Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
This chapter discusses the significance of corporate compliance programmes as a competition enforcement tool. Current enforcement challenges in the fight against collusive practices that are, a low probability of detection and under-deterrence of corporate fines, raise the need to move away from a strictly sanction-based type of enforcement. It is argued that competition authorities should steer companies’ incentives towards implementing effective compliance programmes. Rewarding effective compliance programmes in the context of an investigation can improve the effectiveness of corporate sanctions in providing ex ante incentives to companies to deter and detect illegal behaviour internally. Outlining the key foundations of an effective compliance programme, this chapter also helps understanding how and when competition authorities should reward the compliance efforts of companies.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Abrantes-Metz, R., Bajari, P., & Murphy, J. (2010). Enhancing compliance programs through antitrust screening. The Antitrust Counselor, 4(5).
Almunia, J. (2011). Speech/11/268 from 14 Apr 2011.
Angelucci, C., & Han, M. A. (2010). Monitoring managers through corporate compliance programs. Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-14.
Arlen, J. (1994). The potentially perverse effects of corporate criminal liability. The Journal of Legal Studies, 23(2), 833–867. CrossRef
Autorité de la Concurrence. (2012a). Antitrust compliance and compliance programmes, Corporate tools for competing safely in the market place. Paris.
Autorité de la Concurrence. (2012b). Framework-Document of 10 February 2012 on Antitrust Compliance Programmes. Available from http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_compliance_10february2012.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217. CrossRef
Bryant, P. G., & Eckard, E. W. (1991). Price fixing: The probability of getting caught. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 531. CrossRef
Combe, E., Monnier, C., & Legal, R. (2008). Cartels: The probability of getting caught in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Research papers.
Council of the European Union. (2003). Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector. Official Journal of the European Union L192/54.
Department of Justice (DoJ). (1993). Corporate Leniency Policy.
European Commission. (1982). National Panasonic Case COMP IV/30.070, Decision no. 82/853/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union L284/41.
European Commission. (1988). Napier Brown – British Sugar Case COMP IV/30.178, Decision no. 88/518/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union L284/41.
European Commission. (1998). British Sugar plc Case COMP IV/F-3/33.708, Tate & Lyle plc Case COMP IV/F-3/33.709, Napier Brown & Company Ltd Case COMP IV/F-3/33.710, James Budgett Sugars Ltd Case COMP IV/F-3/33.711. Decision no. 1999/210/EC. Official Journal of the European Union L076/01.
European Commission (DG Competition). (2012). Compliance matters, What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules. Brussels.
Geradin, D. (2013). Antitrust compliance programmes & optimal antitrust enforcement: A reply to Wouter Wils. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1(2), 18. CrossRef
Global Compliance News. (2014). Italy: Competition Compliance programs a mitigating factor for fines imposed by the Italian Antitrust Authority, 4 Nov 2016. Available from http://globalcompliancenews.com/italy-competition-compliance-20141104/. Accessed 10 April 2016.
Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., Motchenkova, E., David, E., Thépot, F., Massman, J., and Strader, M.J. (2014). Just and Optimal Financial Penalties for Infringement of Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis. Project Report. UCL Faculty of Laws, London.
Marvão, C. (2015). The EU leniency programme and recidivism. Review of Industrial Organization, 48(1), 1–27. CrossRef
Murphy, J. E. (2011). In OECD, Policy Roundtable, Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, 14-15. Report available from: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.
Murphy, J. E. (2012). A compliance & ethics program on a dollar a day: How small companies can have effective programs. Available from: http://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/ResourceOverview/CEProgramDollarADay-Murphy.pdf. Accessed 12 April 2016.
Murphy, J. E. (2013). Making the sentencing guidelines message complete. Available from: http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20130801/Public_Comment_Murphy_Proposed_Priorities.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.
OFT. (2011). How your business can achieve compliance with competition law. OFT1340, London.
OFT. (2012). OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty. OFT423, London.
Parker, C., & Gilad, S. (2011). Internal corporate compliance management systems: Structure, culture and agency. In C. Parker & V. Lehmann Nielsen (Eds.), Explaining compliance: Business responses to regulation. Edward Elgar.
Posner, R. A. (1976). Antitrust law: An economic perspective (p. 225). University of Chicago Press. In Wils (2002) The optimal enforcement of EC antitrust law (p. 200). Kluwer Law International.
Snyder, B. (2015). Speech at the Sixth Annual Chicago Forum on International Antitrust, 08.06.2015. Available from http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-brent-snyder-delivers-remarks-sixth-annual-chicago. Accessed 10 April 2016.
Sokol, D. (2012). Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement. Antitrust Law Journal, 78, 202.
Stephan, A., & Nikpay, A. (2015). Leniency decision-making from a corporate perspective: Complex realities. In C. Beaton-Wells & C. Tran (Eds.), Anti-Cartel enforcement in a contemporary age: Leniency religion. London: Hart Publishing.
Thépot, F. (2015). Antitrust v. anti-corruption policy approaches to compliance: Why such a gap?. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 6(2).
United States Attorney’s Manual. (2008). 9-28.400, Special Policy Concerns. Available from: http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. Accessed 10 April 2016.
US Sentencing Guidelines Manual. (2012). United States Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C.
Wils, W. P. J. (2002). The optimal enforcement of EC antitrust law (p. 200). Kluwer Law International.
Wils, W. P. J. (2013). Antitrust compliance programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1, 52–81. CrossRef
- Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective Antitrust Enforcement?
- Chapter 9
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, digitale Transformation/© Maksym Yemelyanov | Fotolia