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Erschienen in:
2007 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Can Private Learn From Public Governance?
verfasst von : Bruno S. Frey, Matthias Benz
Erschienen in: Nonprofit-Organisationen und Märkte
Verlag: Deutscher Universitätsverlag
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Corporate governance is importantly based on Agency Theory and relies on extrinsic incentives to align the interests of managers, employees and shareholders. This paper argues that in view of recent corporate scandals, private governance can learn from public governance: (1) Goal-oriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection process of employees; (2) Extrinsic, but non-monetary incentives (e.g. conferring orders and titles) can be used; (3) The power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power, appropriate rules of succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms.