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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Cooperation, Spill-over Effects, and Integration

verfasst von : Saira Khan

Erschienen in: The Iran Nuclear Deal

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

This chapter serves as a platform for the study by introducing the theoretical framework. It incorporates the theory of integration to demonstrate its relevance in understanding cooperation between enduring rivals, particularly in the context of protracted conflicts. The focus of the chapter is to highlight the conditions under which states involved in protracted conflicts can cooperate, specifically on high-stakes issues such as proliferation. It emphasizes that the most challenging aspect of cooperation lies in bringing states to the negotiating table. States engage in rational cost–benefit calculations before committing to any cooperative arrangement. This process can be time-consuming as enduring rivals inherently lack trust and face difficulties in persuading their domestic constituents about the prospects of cooperation. Moreover, leaders tend to be skeptical of sudden shifts in behavior from their belligerent counterparts. However, once a cooperative endeavor, such as the Iran nuclear deal, is initiated, the primary task for the involved actors is to remain loyal to the agreed-upon rules. Defection is to be avoided at all costs for a cooperative arrangement to succeed. Adherence to the rules fosters the development of trust, which is gradually consolidated over time. Building confidence is a process that may require patience, but is achievable if states uphold the norms of the arrangement and refrain from cheating. Trust becomes the bedrock of cooperation, leading to the consolidation of the arrangement. As trust grows, cooperation becomes habitual for the states involved, and they may pursue additional cooperative arrangements on various levels, including trade, transactions, communication, and cultural exchange. In essence, cooperation breeds further cooperation. Optimism in the relationship and patience are important during this period. Positive spill-over effects of cooperation become evident and eventually become institutionalized. Under such circumstances, the conflict between the protracted conflict states has the potential to be transformed to a new level. This positive transformation paves the way for the resolution of the conflict. The chapter highlights the potential for conflict transformation and the prospects of resolving protracted conflicts when cooperation becomes ingrained in the relationship. To recap, this chapter lays the groundwork for the study by introducing the general theoretical framework of integration. It emphasizes the importance of trust, loyalty to the agreed-upon rules, and the gradual consolidation of cooperation over time. The chapter outlines the transformative power of cooperation and its potential to resolve protracted conflicts.

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Metadaten
Titel
Cooperation, Spill-over Effects, and Integration
verfasst von
Saira Khan
Copyright-Jahr
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_5

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