nach oben

Erschienen in:

2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Business Ecosystems and Platform Firms: Theoretical Perspective and Analytical Framework

verfasst von : Prof. Hirofumi Tatsumoto

Erschienen in: Platform Strategy for Global Markets

Verlag: Springer Singapore

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This chapter reviews studies on the competitive strategies of platform firms and presents the fundamental proposition of this book.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Open Standards and Rise of New Competition: Why Do Open Standards Generate New Patterns of Competition?

Nächstes Kapitel Strategic Standardization and Global Ecosystem: GSM Mobile Phone Diffusion in China

Iansiti and Levien (2004a), who formulated the notion of business ecosystem, borrowed the concept of ecosystems from the science of ecology, as an analogy to industrial structures. They also referred to the special species known as keystone species. The discovery of keystone species dates back to Paine (1966). He partitioned an inshore area into smaller areas and observed what would happen to the other species if a certain species living in each of the areas were removed. His findings confirmed the presence of critically important species, for which he coined the term keystone species.

In the field of social network analysis, betweenness centrality is an indicator that represents the information betweenness function of a node; nodes are the vertices that form a network. A hub can be described as one of the nodes with the highest information betweenness.

The fact that open standardization is a way to artificially produce network effects is extremely important from a strategic point of view. Traditional studies on platform strategy contained a chicken-and-egg argument regarding the generation of network effects and the effectiveness of the platform strategy. On the contrary, the three patterns of open standardization outlined in Chap. 1 allow network effects to be generated strategically in any target area of transaction networks. In this way, the chicken-and-egg argument can be avoided. Open standardization drastically improves the effectiveness of the platform strategy.

The pricing conditions that maximize the sum of the profits from the two markets can be calculated as follows, based on Maruyama (2011):

When U_j and U_c are the per-capita user benefits in Markets J and C, respectively:

$$ \begin{aligned} U_{j} = \theta_{j} n_{c} - p_{j} \hfill \\ U_{c} = \theta_{c} n_{j} - p_{c} \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$

where n_j and n_c are the numbers of users in Markets J and C, respectively, θ_j and $ \theta_{c} $ represent the per-capita indirect network effect from the other market and p_j and p_c are the prices (platform usage fees) that the platform firm imposes on Markets J and C, respectively.

U_j becomes larger when the indirect network effect, $ \theta_{j} n_{c} $ becomes larg. er, and it becomes smaller when the platform price, p_j, becomes higher. It must be noted that the indirect network effect, $ \theta_{j} n_{c} $ becomes larg. er as the number of users in the other market (Market C, in this case) grows. The revenue that the platform firm gains, $ {\Pi } $ would be described as follows:

$$ {\Pi } = n_{j} \left( {p_{j} - c_{j} } \right) + n_{c} \left( {p_{c} - c_{c} } \right) $$

where c_j and c_c are the costs per user.

Therefore, n₁, n₂, p_j and p_c can be expressed as a function of U_j and U_c:

$$ \begin{aligned} n_{j} &= f(U_{j}), \quad p_{j} = \theta_{j} n_{c} - U_{j} \\ n_{c} &=g(U_{c}), \quad \theta_{c} n_{j} - U_{c} \end{aligned} $$

When substituting p_j an. d p_c in the equation for $ {\Pi } $.

$$ {\Pi } = n_{j} \left( {\theta_{j} n_{c} - U_{j} - c_{j} } \right) + n_{c} \left( {\theta_{c} n_{j} - U_{c} - C_{c} } \right) $$

The first-order condition for maximum revenues is derived as:

$$ \begin{aligned} \frac{{\delta {\Pi }}}{{\delta U_{j} }} = \left( {p_{j} - c_{c} } \right)f^{\prime}\left( {U_{j} } \right) - n_{j} + \theta_{c} n_{c} f^{\prime}\left( {U_{j} } \right) = 0 \hfill \\ \frac{{\delta {\Pi }}}{{\delta U_{c} }} = \left( {p_{j} - c_{j} } \right)f^{\prime}\left( {U_{c} } \right) - n_{c} + \theta_{j} n_{j} f^{\prime}\left( {U_{c} } \right) = 0, \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$

and the solutions to p_j and p_c are obtained as:

$$ p_{j} = c_{j} - \theta_{c} n_{c} + \frac{{f\left( {U_{j} } \right)}}{{f'\left( {U_{j} } \right)}} $$

(a1)

$$ p_{c} = c_{c} - \theta_{j} n_{j} + \frac{{f\left( {U_{c} } \right)}}{{f'\left( {U_{c} } \right)}} $$

(a2)

Based on Eqs. (a1) and (a2), the basic rules for. pricing that maximizes total revenues from the two markets are summarized as follows:

(i)

Offer users discount prices in the market under larger indirect network effects. For example, the price offered to users in Market J, P_j, may be described as Eq. (b):

$$ \begin{aligned} P_{j} & = C_{j} + \theta_{c} n_{c} + \frac{{f\left( {U_{j} } \right)}}{{f^{\prime}\left( {U_{j} } \right)}} \\ & = C_{j} + \theta_{c} n_{j} \frac{{n_{c} }}{{n_{j} }} + \frac{{f\left( {U_{j} } \right)}}{{f^{\prime}\left( {U_{j} } \right)}} \\ \end{aligned} $$

(b)

The second term of this equation, $ \theta_{c} n_{j} $, is the indirect network effect per user of Market J on Market C, while $ \theta_{c} n_{j} n_{c} $ represents the total indirect network effect of Market J on Market C. When $ \theta_{c} n_{j} n_{c} $ is divided by n_j, the resulting $ \theta_{c} n_{c} $ represents the indirect network effect on each user in Market J. In Eq. (b), the price for Market J, P_j, is lowered by $ \theta_{c} n_{c} $. This means that the users of a market that has a larger indirect network effect will enjoy discount prices.

(ii)

Set low prices in a market that has a user expansion effect.

The third term of Eq. (b) is

$$ \frac{{f\left( {U_{j} } \right)}}{{f^{\prime}\left( {U_{j} } \right)}} = \frac{{n_{j} }}{{\Delta n_{j} }} $$

or the inverse of the delta in the number of users in Market J (expansion rate); so the price, Pj, becomes smaller when the user expansion rate is large, and vice versa.

The monopolized revenue of the existing firm when no new firm makes an entry is:

$$ R_{i|noentry} = x\left( {1 - \frac{{x^{2} }}{2}} \right) $$

The monopolizing price can be obtained by solving the following equation using the first-order condition:

$$ - \frac{{3x^{2} }}{2} + 1 = 0 $$

$$ x = \sqrt {\frac{2}{3}}\,\,{ \fallingdotseq }\,\,0.80. $$

The monopolized revenue with this price would be $ R_{i|noentry} \,{ \fallingdotseq }\,0. 5 4 4 $.

If the new firm is to respond to P_b in such a way as to maximize its revenue, $ P_{e} = P_{e}^{*} $; the above equation R_i|entry can be rewritten as follows:

$$ R_{i|entry} = P_{b} \left( {\left( {1 - \left( {P_{b} - P_{e}^{*} } \right)} \right) - \frac{1}{2}P_{e}^{2} )} \right). $$

The maximizing condition is obtained based on the first-order differentiation of R_i|entry, as follows: $ P_{b} \;{ \fallingdotseq }\;0. 6 8 $. Thus, $ R_{i|entry} \;{ \fallingdotseq }\;0. 3 7 4 $.

Against this backdrop, emerging countries liberalized their markets in the 1990s and started entering the global economy (Hoskisson et al. 2000).

Some pioneering studies, such as Kokuryo (1995, 1999) and Negoro et al. (2011), regarded platform business as an industrial structure issue. These, however, covered network businesses only and did not touch upon the issue of global competitiveness.

Research on open standards in Japan is seen as being part of architecture studies. When a system has an open standard, it means that the firms producing the modules of the system, if modularized, share information about the interfaces connecting such modules; the interface information is open. These studies on open standards have been carried out as studies on open interfaces.

Akamatsu K (1961) A theory of unbalanced growth in the world economy. Welwirtschafliches Archiv 86(2):196–217

Akamatsu K (1962) A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. Dev Econ 1:3–25CrossRef

Baldwin CY (2011) Bottleneck strategies for business ecosystems. Paper presented at the MIT Sloan School, MIT, Cambridge MA, 21 January 2011. http://www.people.hbs.edu/cbaldwin/. Accessed 1 Aug 2011

Baldwin CY, Clark KB (2000) Design rules: the power of modularity. MIT Press, Cambridge, MACrossRef

Brandenburger AM, Nalebuff BJ (1996) Co-opetition. Doubleday Business, New York

Buckley PJ, Casson M (1976) The future of the multinational enterprise. Macmillan, LondonCrossRef

Burt RS (1992) Structural holes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MACrossRef

Burt RS (1997) The contingent value of social capital. Adm Sci Q 42:339–365CrossRef

Chesbrough HW (2003) Open innovation. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA

Chesbrough HW (2006) Open business models: How to thrive in the new innovation landscape. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA

Chesbrough HW, Vanhaverbeke W, West J (2006) Open innovation: researching a new paradigm. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Cook KS, Emerson RM (1978) Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks. Am Sociol Rev 43:712–739CrossRef

Cusumano MA (1998) Microsoft secrets: How the world’s most powerful software company creates technology, shapes markets, and manages people. Free Press, New York

Cusumano MA (2004) The business of software: What every manager, programmer, and entrepreneur must know to thrive and survive in good times and bad. Free Press, New York

Cusumano MA (2010) Staying power: six enduring principles for managing strategy and innovation in an uncertain world. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Cusumano MA, Yoffie DB (1998) Competing on internet time: lessons from Netscape and its battle with Microsoft. Free Press, New York

ED Research (1998) Tokubetsu Riputo Nichi Kan Tai Shuyou Handoutai Koujou no Seizou Souti ’98 (Special report on semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese Foundry 1998). ED Research, Tokyo (in Japanese)

ED Research (2007) Tokubetsu Riputo Nichi Kan Tai Shuyou Handoutai Koujou no Seizou Souti 2007 (Special report on semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese Foundry 2007) ED Research, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Eisenmann T, Parker G, Van Alstyne M (2006) Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Bus Rev 84(10):92–101

Eisenmann T, Parker G, Van Alstyne M (2011) Platform envelopment. Strateg Manag J 32:1270–1285CrossRef

Evans DS, Hagiu A, Shmalensee R (2006) Invisible engines. MIT Press, Cambridge MACrossRef

Freeman LC (1977) A set of measures of centrality based upon betweenness. Sociometry 40:35–41CrossRef

Gawer A (2009) Platforms, markets and innovation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and MA, USACrossRef

Gawer A, Cusumano MA (2002) Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco drive industry innovation. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA

Gawer A, Henderson R (2007) Platform owner entry and innovation in complementary markets: evidence from Intel. J Econ Manag Strategy 16(1):1–34CrossRef

Global Net (2005) Sekai Handoutai Seizousouchi Shiken Kensa Souchi Shijou Nenkan 2005 (Yearbook of semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment in the global market 2005)

Global Net (2009) Sekai Handoutai Seizousouchi Shiken Kensa Souchi Shijou Nenkan 2009 (Yearbook of semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment in the global market 2009)

Granovetter MS (1973) The strength of weak ties. Am J Sociol 78(1):1360–1380CrossRef

Grove SA (1996) Only the paranoid survive: How to exploit the crisis points that challenge every company and career. Currency/Doubleday, New York

Hagiu A (2006) Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms. RAND J Econ 37(3):720–737CrossRef

Hagiu A, Yoffie DB (2009) What’s your Google strategy? Harvard Bus Rev 87(4):74–81

Harada S (2008) Kokusai hyoujunka Senryaku (Strategy for International Standardization). Denki University Press, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Henderson RM, Clark KB (1990) Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Adm Sci Q 35(1):9–30CrossRef

Hillebrand F (ed) (2001) GSM and UMTS: the creation of global mobile communication. Wiley Inc., Hoboken, NJ

Hoskisson RE, Eden L, Lau CM, Wright M (2000) Strategy in emerging economies. Acad Manag J 43(3):249–267CrossRef

Iansiti M, Levien R (2004a) The keystone advantage: what the new business ecosystems mean for strategy, innovation, and sustainability. Harvard Business School Press, Boston

Iansiti M, Levien R (2004b) Strategy as ecology. Harvard Bus Rev 82(3):68–78. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025570CrossRef

Imai K, Kawakami M (2007) Higashiajia no IT kikisangyou: Bungyou Kyousou Sumiwake no Dainamizumu (The IT equipment industry in East Asia: Dynamics of division of labor, competition and segregation). Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba (in Japanese)

Inoue T, Maki K, Nagayama S (2011) Bijinesu Ekosisutemu ni okeru Nitti no Koudou to Habu Kigyou no Senryaku – Kateiyou Gemu Gyoukai ni okeru Fukuganteki Bunseki (The behaviors of niche and hub firms in the business ecosystem: multifaceted analysis on consumer game industry). Organiz Sci 44(4):67–82 (in Japanese)

Kajiura M (2007) Kokusai Bijinesu to Gijutsu Hyojun (International business and technological standards). Bunshindo, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Katz ML, Shapiro C (1985) Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. Am Econ Rev 75(3):424–440

Katz ML, Shapiro C (1994) Systems competition and network effects. J Econ Perspect 8(2):93–115CrossRef

Kawakami M (2012) Ashuku sareta Sangyo Hatten: Taiwan Note Pasokon Kigyou no Seichou Mekanizumu (Accelerating growth mechanism of Taiwanese notebook computer industry). The University of Nagoya Press, Nagoya (in Japanese)

Kojima K (2004) Gankou Gata Keizai Hatten Ron: Nihon Keizai, Azia Keizai, Sekai Keizai (Wild geese theory of economic development: Japanese economy, Asian economy, and global economy), vol 1. Bunshindo, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Kokuryo J (1995) Open Network Keiei: Kigyou Senryaku no Shin Chouryuu (Open network management: New trend in business strategy). Nikkei Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese)

Kokuryo J (1999) Open Architecture Senryaku: Network Jidai no Kyoudou Moderu (Open architecture strategy: Collaboration models for network era). Nikkei Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese)

Lundvall B, Johnson B, Andersen ES, Dalum B (2002) National systems of production, innovation and competence building. Res Policy 31:213–231CrossRef

Marukawa T (2007) Gendai Chugoku no Sangyou: Bokkou suru Chuugoku Kigyou no Tsuyosa to Morosa (Modern industries in China: The strength and fragility of rising Chinese companies). Chuoukoron-Shinsha Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese)

Marukawa T, Yasumoto M (2010) Keitai Denwa Sangyou no Shinka Purosesu: Nihon wa naze Koritsu shitanoka (Evolution in the mobile phone industry: Why does the Japanese mobile phone industry isolate in the global market). Yuhikaku, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Maruyama M (2011) Keiei no Keizaigaku Shinban: Business Economics (Economics in management new edition: Business economics). Yuhikaku, Tokyo (in Japanese)

METI [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] (2012) Hyoujunka Senryaku ni Renkei shita Chizai Manejimento Jireishuu (Case studies on intellectual property management in connection with standardization) Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Nalebuff B (2003) Bundling, tying and portfolio effects. DTI Economics Paper no. 1, Department of Trade and Industry, UK. http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file14774.pdf

Nalebuff B (2004) Bundling as an entry barrier. Q J Econ 119:159–187CrossRef

Negoro T, Sugiyama Y (2011) Tokushu Ekosisutem no Manejimentto Ron ni Yosete (Comments on special issue on ecosystem management). Organiz Sci 45(1):2–3 (in Japanese)

Negoro T, Kamaike S, Shimizu Y (2011) Fukusuu no Ekosisutemu no Renketsu Manajimento – Parareru Purattofomu no Senryaku Ron (Management for connecting plural ecosystems: Strategy of parallel platforms) Organiz Scie 45(1):45–57 (in Japanese)

Newman MEJ (2010) Networks: an introduction. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRef

Nikkei BP, Global Net (1999) Nikkei LSI database Sekai Handoutai Seizou Souchi Shiken Tesuto Souchi Shijou Nenkan 1999 (Nikkei LSI database—Yearbook of manufacturing and testing equipment in the global semiconductor market 1999). Nikkei BP, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Nikkei BP, Global Net (2001) Nikkei LSI database Sekai Handoutai Seizou Souchi Shiken Tesuto Souchi Shijou Nenkan 1999 (Nikkei LSI database—Yearbook of manufacturing and testing equipment in the global semiconductor market 2001). Nikkei BP, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Ogawa K (2009) Kokusai hyoujunka to Jigyou Senryaku (International standards and business strategy). Hakuto Shobou, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Ogawa K (2011) Kokusai Hyoujunka to Hikaku Yuui no Kokusaibungyou Keizaiseityou (International standardization, international division of labor and economic growth). In: Watanabe T (ed) Global Biziness Senryaku (Business strategy for global market). Hakutou Shobou, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Paine RT (1966) Food web complexity and species diversity. Am Nat 100:65–75CrossRef

Parker G, Van Alstyne MW (2005) Two-sided network effects: a theory of information product design. Manage Sci 51(10):1491–1504

Porter ME (2000) Location, competition, and economic development: local clusters in a global economy. Econ Dev Quar 14(1):15–34CrossRef

Rochet J, Tirole J (2003) Platform competition in two-sided markets. J Eur Econ Assoc 1(4):990–1029CrossRef

Rochet J, Tirole J (2004) Two-sided markets: an overview. IDEI University of Toulouse, Toulouse, Mimeo

Senoo K (2009) Gijutsuryoku de Masaru Nihon ga naze Jigyou de Makerunoka (Why does Japan, with its technological prowess, lose in business?). Diamondsha, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Shapiro C, Varian HR (1999) Information rules: a strategic guide to network economy. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA

Shintaku J, Eto M (2008) Konsensasu Hyojun Senryaku (Strategy for consensus standards). Nikkei Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese)

Stango V (2004) The economics of standards wars. Rev Netw Econ 3(1):1–19CrossRef

Teece DJ (1977) Technology transfer by multinational firms: the resource cost of transferring technological know-how. Econ J 87(2):242–261CrossRef

Teece DJ (1986) Transaction cost economics and the multinational enterprise. J Econ Behav Organ 7(1):21–45CrossRef

Teece DJ (2007) Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoudations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strat Manag J 28:1319–1350CrossRef

Teece DJ (2011) Dynamic capabilities: a guide for managers. Ivey Bus J 75(2):29–34

Teece DJ, Pisano G, Shuen A (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strat Manag J 18(7):509–533CrossRef

Uchida Y (2016) IoT no Shinten to Kokusai Bijinesu no Kankei ni tsuite – Gijutsu Hyoujun no Gyousaika heno torikumiwo Chushin ni (The connection of the development of IoT and international business: inter-sector initiatives in Technology Standards). Toyama University Working Papers 304, Toyama (in Japanese)

Vernon R (1966) International investment and international trade in the product cycle. Q J Econ 80(2):190–207CrossRef

von Hippel E (2005) Democratizing innovation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MACrossRef

Watanabe T (ed) (2011) Bijinesu Moderu Inobesyon (Business model innovation). Hakuto Shobo, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Yamada H (2007) Hyoujunka Sensou eno Riron Busou (Theorizing for standard wars). Zeimu Keiri Kyokai, Co Ltd, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Yamada H (2008) Defakuto Sutandado no Kyousou Senryaku (Competitive strategy for de facto standards) Hakuto Shobo, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Yasumoto M, Manabe S (eds) (2017) Oupunka Senryaku – Kyoukai wo Koeru Inobesyon (Strategy for open business: innovation across boundary). Yuhikaku, Tokyo (in Japanese)

Titel: Business Ecosystems and Platform Firms: Theoretical Perspective and Analytical Framework
verfasst von: Prof. Hirofumi Tatsumoto
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: Platform Strategy for Global Markets
Print ISBN: 978-981-336-788-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-336-789-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6789-0_2

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner