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Journal of Business Ethics

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23.12.2017 | Original Paper

Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Disclosures: An Investigation of Investors’ and Analysts’ Perceptions

verfasst von: Audrey Hsu, Kevin Koh, Sophia Liu, Yen H. Tong

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 2/2019

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Abstract

We conjecture that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be indicative of managerial ethics and integrity and examine whether equity investors and financial analysts consider CSR performance when they assess firms’ disclosures of actual and forecasted earnings. We find that only adverse CSR performance affects investors’ assessments of these disclosures. In contrast, we find that both positive and adverse CSR performance affect analysts’ forecast revisions in response to firms’ disclosures. We also find that firms with adverse CSR performance exhibit lower disclosure quality and earnings persistence, but do not find that firms with positive CSR performance exhibit higher levels of both measures. This asymmetric result is consistent with investors’, but not analysts’, assessments of the effect of CSR performance on corporate disclosures. Our results are robust to using a three-stage least squares approach to address endogeneity concerns and to a battery of robustness and sensitivity analyses. Overall, our findings suggest that investors and analysts consider CSR when assessing the information in earnings-related corporate disclosures.

Vorheriger Artikel Local Social Environment, Firm Tax Policy, and Firm Characteristics

Nächster Artikel Investment Ethics and the Global Economy of Sports: The Norwegian Oil Fund, Formula 1 and the 2014 Russian Grand Prix

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Business Social Responsibility is the largest organization in the US devoted to the promotion and development of corporate social responsibility among businesses and organizations.

We use the terms “equity investors” and “investors” interchangeably to refer to investors who invest in firms’ equity shares. We also use the term “financial analysts” and “analysts” interchangeably to refer to analysts who work for brokerages that provide research information on firms, including those listed on the stock exchanges.

Prior studies on the economic consequences of CSR include Waddock and Graves (1997), Roman et al. (1999), Orlitzky et al. (2003), Webb (2004), Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Surroca and Tribó (2008), Walls et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Koh and Tong (2013), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), Khan et al. (2016), and Jeong et al. (2016).

In this regard, our study differs from prior studies (e.g., Roman et al. 1999; Waddock and Graves 1997) that examine the association between CSR performance and stock prices because our focus is on short-window price reactions to earnings-related disclosures and not on long-window stock price changes as a measure of firm performance.

Stock recommendations are based on categorical measures, such as “Sell,” “Hold,” and “Buy,” which are ordinal in nature. Earnings forecasts are based on analysts’ estimates of earnings per share, usually forecasted to the nearest cent. Hence, earnings forecasts provide a more detailed or finer measure of analysts’ reaction to new information. For example, a fine for environmental violations may decrease analysts’ earnings forecasts for the firm by a cent, but may leave analysts’ stock recommendation unchanged because the decrease of one cent is not significant enough to change the recommendation from, say, “Buy” to “Hold.”

In contrast, Davis et al. (2015) examine a broader sample of firms and find that firms with positive CSR activities exhibit more tax-avoidance activities. Davis et al. (2015) conclude that on average, managers view positive CSR activities and tax payments as substitutes.

Our study differs from these studies that rely on accounting-based measures of earnings management to examine whether CSR performance is indicative of managerial integrity and ethics (e.g., Kim et al. 2012; Koh and Tong 2013; Hoi et al. 2013). These studies can only address how CSR performance affects the reported accounting numbers, not how stakeholders respond to these reported accounting numbers. Our study attempts to fill this void in the extant literature by directly examining the effect of CSR performance on stakeholders’ reactions to the earnings numbers disclosed by firms.

For overviews of the major theoretical perspectives regarding CSR and financial performance, see McWilliams et al. (2006) and Gao and Bansal (2013).

Margolis and Walsh (2003) suggest that although most research evidence points to a positive association between CSR performance and financial performance, overall empirical evidence of this association is mixed. They examine 109 archival studies and find that 54 (7) report a positive (negative) effect of CSR performance on future firm performance, whereas 48 do not report a significant relation between the two factors.

Examining positive and adverse CSR performance separately is also consistent with the call by Mattingly and Berman (2006), who urge researchers to ensure that CSR strengths and weaknesses remain independent (i.e., are not combined) in a research design. Using factor analysis to identify latent constructs underpinning KLD ratings, Mattingly and Berman (2006) find that KLD’s strength and concern ratings do not exhibit convergent validity as they do not converge and load together on a single factor. Thus, they caution that using a net composite indicator of CSR performance is not a valid research a negative CSR performance is not simply the converse of positive CSR performance, or vice versa.

GAAP are financial reporting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is the organization responsible for financial reporting standards in the USA.

Recently, the effectiveness of KLD ratings studies for measuring CSR performance has been questioned. However, Chatterji et al. (2009) confirm that KLD’s environmental concern ratings capture past environmental performance and are useful in predicting future environmental violations. Nonetheless, they find that the environmental strength ratings are less useful in predicting future environmental performance. Szwajkowski and Figlewicz (1999) find that KLD ratings are substantially valid measures of CSR performance. Mattingly and Berman (2006) describe the KLD dataset as the standard quantitative measurement of CSR performance.

Value-weighed abnormal returns (CAR) are based on market risk adjustment, which uses the value-weighted market portfolio as the benchmark. Size-adjusted abnormal returns (SAR) are based on a firm characteristic risk adjustment, which uses the value-weighted portfolio returns of firms of the same size as the benchmark portfolio. These two risk adjustment approaches are widely used in prior studies examining stock price reactions (e.g., see Grullon et al. 2002; Gleason and Lee 2003; Richardson et al. 2005; Cheung 2011; Ng et al. 2013; deHann et al. 2015). We do not rely on the Fama–French three- or four-factor model for risk adjustment because Ahern (2009) shows that abnormal return estimation using such models can produce statistical biases if the sample exhibits non-normal returns.

Ideally, the stock price used as the scaler should not be affected by any information in the management forecasts. Prior studies have used stock prices that range from 2 days prior forecast date to the beginning of the quarter in which the forecast is made (e.g., see Ng et al. 2013; Li and Zhang 2015). We use stock price 10 days before forecast date because Agapova and Madura (2011) find that information in management forecasts is leaked prior to the forecast dates and that the bulk of the leaked information occurs during the 10 days prior to the forecast dates. As a robustness check, we use the stock price 2 days before the forecast dates as the scaler and find that our results remain robust and our inferences unchanged.

The number of days between quarterly earnings announcements, including announcements of annual earnings in the fourth fiscal quarter, is about 90 calendar days apart (i.e., a calendar quarter). Thus, we use a 90-day window on both sides of an annual earnings announcement date to calculate analysts’ forecast revision (REV_EA). This will ensure that the prior consensus forecast is after the announcement of third fiscal quarter earnings, and the latter consensus forecast is before the announcement of first fiscal quarter earnings. On the one hand, using a window period longer than 90 days may not ensure that the calculated analysts’ forecast revision reflects only the news contained in the annual earnings announcement made in the fourth fiscal quarter. On the other hand, using a smaller window period of less than 90 days may unnecessarily reduce sample size. In our sample, we find that the average number of days between the annual earnings announcement date and the first updated consensus earnings forecast is 42.66 days. The average number of days between the annual earnings announcement date and the last updated consensus earnings forecast is 44.51 days.

Unlike earnings announcements, which are made only once every quarter and about 90 days between each announcement, managers may announce earnings forecasts more than once in a single quarter. Thus, following prior research (e.g., Hutton et al. 2012), we use a 30-day window period to calculate REV_MF. In our sample, we find that the average number of days between the management forecast date and the first updated consensus earnings forecast is 5.88. The average number of days between the management forecast date and the last updated consensus earnings forecast is 15.62.

Our study’s primary focus is whether CSR performance per se is indicative of managerial integrity and ethics, which in turn is indicative of disclosure quality and financial performance. Thus, the examination of our underlying assumptions about disclosure quality and earnings persistence is secondary. We note that if the assumptions hold, then including proxies of disclosure quality and earnings persistence in our empirical specifications will mechanically diminish the explanatory power of CSR performance for investors’ and analyst’ reactions. However, such an outcome does not invalidate the inference that CSR performance can be indicative of managerial integrity and ethics, which are factors that can influence disclosure quality and earnings persistence.

In their validation test, Chen et al. (2015) find that DQ is negatively (positively) associated with analysts’ forecast dispersion (accuracy), negatively associated with the information asymmetry component of bid-ask spreads, and negatively associated with the cost of capital.

The use of lagged earnings in Eq. (6) may raise concerns about bias and inefficient ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates for dynamic panel model. However, Nickell (1981) and Baltagi (2008) note that OLS coefficient estimates of a lagged dependent variable are biased mostly because of the correlations between firm fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. In Eq. (6), we do not use firm fixed effects, only industry and year fixed effects. Moreover, we also adjust for inefficient estimates by calculating firm-clustered standard errors to account for firm-level serial correlations. Nonetheless, to address concerns about dynamic panel model, we employ the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) approach to estimate Eq. (6) as a robustness check. The results (untabulated) remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6, and our inferences remain unchanged.

The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are based on the largest sample in our study (based on the samples used in Table 3). When we restrict our analyses to the smaller samples that have analysts’ forecasts (based on the samples used in Table 4), we find similar results to those reported in Tables 5 and 6. Therefore, the asymmetric effect of CSR performance on firms’ actual disclosure quality and earnings persistence is not dependent on the specific samples used in our analyses.

In addition, we check the variance inflation factor (VIF) for estimated Eqs. (1)–(4). The VIFs for our test variables (i.e., CSRS × ESURP, CSRC × ESURP, CSRS × MFSURP, and CSRC × MFSURP) and the control variables are all below ten, except for the interacted terms of control variables LNSALES and INST with both ESURP and MFSURP. As such, we perform a robustness check by dropping LNSALES and INST completely from Eqs. (1)–(4) and re-estimate these equations. We find that the results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 of the paper, and we believe multicollinearity does not affect our overall results and inferences.

We caveat that our findings can neither speak to why investors and analysts view positive CSR performance differently, nor to the appropriateness of their differential reactions to earnings-related corporate disclosures. However, one possible explanation is that some analysts may issue optimistic earnings forecasts and stock recommendations to please managers so that they can gain better access to firm information and can build better relationship with the firms (e.g., see Ke and Yu 2006; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). Thus, it is possible that financial analysts may view and react to positive CSR performance differently from equity investors because they have a slightly different set of incentives and decision-making outcomes.

We combine the KLD’s employee and diversity dimensions and the community and human rights dimensions into two single stakeholder categories (employee and community). This is for the sake of brevity as the diversity dimension corresponds to CSR activities that primarily affect employees, whereas the human rights dimension corresponds to CSR activities that are associated with international labor rights and with relations between companies and indigenous people.

Untabulated results show that the results on CSR concern variables reported in Tables 10 and 11 are qualitatively similar when we include the CSR strength variable in the regression specifications.

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Titel: Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Disclosures: An Investigation of Investors’ and Analysts’ Perceptions
verfasst von: Audrey Hsu
Kevin Koh
Sophia Liu
Yen H. Tong
Publikationsdatum: 23.12.2017
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 2/2019
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3767-0

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