Skip to main content

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution

verfasst von : Shruti Rajagopalan

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This chapter conceptualizes computer code as constitutional rules and constraints governing blockchain technology. The Bitcoin protocol is essentially a set of rules written in computer code, governing what is, and what is not, allowed by the participants in the Bitcoin network. In this sense, it is like a constitution. No single participant can change the rules, but new rules (in the form of upgrades to the open-source software) can be advanced by different participants. The key to understanding Bitcoin’s rules is to understand consensus at all levels. In this context, Buchanan’s scholarship analyzing constitutional choice is extremely relevant to blockchain technology in general, and Bitcoin in particular.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
Double-spending is the act of using the same digital currency for more than one transaction.
 
3
Every public key is 256 bits long and the resulting hash from the public key is 160 bits long. The public key is used to indicate the ownership of an address to receive funds. A private key is a randomly generated string (numbers and letters), allowing bitcoins to be spent. A private key is always mathematically related to public key or the wallet address, but only known to the owner and not required to be shared for transactions. The public key is mathematically derived from the corresponding private key, but the beauty and benefit of cryptography is that it would be nearly impossible to use the public key to derive the private key, requiring about a trillion years for a supercomputer to crack the reverse mathematics solution.
 
4
A similar argument has been made for cyberspace and other technologies by Lessig (1999). Lawrence Lessig famously described the code that regulates cyberspace as law, in that this code, or architecture, sets the terms on which life in cyberspace is experienced. If code is the law that regulates behavior or the individual participants, then the changes in code also lead to changes in the behavior of the participants.
 
5
This is only an estimate. No one knows how many nodes there in the Bitcoin network since all are not reachable. Some website like https://​bitnodes.​earn.​com update the number of reachable nodes frequently.
 
6
At this point it is important to understand the difference between nodes and miners. Full nodes are the computers have a complete record of the blockchain and verify all the transactions in the system and enforce consensus rules using Bitcoin Core. There are also nodes that are not full nodes, which only have a small portion of the blockchain and are mainly used to transact and can be used to connect with full nodes for transactions. Miners are full nodes, but in addition to maintaining the complete blockchain, they also perform proof-of-work to mine new Bitcoin.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014). Mastering Bitcoin. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media. Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014). Mastering Bitcoin. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media.
Zurück zum Zitat Böhme, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B., & Moore, T. (2015). Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2), 213–238.CrossRef Böhme, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B., & Moore, T. (2015). Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2), 213–238.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1962). Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions. In L. Yeager (Ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution (pp. 155–183). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Buchanan, J. M. (1962). Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions. In L. Yeager (Ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution (pp. 155–183). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1990). The Domain of Constitutional Economics. Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), 1–18.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1990). The Domain of Constitutional Economics. Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), 1–18.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M., & Faith, R. L. (1981). Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities. The Journal of Law and Economics, 24(1), 95–111.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M., & Faith, R. L. (1981). Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities. The Journal of Law and Economics, 24(1), 95–111.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2018). Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Institutional Economics, 14(4), 639–658.CrossRef Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2018). Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Institutional Economics, 14(4), 639–658.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lessig, L. (1999). Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books. Lessig, L. (1999). Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books.
Zurück zum Zitat Nair, M., & Sutter, D. (2018). The Blockchain and Increasing Cooperative Efficacy. Independent Review, 22(4), 529–550. Nair, M., & Sutter, D. (2018). The Blockchain and Increasing Cooperative Efficacy. Independent Review, 22(4), 529–550.
Zurück zum Zitat Popper, N. (2016, January 14). A Bitcoin Believer’s Crisis of Faith. The New York Times. Popper, N. (2016, January 14). A Bitcoin Believer’s Crisis of Faith. The New York Times.
Zurück zum Zitat Swanson, T. (2014). Great Chain of Numbers. A Guide to Smart Contracts, Smart Property, and Trustless Asset Management. Mountain View, CA: Creative Commons. Swanson, T. (2014). Great Chain of Numbers. A Guide to Smart Contracts, Smart Property, and Trustless Asset Management. Mountain View, CA: Creative Commons.
Metadaten
Titel
Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution
verfasst von
Shruti Rajagopalan
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_17