The Iran Nuclear Deal

This chapter of the study focuses on the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by the P5+1 countries. It begins by highlighting that addressing the Iranian nuclear issue was one of the primary goals of President Barack Obama’s administration. After nearly two years of negotiations, a deal acceptable to both Iran and the allied powers, including the United States, was signed. The chapter covers the diplomatic meetings, both secret and formal, that paved the way for the nuclear deal. It explores the initial skepticism from both Iran and the United States regarding each other’s intentions in signing the deal. Over time, through continuous efforts, these initial skepticisms transformed into optimism, leading to the negotiation process that ultimately resulted in the deal. The JCPOA imposed restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, aiming to ensure that it remained peaceful in nature. It discusses the nuclear restrictions placed on Iran, as well as the monitoring and verification systems established to ensure compliance. The chapter also addresses the sanctions relief provided to Iran as part of the deal. Furthermore, it examines the clauses and conditions of the JCPOA, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages for both Iran and the United States in signing the deal. It also discusses the broader implications of the deal, particularly its contribution to global non-proliferation efforts.

This chapter looks at the reasons behind the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal under the administration of President Donald Trump. It analyzes the global proliferation threat that arose as a result of this decision. The chapter explores the rationale provided by the Trump administration for pulling Washington out of the agreement, particularly the argument that the deal failed to adequately address Iran’s ballistic missile program, its involvement in terrorism, and its role in regional conflicts. Building on the discussion of the terms of the JCPOA in the previous chapter, this section comprehensively examines these terms from the perspective of the Trump administration. The aim is to understand the administration’s justification for its exit policy and its assessment of the flaws in the 2015 nuclear deal. The chapter also examines the consequences of the US withdrawal, particularly in the realm of Iranian nuclear politics. It analyzes the reimposition of sanctions by the United States and its efforts to eliminate Iran’s oil exports. These actions had significant implications for Iran and its nuclear activities. While the chapter provides a brief overview of these consequences, a more detailed analysis is offered in the case study chapter. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the failure of multilateral diplomacy and the security regime resulting from the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal. It explores how the withdrawal undermined the efforts of multilateral diplomacy and raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing security framework.

Chapter four analyzes existing works conducted on the subject of Iran’s nuclear drive. It explores the factors utilized by scholars to understand Iran’s current nuclear ambition. By providing a detailed discussion of these factors and highlighting the significance of previous works, the chapter aims to demonstrate the inadequacies of existing scholarship in comprehending Iran’s renewed nuclear interest. The chapter argues that while previous works have made valuable contributions, and there is a lack of a comprehensive theoretical explanation for Iran’s current nuclear ambition. This gap exists because the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal is a relatively recent development, and thus, the existing scholarship primarily focuses on descriptive analysis of Iran’s nuclear activities. However, it is crucial to understand why the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement has lost its ability to effectively contain Iran’s nuclear program. The decline in Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA and its reluctance to renegotiate a revised JCPOA in the face of the US strategy of “Maximum Pressure” need to be comprehensively explored. Additionally, the chapter identifies a missing element in previous scholarship, namely an explanation of why Iran seemingly disregards its violations of the terms of the nuclear deal. To address these gaps, the current work draws upon previous scholarship on protracted conflict and proliferation interest. It argues that protracted conflict states, including Iran, are more prone to proliferation due to conflict-related reasons. The chapter further argues that the potential proliferator’s interest in nuclear proliferation intensifies when its conflict rival defects or betrays the cooperative arrangement between them. Cooperation often occurs when actors perceive actual or potential conflicts in their policies. Cooperation is therefore a mechanism for managing conflicts, rather than the absence of conflicts. When a cooperative arrangement is fractured, the state of the conflict worsens compared to the pre-conflict management arrangement. In the nuclear realm, the victim state responds with a fierce spill-back policy. Theoretical explanations that address these issues are provided in chapters four, five, and six.

This chapter serves as a platform for the study by introducing the theoretical framework. It incorporates the theory of integration to demonstrate its relevance in understanding cooperation between enduring rivals, particularly in the context of protracted conflicts. The focus of the chapter is to highlight the conditions under which states involved in protracted conflicts can cooperate, specifically on high-stakes issues such as proliferation. It emphasizes that the most challenging aspect of cooperation lies in bringing states to the negotiating table. States engage in rational cost–benefit calculations before committing to any cooperative arrangement. This process can be time-consuming as enduring rivals inherently lack trust and face difficulties in persuading their domestic constituents about the prospects of cooperation. Moreover, leaders tend to be skeptical of sudden shifts in behavior from their belligerent counterparts. However, once a cooperative endeavor, such as the Iran nuclear deal, is initiated, the primary task for the involved actors is to remain loyal to the agreed-upon rules. Defection is to be avoided at all costs for a cooperative arrangement to succeed. Adherence to the rules fosters the development of trust, which is gradually consolidated over time. Building confidence is a process that may require patience, but is achievable if states uphold the norms of the arrangement and refrain from cheating. Trust becomes the bedrock of cooperation, leading to the consolidation of the arrangement. As trust grows, cooperation becomes habitual for the states involved, and they may pursue additional cooperative arrangements on various levels, including trade, transactions, communication, and cultural exchange. In essence, cooperation breeds further cooperation. Optimism in the relationship and patience are important during this period. Positive spill-over effects of cooperation become evident and eventually become institutionalized. Under such circumstances, the conflict between the protracted conflict states has the potential to be transformed to a new level. This positive transformation paves the way for the resolution of the conflict. The chapter highlights the potential for conflict transformation and the prospects of resolving protracted conflicts when cooperation becomes ingrained in the relationship. To recap, this chapter lays the groundwork for the study by introducing the general theoretical framework of integration. It emphasizes the importance of trust, loyalty to the agreed-upon rules, and the gradual consolidation of cooperation over time. The chapter outlines the transformative power of cooperation and its potential to resolve protracted conflicts.

This chapter focuses on the concept of “spill back” in the context of a cooperative arrangement being fractured, specifically due to geographical or political reasons leading to a spill-back policy by a victim state. It distinguishes spill-back policy from spill-over effects, which were discussed in the previous chapter, and draws connections between spill-back, negative reciprocity, the nexus between foreign and domestic policy, crises, and misperceptions. The chapter examines how the victim state responds when a cooperative arrangement is ruptured, particularly in cases where a member state's actions have negative consequences for the victim state. It analyzes spill-back as a policy response triggered by the breach of trust and negative reciprocal actions. It further explores the linkages between spill-back policy and the interplay between foreign and domestic policy, crisis dynamics, and the role of misperceptions. It concludes by discussing the rapid pace of negative reciprocal spill-back effects on the affected state when a cooperative deal is ruptured. It establishes a theoretical framework to understand the renewed nuclear proliferation interest of a state that faces defectors in a previously enthusiastic nuclear deal or arrangement. While a cooperative arrangement can have positive consequences when it works, the failure of such an arrangement creates a trust deficit and residue left by the defectors, leading to an acceleration of nuclear weapons development. The additional insecurity faced by the concerned state makes it a more determined and serious proliferator, ultimately becoming an unstoppable proliferator under these circumstances. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter is then tested against the current Iranian nuclear proliferation drive. It examines how a spill-back policy is adopted by a state that has lost interest in a cooperative arrangement due to facing a defector. The fast-paced spill-back of the affected state is facilitated by the factors discussed in the subsequent chapter. In a nutshell, this chapter focuses on the concept of spill-back policy, exploring its connection to negative reciprocity, the interplay between foreign and domestic policy, crises, and misperceptions. It establishes a theoretical framework to understand the intensified nuclear proliferation interest of a state in response to a ruptured cooperative deal. The chapter provides insights into the dynamics of spill-back and its implications, particularly in the case of the current Iranian nuclear proliferation drive.

This chapter serves as the main theoretical premise of the study, presenting the key arguments and hypotheses. It outlines the causal connections between the dependent variable, renewed nuclear ambition, and the independent variables, which include the salience of long-running rivalries, the presence of nuclear latency, the drive to regain prestige and identity through acquiring nuclear weapons, and the desire for trade and aid benefits. The chapter also introduces the precipitating factor, which refers to the differences between major powers regarding the nuclear issue of the state in question. It explains how these differences create a conducive platform for a potential proliferator to renew its proliferation ambition. The argument put forward is that when a state faces a fractured nuclear deal, especially if the fracture is caused by its primary enduring rival, it is likely to pursue a fast-track spill-back policy. The facilitating factors, such as long-running rivalries, nuclear latency, the desire for prestige, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits, contribute to this spill-back policy. The precipitating factor, in the form of disagreements between major powers, plays a role in generating a supportive environment for the state to renew its nuclear plan. The subsequent three chapters of the study analyze the Iranian nuclear proliferation interest in different periods. The first chapter examines Iran's nuclear proliferation interest prior to the nuclear deal, providing context for understanding its motivations. The second chapter focuses on the muted proliferation status during the first two years of the deal, characterized by parties adhering to the agreement's clauses. The third chapter explores Iran's fast-paced spill-back nuclear policy in the post-fractured deal period, utilizing the theoretical framework established earlier. This chapter, thus, presents the theoretical framework of the study, stating the main propositions and explaining the causal connections between the variables. It highlights the role of long-running rivalries, nuclear latency, the pursuit of prestige, trade, and aid, as well as the precipitating factor of major power disagreements, in shaping the renewal of nuclear ambitions. The following chapters analyze Iran's nuclear proliferation interests in different periods, utilizing this theoretical framework.

This chapter focuses on Iran's nuclear status between 2015 and 2018, a period when Iran, the United States, and the other parties to the nuclear deal were fully committed to its implementation. This phase is characterized as a trust-building period, during which the loyalty and adherence of all deal members were particularly significant. Patience was emphasized as a key virtue for both Iran and the other members, as they needed to observe and evaluate each other's compliance with the deal's commitments. During these years, often referred to as the “sunshine” years of the deal, all parties involved honored the rules of the agreement, signaling an optimistic future of increased cooperation. The chapter highlights that Iran's nuclear program was effectively capped and placed under strict surveillance by the IAEA. There were no grounds to suspect Iran of deceiving the international community regarding its nuclear activities. Iran complied with its proliferation commitments and demonstrated its willingness to abide by the terms of the deal. Under the accord, Iran relinquished 97% of its uranium fuel, significantly reducing its capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The country also maintained its stockpile well below the threshold required for the production of a single bomb. Rigorous and regular inspections conducted by the IAEA, as well as the affirmation of compliance by the United States, further validated Iran's adherence to the deal.

The chapter emphasizes that Iran's nuclear behavior during this period was directly influenced by the lifting of major Western sanctions that had been imposed for decades. It was expected that the consolidated nuclear deal would pave the way for increased socio-economic and political interactions between Iran and the United States, eventually fostering an environment to resolve their long-standing conflicts.

An intriguing aspect explored in this chapter is the recognition of Iran as a latent proliferator, which emerged as a result of the nuclear deal. It probes deeper into the concept of the “life of proliferation” introduced in the previous chapter. The analysis examines Iran's latency status and explores the potential for it to transition from a recognized latent proliferator to an active proliferator. Overall, this chapter provides a detailed account of Iran's nuclear status between 2015 and 2018, highlighting the success of the deal in capping Iran's nuclear program, ensuring strict surveillance, and building trust among the deal members. It also examines the implications of the deal on Iran's status as a latent proliferator and explores the possibilities of its transformation into an active proliferator.

This chapter focuses on Tehran's shifting proliferation aspirations and highlights Iran's transformation from a low-to-moderate proliferation aspirant to a moderate-to-high proliferation aspirant following the fracture of the nuclear deal by the United States. The chapter outlines that Iran has already breached its uranium limit, as agreed upon in the 2015 nuclear deal, thus partially stepping out of the agreement. Despite remaining compliant with the JCPOA for a year after the U.S. withdrawal, Iran has now accumulated sufficient uranium for the production of multiple nuclear weapons and has resumed enrichment activities at the underground site in Fordow. There is a concern that if the US imposes further sanctions despite its own non-compliance with the deal, and Iran may withdraw from both the JCPOA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The “maximum pressure” policy pursued by the Trump administration is highlighted as a significant trigger, leading to Iran producing at least eight times more enriched uranium than permitted under the agreement. Furthermore, Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with international inspectors is noted, and the chapter presents evidence of Iran progressively deviating from its commitments under the deal.

The Biden administration's decision to maintain sanctions on Iran, mirroring the approach of the Trump era, has significantly impacted Iran's nuclear proliferation activities. These sanctions have subjected Iran to economic pressure, severely restricting its international trade, access to financial markets, and oil exports, thereby impeding its ability to invest in its nuclear program. In response, Iran has escalated its nuclear activities, including higher uranium enrichment levels and the development of advanced centrifuges, signaling a resolve to withstand economic coercion. While the Biden administration seeks to engage in negotiations to revive the JCPOA or establish a new agreement, the continued sanctions have created a complex dynamic, whereby Iran responds to economic constraints by asserting its nuclear capabilities, underscoring the ongoing challenges in US-Iran relations and the intricacies of nuclear diplomacy in the region.

The chapter underscores Iran's strong inclination toward proliferation decisions, attributing this shift to the US defection from the deal and the subsequent lack of trust in any security arrangement. The motivations behind Iran's current uranium enrichment activities are explored in detail. A comparison is drawn between Iran's current proliferation activities and its past actions, indicating that the current intensity of Iran's proliferation efforts is the most rapid to date. This highlights the heightened determination of states to achieve their security goals under any circumstance when faced with the failure of such agreements. Additionally, it provides a causal explanation for Iran's accelerated proliferation activities, considering facilitating factors such as the presence of long-running rivalries, the existence of nuclear latency, the desire to regain lost prestige and identity, and the expectation of trade and aid benefits. It also analyzes the role played by the precipitating factor, namely the differences between major powers involved in the deal, in driving Iran's renewed interest in proliferation.

Based on the findings, it is concluded that the case study of Iran confirms the propositions of the theoretical framework. This indicates that the theory is applicable and relevant to understanding the dynamics of the Iran nuclear deal and the potential for cooperation in protracted conflicts. The theory regarding the breakdown of the JCPOA and its implications for international non-proliferation efforts are applicable to the current Iranian nuclear ambitions.

The conclusion also provides policy implications of the study. It suggests that the findings of the study have implications for US foreign and security policies and calls for specific policy recommendations in relation to Iran. It emphasizes the need for the United States to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal to prevent Tehran from developing and using nuclear weapons. It highlights that the breakdown of the JCPOA would erode the global non-proliferation framework, raise doubts about diplomacy's effectiveness, reduce trust among treaty signatories, and hinder future nuclear negotiations. The deal's collapse could also result in the loss of vital monitoring mechanisms, making it harder to oversee Iran's nuclear activities. Additionally, it may disrupt regional alliances, causing countries like European powers and Russia to adjust their positions, potentially complicating efforts to address regional conflicts and security concerns. Furthermore, it emphasizes that informal and short-term agreements differ significantly from the JCPOA, underscoring the need to acknowledge the JCPOA’s unique importance in the context of nuclear nonproliferation. Overall, the JCPOA’s failure and deteriorating US-Iran relations could have significant and far-reaching implications for regional stability and nuclear proliferation prevention in the Middle East. Additionally, the breakdown of the JCPOA could prolong the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States.