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Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 1/2014

01.06.2014

Complexities of electing diverse committees

verfasst von: Thomas C. Ratliff, Donald G. Saari

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 1/2014

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Abstract

Electing a committee introduces constraints beyond excellence, such as ensuring a balance of gender, tenure, talent, and other characteristics. The difficulties are captured by an actual example where every voter desired gender diversity on a committee and voted accordingly, but only men were elected. After developing the properties of certain methods that avoid these problems, other needs in this area are described.

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Fußnoten
1
This is not hypothetical; when one of us (DGS) tallied CMC ballots for two different years, it was clear that some voters had adopted this strategic voting behavior.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Complexities of electing diverse committees
verfasst von
Thomas C. Ratliff
Donald G. Saari
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2014
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 1/2014
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0773-8

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