nach oben

Erschienen in:

2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Conclusion

verfasst von : Dag Tanneberg

Erschienen in: The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Does political repression work for authoritarian rule? On the one hand, repression is a hallmark of authoritarian governance. It denotes any action governments take to increase the costs of collective action. Autocrats consciously apply repression to curb popular opposition within their territorial jurisdiction. They repress in order to protect their policies, personnel, or other interests against challenges from below. Repression is, thus, a means to the end of political survival in non-democratic contexts. A useful means lives up to its promises. Does repression do that? This project started on the suspicion that we do not yet know the answer. This concluding chapter recalls the key theoretical ideas developed along the way, highlights the main findings of the book, and concludes with opportunities for future research.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d’État?

On leadership in contentious politics see Aminzade et al. (2001).

Aminzade, R., Goldstone, J. A., & Perry, E. J. (2001). Leadership dynamics and dynamics of contention. In R. R. Aminzade, J. A. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. J. Perry, W. H. Sewell, S. Tarrow, & C. Tilley (Eds.), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 89–125). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Aytaç, S. E., Schiumerini, L., & Stokes, S. (2017). Why do people join backlash protests? Lessons from Turkey. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716686828.CrossRef

Bob, C., & Nepstad, S. E. (2007). Kill a leader, murder a movement? Leadership and assassination in social movements. American Behavioral Scientist, 50(10), 1370–1394. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764207300162.CrossRef

Boudreau, V. (2004). Resisting dictatorship: Repression and protest in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. American Journal of Political Science, 54(4), 936–950. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x.CrossRef

Casper, B. A., & Tyson, S. A. (2014). Popular protest and elite coordination in a coup d’état. The Journal of Politics, 76(2), 548–564. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001485.CrossRef

Chenoweth, E., Pinckney, J., & Lewis, O. A. (2017). Nonviolent and violent campaigns and outcomes dataset: v.3.0. https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html.

Chenoweth, E. (2018). Backfire in action: Insights from nonviolent campaigns, 1946–2006. In L. R. Kurtz & L. A. Smithey (Eds.), The paradox of repression and nonviolent movements (pp. 26–51). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.CrossRef

Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., Teorell, J., et al. (2018). V-dem country-year dataset 2018. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18.

Davenport, C. (2007a). State repression and the domestic democratic peace. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Davenport, C. (2007b). State repression and the tyrannical peace. Journal of Peace Research, 44(4), 485–504. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078940.CrossRef

de Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 502–527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.

Diamond, L. (2010). Liberation technology. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 69–83.CrossRef

Edel, M., & Josua, M. (2018). How authoritarian rulers seek to legitimize repression: Framing mass killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan. Democratization, 5(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1439021.CrossRef

Francisco, R. A. (2004). After the massacre: Mobilization in the wake of harsh repression. Mobilization: An International Journal, 9(2):107–126.

Francisco, R. A. (2005). The dictator’s dilemma. In C. Davenport, H. Johnston & C. M. Mueller (Eds.), Repression and mobilization (pp. 58–84). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ganghof, S. (2005). Kausale Perspektiven in der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft: X-zentrierte versus Y-zentrierte Forschungsstrategien. In S. Kropp & M. Minkenberg (Eds.) Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft (pp. 76–93). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80441-9_4.

Gerschewski, J. (2013). The three pillars of stability: Legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes. Democratization, 20(1), 13–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860.CrossRef

Gerschewski, J., Merkel, W., Schmotz, A., Stefes, C. H., & Tanneberg, D. (2012). Warum überleben Diktaturen? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53, 106–131. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845244655-111.CrossRef

Greitens, S. C. (2016). Dictators and their secret police: Coercive institutions and state violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Gunitsky, S. (2015). Corrupting the cyber-commons: Social media as a tool of autocratic stability. Perspectives on Politics, 13(1), 42–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714003120.CrossRef

Haschke, P. (2018). Human rights in democracies. London: Routledge.

Kurtz, L. R., & Smithey, L. A. (Eds.). (2018). The paradox of repression and nonviolent movements. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Moore, W. H. (1998). Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and timing. American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 851–873.CrossRef

Nordås, R., & Davenport, C. (2013). Fight the youth: Youth bulges and state repression. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 926–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12025.

Rejali, D. (2009). Torture and democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef

Ritter, E. H. (2014). Policy disputes, political survival, and the onset and severity of state repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(1), 143–168.CrossRef

Ritter, E. H., & Conrad, C. R. (2016). Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression. American Political Science Review, 110(1), 85–99. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055415000623.CrossRef

Rød, E. G., & Weidmann, N. B. (2015). Empowering activists or autocrats? The internet in authoritarian regimes. Journal of Peace Research, 52(3), 338–351. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314555782.CrossRef

Siegel, D. A. (2009). Social networks and collective action. American Journal of Political Science, 53(1), 122–138. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x.CrossRef

Siegel, D. A. (2011). When does repression work? Collective action in social networks. The Journal of Politics, 73(4), 993–1010. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611000727.CrossRef

Sullivan, C. M. (2016). Undermining resistance: Mobilization, repression, and the enforcement of political order. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(7), 1163–1190. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714567951.CrossRef

Sutton, J., Butcher, C., & Svensson, I. (2014). Explaining political jiu-jitsu: Institution-building and the outcomes of regime violence against unarmed protests. Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 559–573. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314531004.CrossRef

Tanneberg, D. (2018). Why do democracies violate human rights? In: W. Merkel & S. Kneip (Eds.), Democracy and Crisis (pp. 299–324). Wiesbaden: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72559-8_13.

Weidmann, N. B., & Rød, E. G. (forthcoming). The internet and political protest in autocracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Titel: Conclusion
verfasst von: Dag Tanneberg
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35476-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-35477-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_6