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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. Fractured Deal and Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest

verfasst von : Saira Khan

Erschienen in: The Iran Nuclear Deal

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

This chapter serves as the main theoretical premise of the study, presenting the key arguments and hypotheses. It outlines the causal connections between the dependent variable, renewed nuclear ambition, and the independent variables, which include the salience of long-running rivalries, the presence of nuclear latency, the drive to regain prestige and identity through acquiring nuclear weapons, and the desire for trade and aid benefits. The chapter also introduces the precipitating factor, which refers to the differences between major powers regarding the nuclear issue of the state in question. It explains how these differences create a conducive platform for a potential proliferator to renew its proliferation ambition. The argument put forward is that when a state faces a fractured nuclear deal, especially if the fracture is caused by its primary enduring rival, it is likely to pursue a fast-track spill-back policy. The facilitating factors, such as long-running rivalries, nuclear latency, the desire for prestige, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits, contribute to this spill-back policy. The precipitating factor, in the form of disagreements between major powers, plays a role in generating a supportive environment for the state to renew its nuclear plan. The subsequent three chapters of the study analyze the Iranian nuclear proliferation interest in different periods. The first chapter examines Iran's nuclear proliferation interest prior to the nuclear deal, providing context for understanding its motivations. The second chapter focuses on the muted proliferation status during the first two years of the deal, characterized by parties adhering to the agreement's clauses. The third chapter explores Iran's fast-paced spill-back nuclear policy in the post-fractured deal period, utilizing the theoretical framework established earlier. This chapter, thus, presents the theoretical framework of the study, stating the main propositions and explaining the causal connections between the variables. It highlights the role of long-running rivalries, nuclear latency, the pursuit of prestige, trade, and aid, as well as the precipitating factor of major power disagreements, in shaping the renewal of nuclear ambitions. The following chapters analyze Iran's nuclear proliferation interests in different periods, utilizing this theoretical framework.

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Fußnoten
1
It can be argued that geographical spill-back and functional spill-back are intrinsically connected since a county that decides to not live up to its commitments to a deal may decide to exit from the deal. In other words, when a country exits from the deal, it has, in fact, also created a functional spill-back, However, the study uses the two separately because it is no point discussing a state’s disregard for its commitments pertaining to the deal when it exits from it. Its disregard is obvious due to its decision to exit from the deal. Thus, functional spill-back is used to understand that a country does not fully abide by the norms of a deal, but remains in the deal nonetheless.
 
2
Saira Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East (London and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002).
 
3
For detailed analysis, see Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2010 and 2011).
 
4
“Iran Lacks Allies in Confronting the U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020.
 
5
Weiqi Zhang, “Neither Friend nor Big Brother: China’s Role in North Korean Foreign Policy Strategy,” Palgrave Communications, February 13, 2018.
 
6
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 188; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 50–51; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21(3), Winter 1996/1997.
 
7
Jeremy Kinsman, “U.S. and Iran: A Diplomatic Lesson for Canada,” Policy Magazine, May/June 2015.
 
8
Gwynne Dyer, “Unravelling Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Game,” Bangkok Post, July 29, 2020.
 
9
See Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21(3), Winter 1996–1997.
 
10
Michael Malyshev, “Nuclear Latency and the Future Strategic Environment,” Strategic Insights, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. https://​www.​files.​ethz.​ch/​isn/​189512/​Nuclear%20​latency%20​and%20​the%20​future%20​strategic%20​environment.​pdf.
 
11
Michael Malyshev, “Nuclear Latency and the Future Strategic Environment,” Strategic Insights, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. https://​www.​files.​ethz.​ch/​isn/​189512/​Nuclear%20​latency%20​and%20​the%20​future%20​strategic%20​environment.​pdf.
 
12
“New Evidence: Modern Civilization Began in Iran,” Xinhua, August 10, 2007.
 
13
Thomas E. Doyle, “The Iranian Nuclear Controversy is also about Saving Face,” Washington Post, April 12, 2015.
 
14
Homeira Moshirzadeh, “The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy.” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 528.
 
15
Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘‘The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 529.
 
16
Homeira Moshirzadeh, “The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 529.
 
17
George Quester, “Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation,” Annals, 430, March 1977; William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982); Michael Mazarr, “Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,” International Security, 20(2), Fall 1995.
 
18
Zach Beauchaml, “Trump’s Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, Explained,” Vox, May 8, 2018.
 
19
Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017.
 
20
Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017.
 
21
Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017.
 
22
Conor Finnegan and Elizabeth McLaughlin, “Analysis: How Trump’s Foreign Policy has Affected Global Relations since Assuming Office,” ABC News, July 20, 2017.
 
23
Conor Finnegan and Elizabeth McLaughlin, “Analysis: How Trump’s Foreign Policy has Affected Global Relations since Assuming Office,” ABC News, July 20, 2017.
 
24
“Iran: Trump Wrong if He Thinks Tehran Regime Will Collapse,” The New York Times, February 15, 2020.
 
25
“Iran: Trump Wrong if He Thinks Tehran Regime Will Collapse,” The New York Times, February 15, 2020.
 
Metadaten
Titel
Fractured Deal and Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest
verfasst von
Saira Khan
Copyright-Jahr
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_7

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