: Routledge.
Busuioc, E. M. (2016). Friend or fore? Inter-agency cooperation, organizational reputation, and turf. Public Administration, 94(1), 40–56.CrossRef
Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power: Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carpenter, D. P., & Krause, G. A. (2012). Reputation and public administration. Public Administration Review, 72(1), 26–32.CrossRef
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Dearborn, D. C., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Selective perception: A note on the departmental identifications of executives. Sociometry, 21(2), 140–144.CrossRef
Dunleavy, P. (1991). Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: Economic explanations in political science. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Egeberg, M. (2012). How bureaucratic structure matters: An organizational perspective. In J. Pierre & B. G. Peters (Eds.), The Sage handbook of public administration (2nd ed., pp. 157–167). Los Angeles: Sage.CrossRef
Fligstein, N., Stuart Brundage, J., & Schultz, M. (2017). Seeing like the Fed: Culture, cognition, and framing in the failure to anticipate the financial crisis of 2008. American Sociological Review, 82(5), 879–909.CrossRef
Gieve, J., & Provost, C. (2012). Ideas and coordination in policymaking: The financial crisis of 2007–2009. Governance, 25(1), 61–77.CrossRef
Gilad, S. (2012). Attention and reputation: Linking regulators’ internal and external worlds. In M. Lodge & K. Wegrich (Eds.), Executive politics in times of crisis (pp. 157–175). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef
Gilad, S. (2015). Political pressures, organizational identity, and attention to tasks: Illustrations from pre-crisis financial regulation. Public Administration, 93(3), 593–608.CrossRef
Goodsell, C. T. (1985). The case for bureaucracy: A public administration polemic (2nd ed.). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Gulick, L. (1937). Notes on the theory of organization. In L. Gulick & L. Urwick (Eds.), Papers on the science of administration (pp. 2–45). New York: Institute of Public Administration.
Hammond, T. H. (1990). In defence of Luther Gulick’s notes on the theory of organization. Public Administration, 68(2), 143–173.CrossRef
Hammond, T. H. (2007). Why is the intelligence community so difficult to redesign? Smart practices, conflicting goals, and the creation of purpose-based organizations. Governance, 20(3), 401–422.CrossRef
’t Hart, P., & Wille, A. (2012). Bureaucratic politics: Opening the black box of executive government. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), The Sage handbook of public administration (pp. 369–378). Los Angeles: Sage.CrossRef
Hartlapp, M., Metz, J., & Rauh, C. (2013). Linking agenda setting to coordination structures: Bureaucratic politics inside the European Commission. Journal of European Integration, 35(4), 425–441.CrossRef
Heims, E. M. (2017). Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: A cross-sector comparison. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(8), 1116–1134.CrossRef
Hinterleitner, M., & Sager, F. (2016). Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: Of foxes and lions. European Political Science Review, 9, 1–20.
Hood, C. (1974). Administrative diseases: Some types of dysfunctionality in administration. Public Administration, 52(4), 439–454.CrossRef
Hood, C. (1998). The art of the state: Culture, rhetoric, and public management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hood, C. (2011). The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Janis, I. L. (1989). Crucial decisions: Leadership in policymaking and crisis management. New York: Free Press.
Jones, B. D. (2017). Behavioral rationality as a foundation for public policy studies. Cognitive Systems Research, 43, 63–75.CrossRef
Koop, C., & Lodge, M. (2014). Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(9), 1311–1329.CrossRef
Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (2014). Fiscal consolidation in Germany: Drifting away from the politics of the switching yard? In C. Hood, D. Heald, & R. Himaz (Eds.), When the party’s over: The politics of fiscal squeeze in perspective (pp. 161–183). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maor, M. (2015). Theorizing bureaucratic reputation. In A. Wæraas & M. Maor (Eds.), Organizational reputation in the public sector (pp. 17–36). New York: Routledge.
Maor, M., Gilad, S., & Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2013). Organizational reputation, regulatory talk, and strategic silence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 581–608.CrossRef
Mayntz, R. (2003). New challenges to governance theory. In H. Bang (Ed.), Governance as social and political communication (pp. 27–40). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Meier, K. J. (2010). Governance, structure, and democracy: Luther Gulick and the future of public administration. Public Administration Review, 70, S284–S291.CrossRef
Merton, R. K. (1940). Bureaucratic structure and personality. Social Forces, 18(4), 560–568.CrossRef
Metcalfe, L. (1994). International policy co-ordination and public management reform. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 60(2), 271–290.CrossRef
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 commission report: Final report. New York: Norton.
Parker, C. F., & Stern, E. K. (2002). Blindsided? September 11 and the origins of strategic surprise. Political Psychology, 23(3), 601–630.CrossRef
Pidgeon, N., & O’Leary, M. (2000). Man-made disasters: Why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Science, 34(1), 15–30.CrossRef
Roberts, A. (2010). The logic of discipline: Global capitalism and the architecture of government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Scharpf, F. W. (1994). Games real actors could play: Positive and negative coordination in embedded negotiations. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(1), 27–53.CrossRef
Seibel, W. (2014). Kausale Mechanismen des Behördenversagens: Eine Prozessanalyse des Fahndungsfehlschlags bei der Aufklärung der NSU-Morde. der moderne staat, (2014/02), 375–413.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. New York: Harper & Row.
Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations. New York: Macmillan.
Simon, H. A. (1964). On the concept of organizational goal. Administrative Science Quarterly, 9(1), 1–22.CrossRef
Vestlund, N. M. (2015). Changing policy focus through organizational reform? The case of the pharmaceutical unit in the European Commission. Public Policy and Administration, 30(1), 92–112.CrossRef
Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371–398.CrossRef
Wegrich, K., & Štimac, V. (2014). Coordination capacity. In M. Lodge & K. Wegrich (Eds.), The problem-solving capacity of the modern state (pp. 41–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilensky, H. L. (1967). Organizational intelligence: Knowledge and policy in government and industry. New York: Basic Books.
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books.
Metadaten
Titel
Blind Spots, Biased Attention, and the Politics of Non-coordination
verfasst von
Tobias Bach
Kai Wegrich
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Verlag
Springer International Publishing
Buch
The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non-Coordination

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-76671-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-76672-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_1

Premium Partner

    Bildnachweise