4.1 Perceived quality and prices.
Of initial interest is how perceived quality, a
im, affects prices, p
im
, and profits, π
im
. In this section, firms compete by first simultaneously deciding how much to invest in quality perceptions a
im
. Conditional on these choices, firms next simultaneously set prices. For now, firms can increase perceived quality at no cost. Thus, the fixed cost K
im
is initially zero. Later this restriction will be lifted.
The profit function for brand
i in market
m is
\(\pi _{im}=\left( p_{im}-c_{im}\right) \cdot s_{im}-K_{im}.\) Given the sequence of decisions, prices are solved first. Caplin and Nalebuff (
1991) have shown that a unique Bertrand–Nash equilibrium in prices exists for the demand system in Eq.
3. The first-order condition (f.o.c.) for firm
i is equal to
$$ \frac{d\pi _{im}}{dp_{im}}=\left( p_{im}-c_{im}\right) \cdot s_{im}^{\prime }+s_{im}=0, $$
(4)
and from this, the implicit equation for the prices of interest is
$$ p_{im}^{\ast }-c_{im}=\frac{\mu }{1-s_{im}},\text{ }i=1,2. \label{pim_star} $$
(5)
The price equations are implicit because the right-hand side of the expression for the markup contains prices
p
im
, and perceived quality
a
im
(through
s
im
). Using the last equation to solve for
s
im
and substituting in the profit function gives that at optimal prices
$$ \pi _{im}^{\ast }=p_{im}^{\ast }-c_{im}-\mu -K_{im}. \label{pi_star} $$
(6)
Define the local perceived quality gap as
a
m
≡
a
1m
−
a
2m
. Two useful dependencies of local prices and – in view of Eq.
6 – of profits on this quality gap are:
Thus, the price for either brand increases as its perceived quality advantage over the other brand widens. However, neither brand will adjust its price in equal measure to improvements in perceived quality. Consumers get at least part of the utility stemming from the perceived quality improvement. For a related result, see Anderson et al. (
1992), and Anderson and de Palma (
2001).
The next proposition considers the comparative statics in the second-stage of the game to provide intuition for the effects of the vertical attribute on pricing and profits, and provides the basis for the main results in the paper.
Namely, first, as the perceived quality gap between two brands widens, the marginal effect of
a
m
on prices and profits increases.
3 Proposition 2 therefore implies that low perceived quality brands are less impacted by an increase in perceived quality, than high perceived quality brands are impacted by a comparative decrease. As a consequence, the latter is willing to pay more for sustaining a perceived quality gap than the former is willing to pay for closing it, thus providing an important motivation for why asymmetries may emerge in the market.
Second, in the case of multiple markets, firms can set a
im
in each market. By Jensen’s inequality, the convexity result then implies that two firms, competing on M markets, would prefer to have a distribution of market-specific quality gaps a
m
over an average vertical positioning difference of \(\bar{a}=\frac{1}{M}\sum a_{m}\) in each market.
Before showing that these two arguments can produce stable market outcomes, it is useful to formalize and discuss the interaction of horizontal differentiation μ and vertical differentiation a
m
= a
1m
− a
2m
in the model I consider.
To illustrate this proposition, consider two extreme cases. First, for μ very small (limiting to 0), the leading firm will price its quality advantage almost completely to the market and still capture all demand. Thus, \(\dfrac{d\pi _{im}}{da_{im}}\) approaches 1 for this firm. For the firm that has the lower perceived quality and zero demand, increasing its quality has no consequence (the quality leader would just drop its price and still get all demand), i.e., \(\dfrac{d\pi _{im}}{ da_{im}}\) approaches 0 for the firm that lags in quality. Thus, when products are similar, the lagging firm has no incentive to invest in quality, whereas the leading firm has a positive pay-off to investments in quality.
Second, for μ > 0, there are customers to whom the lower quality product is preferred because it is closer to their ideal points. The perceived quality leader now sets prices taking into account not only the perceived quality advantage but also the adverse quantity effect of pricing too high. The marginal effect of a quality improvement on prices and profits is therefore less than 1. For the lagging firm, the effect of a quality improvement is no longer 0 but positive. I subsequently show (in Proposition 5 below) that in the limit, as μ→ ∞ , the marginal effect of a quality improvement on profits becomes equal for both the leading and the lagging firm and has value 1/3.
Combining these cases, Proposition 3 implies that as μ increases from 0 to infinity, the marginal effect of perceived quality improvements by the high quality provider on profits continuously decreases from 1 to 1/3 in the case of the higher quality brand and increases from 0 to 1/3 in the case of the lower quality brand.
In sum, when there is little horizontal differentiation, the incentives to maintain/dissolve differences in perceived quality are very different for the high vs. the low quality firm. In contrast, if there is sufficient horizontal differentiation, then the player with the high perceived quality has the same incentive to maintain the quality gap as the low perceived quality player has to close it. It is this contingency that makes that asymmetries in quality choices depend on the existing degree of horizontal product differentiation.
4.2 The case of a single market and free quality improvements
Before showing the existence of asymmetric equilibria and their dependence on μ, I first present the results of a benchmark case against which to compare other results later. In this benchmark case, firms compete in a single market and fixed cost is zero (K = 0). In this case, firms will end up positioning symmetrically at the highest possible quality level (say a
H
).
That is to say, given Proposition 1, both brands choose to set perceived quality as high as possible. As a consequence, both brands set equal prices and have equal market shares. The role of
μ in this case is that, as expected, profits and prices rise in the degree of horizontal differentiation.
4 In other words, if horizontal differentiation is effectively absent, price competition will drive margins to zero.
I now consider how the above result can be avoided as a function of several realities of brand competition in packaged goods industries: (i) absence of strong horizontal differentiation, (ii) quality perceptions are costly to obtain and are borne as fixed cost, (iii) firms meet in multiple geographic markets and may have a first mover advantage in all or part of these markets.