nach oben

Public Choice

Erschienen in:

10.08.2017

Crafting consensus

verfasst von: Jan Zápal

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 1-2/2017

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

The paper analyzes the problem of a committee chair using favors at her disposal to maximize the likelihood that her proposal gains committee support. The favors increase the probability of a given member approving the chair’s proposal via a smooth voting function. The decision-making protocol is any quota voting rule. The paper characterizes the optimal allocation of any given level of favors and the optimal expenditure-minimizing level of favors. The optimal allocation divides favors uniformly among a coalition of the committee members. At a low level of favors, the coalition comprises all committee members. At a high level, it is the minimum winning coalition. The optimal expenditure level guarantees the chair certain support of the minimum winning coalition if favors are abundant and uncertain support of all committee members if favors are scarce; elitist or egalitarian committees are compatible with a strategic chair. The results are robust to changing the chair’s objectives and to alternative voting functions, and reconcile theoretical predictions with empirical observations about legislative bargaining experiments, lobby vote buying and executive lawmaking.

Vorheriger Artikel Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency

Nächster Artikel Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

Others, for example Dougherty and Edward (2012), use the term k-majority rule.

Our voting functions are formally related to the contest success functions. See Amegashie (2002) on the use of contest success functions in a bargaining model and Corchon and Dahm (2010) on the connection between contests and bargaining. Moreover, the voting functions are related to probabilistic voting (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) in electoral competition models. We study distribution (of favors), while electoral models typically study redistribution (of income) from one group of voters to another and predict no redistribution with homogeneous voters.

Supermajorities arise in legislative bargaining in non-stationary equilibria (Norman 2002; Dahm et al. 2014; Dahm and Glazer 2015), when proposing is costly (Glazer and McMillan 1990, 1992) or while bargaining over public goods (Volden and Wiseman 2007).

Supermajorities arise in government formation when proposers are uncertain about which coalitions will form (Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981), under preference for ideologically connected coalitions (Axelrod 1970), under uncertainty about the size of the voting body created by abstention (Koehler 1975), because supermajorities make legislative logrolls self-enforcing (Carrubba and Volden 2000), because supermajorities allow for extraction of rents from excess coalition members (Baron and Diermeier 2001) and in the presence of the agenda setter’s aspirations for political stability and greatness (Doron and Sherman 1995).

Most of the vote-buying literature restricts attention either to vote (yes versus no) contingent payments or to outcome (acceptance versus rejection) contingent payments. Dal Bo (2007) introduces ‘pivotal bribes’—payments contingent on a vote being outcome-pivotal—and shows that these allow a single vote-buyer to purchase all votes almost for free. Felgenhauer and Gruner (2008) and Morgan and Vardy (2011) use pivotal bribes, at least in part of their analyses. The pivotal bribes are related but distinct from the observation that if voters can commit to vote for a certain action in return for a transfer, the resulting Bertrand competition among the voters benefits the vote-buyer (Ferejohn 1986).

Tyutin and Zaporozhets (2017), assuming identical payments to the members of the paid coalition, generalize this insight to multiple players.

We assume that the chair is not a voting member of the committee. This is not important. If the chair were to vote, we could relabel n and q, if necessary, and proceed without further alterations.

The full specification is required for the discussion of alternative voting functions in Sect. 5.

Section 5 discusses voting functions generated by different distributions of \((o_{i})_{i\in N}\).

The upfront payments and campaign promises terminology comes from the vote-buying literature, specifically from Dekel et al. (2008).

Section 5 discusses the addition of an outside option the chair receives if her proposal fails.

This observation greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis, as it implies that the uncertainty remaining in the number of votes the chair receives has a Binomial distribution with \(n-r^{*}-s^{*}\) trials, not a Poisson Binomial distribution. The Poisson Binomial random variable represents the number of successes in n independent Bernoulli trials with success probabilities \(p_{1},\ldots ,p_{n}\). The Binomial distribution is the special case when all of the probabilities are equal.

Universal coalitions, in which all members receive favors, can be seen as equally extreme and, hence, implausible prediction as the minimum winning coalitions. However, the model predicts universal coalitions among members who are willing to sell their votes, leaving members who are not willing to sell outside the model. Moreover, not every favor-receiver votes yes.

We conjecture that \(r^{*}\) with increasing \(b\in [q-1,q)\) visits any integer in \(\{0,\ldots ,n-q\}\) and is non-decreasing. We have (numerically) confirmed the conjecture for \(n\le 13\) and any \(q\le n\). Formal proof, however, eludes us.

An alternative intuition uses the fact that the mean number of votes given any \({\mathbf {p}}=(p_{i})_{i\in N}\) is \(\sum _{i\in N}p_{i}\le b\). When \(b\ge q\), the minimum winning coalition clearly is optimal. When \(b<q-1\), the chair’s proposal on average loses and her optimal favor allocation maximizes the variance in the number of votes, \(\sum _{i\in N}p_{i}(1-p_{i})\), which is done by setting \({\mathbf {p}}=(\frac{b}{n})_{i\in N}\). When \(b\in [q-1,q)\), the chair increases the variance only partially.

A Gaussian or ordinary hypergeometric function \(\,_{2}F_{1}\) is a special function that includes many other (special) functions as special cases. See the preliminary section to the proofs in Appendix 1 or Olver et al. (2010) for details.

Propositions 2 and 3 reflect a large increase in B. The former proposition shows that B and \(b^{*}\) are positively related in general.

Because \(\frac{n}{2}+\frac{1}{2}\,_{2}F_{1}(1,1+n,1+\frac{n}{2},\frac{1}{2})\) equals \(\frac{n}{2}+\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\sqrt{\pi }}{2}z(n)\), where, using \(\Gamma \), the Euler gamma function, \(z(n)=\frac{\Gamma \left( 1+\frac{n}{2}\right) }{\Gamma \left( \frac{1+n}{2}\right) }\) and we have \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }z(n)-\frac{\sqrt{n}}{\sqrt{2}}=0\).

The objective \(B{\mathbb {R}}_{q|n}[b]-b\) assumes that, for all \(i\in N\), the chair pays \(x_{i}\) to i and i votes yes with probability \(p_{i}(x_{i})=x_{i}\). This requires a behavioral model of the voting functions, for example, i voting yes out of gratitude to the chair for having received \(x_{i}\). Generating the voting functions through vote-contingent payments and vote motivation implies that the chair pays only for the votes she actually receives.

Assuming that the chair pays only for the votes she actually receives considerably complicates the analysis. In the \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) problem, the chair now maximizes, by choosing \({\mathbf {p}}\in {\mathbb {R}}^{n}\) subject to the ex-post budget constraint \({\mathbf {p}}*{\mathbf {1}}\le B\) and \(p_{i}\in [0,1]\) for \(\forall i\in N\), either \((B-{\mathbf {p}}*{\mathbf {p}}){\mathbb {P}}_{q|n}[{\mathbf {p}}]\) or \(B{\mathbb {P}}_{q|n}[{\mathbf {p}}]-{\mathbf {p}}*{\mathbf {p}}\), depending on whether she pays for the votes only when her proposal passes or not. The complication arises because \({\mathbb {P}}_{q|n}[{\mathbf {p}}]\) and \(-{\mathbf {p}}*{\mathbf {p}}\) must be maximized jointly, so that the nested nature of the \({{\mathbb {FA}}}\) and \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) problems is lost. The only observation that does not require extended additional analysis is that, for \(B<q-1\), any solution to the \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) problem must involve uniform allocation of favors among committee members. This is because, for any \(b'<B\), \(p_{i}=\frac{b'}{n}\) for \(\forall i\in N\) maximizes both \({\mathbb {P}}_{q|n}[{\mathbf {p}}]\) and \(-{\mathbf {p}}*{\mathbf {p}}\), the former by Proposition 1 and the latter by a simple argument.

Because B in \(B{\mathbb {R}}_{q|n}[b]-b\) captures the importance of the proposal for the chair, the second effect does not arise when the proposal is important for the chair.

Setting \(n=q=1\) and \(B\in (0,1)\cup (1,2)\), \(b^{*}=\frac{B}{2}\) in the benchmark \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) while \(b^{*}=0\) if \(B<1\) and \(b^{*}=1\) if \(B>1\) with upfront payments. The change in \(b^{*}\) under upfront payments illustrates the first effect when \(B>1\) and the second effect when \(B<1\).

Upfront payments lower the amount of favors distributed for a small overall budget and increase the amount of favors distributed for a large overall budget. The first effect is similar to the effect of upfront payments in Dekel et al. (2008) and is driven by the all-pay nature of the upfront payments. The second effect is specific to our model and arises because the upfront payments can be considered as an investment, and the chair ensures that her investment returns a profit (results in acceptance) by increasing the investment itself.

As an example, consider binary voting over alternatives yielding utility \(x_{i}\) and y in a quantal response model such as the Quantal Response Equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Then the probability that i votes for \(x_{i}\) is \(p_{i}(x_{i})=\frac{\exp {\lambda x_{i}}}{\exp {\lambda x_{i}}+\exp {\lambda y}}\), where \(\lambda \ge 0\) measures the precision in i’s best response. Thus, \(p_{i}\) is increasing as a function of \(x_{i}\), convex for \(x_{i}\le y\) and concave otherwise.

For the Quantal Response Equilibrium mentioned in footnote 24, we have constructed an example with \(n=3\) and \(q=2\) to illustrate how concavity creates incentives for \(x_{i}\approx x_{j}\) and convexity for \(x_{i}\gg x_{j}\). As y increases from 0 to 1, the voting functions change in a smooth manner from concave to convex, assuming \(b=1\). Correspondingly, the optimal favor allocation focuses first on all 3 players and then switches to focusing on 2, minimum winning, players.

The jump in the \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) solution is driven by points where \({\mathbb {R}}_{q|n}\) is not differentiable. These points correspond to the values of b at which the \({{\mathbb {FA}}}\) solution switches between different coalition sizes. This shows that analysis of the \({{\mathbb {CE}}}\) problem cannot be conducted using calculus since \({\mathbb {R}}_{q|n}\) is endogenous.

The empirical tests of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and of Groseclose and Snyder (1996) by Wiseman (2004) are notable exceptions.

Campos and Giovannoni (2007), Richter et al. (2009), Dorsch (2013) and Kang (2016) study lobbying empirically (see Binderkrantz 2014 and Gregor 2017, for surveys).

The theorem is stated for \(t\in (0,1-p)\), but its discussion clarifies that for \(t=1-p\) the bound is \(p^{n}\) and \(p^{n}\le \exp {[-2n(1-p)^2]}\) \(\forall n\in {\mathbb {N}}_{\ge 1}\) and \(\forall p\in (0,1)\) is standard to verify.

Hoeffding (1956, Theorem 2) shows that if \({\mathbf {p}}^{*}\) has two interior coordinates \(p_{i}^{*}\ne p_{j}^{*}\), then there exists another solution to \({{\mathbb {FA}}}\), \({\mathbf {p}}'\), identical to \({\mathbf {p}}^{*}\) except that \(p_{i}'=p_{j}'\). Lemma 4 is stronger, it shows that \({\mathbf {p}}^{*}\) with interior \(p_{i}^{*}\ne p_{j}^{*}\) does not exist.

Theorem 1 in Darroch (1964) relies on all coordinates of \({\mathbf {p}}\) to lie strictly between zero and unity. To see we can apply the result, note that \({\mathbb {P}}^{*}_{s|n-3}[{\mathbf {p}}^{\{ijk\},*}]={\mathbb {P}}^{*}_{s-u|n-3-u-z}[{\mathbf {p}}^{\{ijkuz\},*}]\) for \(s\in \{q-3,q-2,q-1\}\). We have, \(\forall s\in \{q-3,q-2,q-1\}\), \(s-u\ge q-3-u\ge 0\) by \(u\le q-3\), \(n-3-u-z\ge 2\) by \(z+u\le n-5\) and \(s-u\le n-3-u-z\Leftrightarrow z\le n-3-s\le n-q-2\) by \(z\le n-q-2\).

Aliprantis, C. D., & Border, K. C. (2006). Infinite dimensional analysis. A Hitchhiker's guide. Berlin: Springer.

Amegashie, J. A. (2002). Committees and rent-seeking effort under probabilistic voting. Public Choice, 112(3–4), 345–350.CrossRef

Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. S. (1988). Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82(2), 405–422.CrossRef

Axelrod, R. M. (1970). Conflict of interest: A theory of divergent goals with applications to politics. Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing.

Banks, J. S. (2000). Buying supermajorities in finite legislatures. American Political Science Review, 94(3), 677–681.CrossRef

Banks, J. S., & Duggan, J. (2000). A bargaining model of collective choice. American Political Science Review, 94(1), 73–88.CrossRef

Banks, J. S., & Duggan, J. (2006). A general bargaining model of legislative policy-making. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(1), 49–85.CrossRef

Baron, D. P. (1991). A spatial bargaining theory of government formation in parliamentary systems. American Political Science Review, 85(1), 137–164.CrossRef

Baron, D. P. (1993). Government formation and endogenous parties. American Political Science Review, 87(1), 34–47.CrossRef

Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933–967.CrossRef

Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181–1206.CrossRef

Bassi, A. (2013). A model of endogenous government formation. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 777–793.

Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1986). Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(1), 1–31.CrossRef

Binderkrantz, A. S. (2014). Legislatures, lobbying, and interest groups. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strom (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of legislative studies (pp. 526–542). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyer, P. C., Konrad, K. A., & Roberson, B. (2017). Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 71, 49–62.CrossRef

Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Campos, N. F., & Giovannoni, F. (2007). Lobbying, corruption and political influence. Public Choice, 131(1), 1–21.CrossRef

Cardona, D., & Ponsati, C. (2007). Bargaining one-dimensional social choices. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 627–651.CrossRef

Cardona, D., & Ponsati, C. (2011). Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1), 65–75.CrossRef

Carrubba, C. J., & Volden, C. (2000). Coalitional politics and logrolling in legislative institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 261–277.CrossRef

Chen, Y., & Eraslan, H. (2014). Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information. Theoretical Economics, 9(2), 483–513.CrossRef

Corchon, L., & Dahm, M. (2010). Foundations for contest success functions. Economic Theory, 43(1), 81–98.CrossRef

Dahm, M., & Glazer, A. (2015). A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 116, 465–480.CrossRef

Dahm, M., Dur, R., & Glazer, A. (2014). How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy. Public Choice, 159(1–2), 63–82.CrossRef

Dal Bo, E. (2007). Bribing voters. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 789–803.CrossRef

Darroch, J. N. (1964). On the distribution of the number of successes in independent trials. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 35(3), 1317–1321.CrossRef

Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., & Wolinsky, A. (2008). Vote buying: General elections. Journal of Political Economy, 116(2), 351–380.CrossRef

Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., & Wolinsky, A. (2009). Vote buying: Legislatures and lobbying. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 4(2), 103–128.CrossRef

Diaconis, P., & Zabell, S. (1991). Closed form summation for classical distributions: Variations on a theme of de Moivre. Statistical Science, 6(3), 284–302.CrossRef

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2000). Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. Journal of Economic Theory, 94(1), 46–79.CrossRef

Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R. B. (1999). Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1182–1196.CrossRef

Doron, G., & Sherman, M. (1995). A comprehensive decision-making exposition of coalition politics: The framer’s perspective of size. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7(3), 317–333.CrossRef

Dorsch, M. (2013). Bailout for sale? The vote to save wall street. Public Choice, 155(3–4), 211–228.CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2012). Voting for Pareto optimality: A multidimensional analysis. Public Choice, 151(3–4), 655–678.CrossRef

Eraslan, H. (2002). Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 11–30.CrossRef

Felgenhauer, M., & Gruner, H. P. (2008). Committees and special interests. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(2), 219–243.CrossRef

Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50(1–3), 5–25.CrossRef

Frechette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Lehrer, S. F. (2003). Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 221–232.CrossRef

Frechette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers. Econometrica, 73(6), 1893–1937.CrossRef

Gamson, W. A. (1961). A theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Review, 26(3), 373–382.CrossRef

Glazer, A., & McMillan, H. (1990). Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly. Social Choice and Welfare, 7(4), 369–380.CrossRef

Glazer, A., & McMillan, H. (1992). Amend the old or address the new: Broad-based legislation when proposing policies is costly. Public Choice, 74(1), 43–58.CrossRef

Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G. (1999). Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1135–1155.CrossRef

Gregor, M. (2017). Lobbying mechanisms. In N. Schofield & G. Caballero (Eds.), State, institutions and democracy: Contributions of political economy. Cham: Springer.

Groseclose, T., & Snyder, J. M, Jr. (1996). Buying supermajorities. American Political Science Review, 90(2), 303–315.CrossRef

Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 84(4), 833–850.

Hoeffding, W. (1956). On the distribution of the number of successes in independent trials. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 27(3), 713–721.CrossRef

Hoeffding, W. (1963). Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(301), 13–30.CrossRef

Kang, K. (2016). Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector. Review of Economic Studies, 83(1), 269–305.CrossRef

Koehler, D. H. (1975). Legislative coalition formation: The meaning of minimal winning size with uncertain participation. American Journal of Political Science, 19(1), 27–39.CrossRef

Kuhn, H. W., & Tucker, A. W. (1951). Nonlinear programming. In J. Neyman (Ed.), Proceedings of the second Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability (pp. 481–492). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Laver, M. (1998). Models of government formation. Annual Review of Political Science, 1(1), 1–25.CrossRef

Laver, M., Marchi, S., & Mutlu, H. (2011). Negotiation in legislatures over government formation. Public Choice, 147(3–4), 285–304.CrossRef

Le Breton, M., & Salanie, F. (2003). Lobbying under political uncertainty. Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), 2589–2610.CrossRef

Le Breton, M., & Zaporozhets, V. (2007). Legislative lobbying under political uncertainty. IDEI Working Paper Series No. 493

Le Breton, M., & Zaporozhets, V. (2010). Sequential legislative lobbying under political certainty. Economic Journal, 120(543), 281–312.CrossRef

Le Breton, M., Sudholter, P., & Zaporozhets, V. (2012). Sequential legislative lobbying. Social Choice and Welfare, 39(2–3), 491–520.CrossRef

Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice, 52(3), 273–297.CrossRef

Mandler, M. (2013). How to win a large election. Games and Economic Behavior, 78(1), 44–63.CrossRef

McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 6–38.CrossRef

Miller, L., & Vanberg, C. (2013). Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis. Public Choice, 155(3–4), 373–394.CrossRef

Miller, L., & Vanberg, C. (2015). Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining. European Journal of Political Economy, 37, 288–302.CrossRef

Montero, M. (2007). Inequity aversion may increase inequity. Economic Journal, 117(519), C192–C204.CrossRef

Morgan, J., & Vardy, F. (2011). On the buyability of voting bodies. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 23(2), 260–287.CrossRef

Morgan, J., & Vardy, F. (2012). Negative vote buying and the secret ballot. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 28(4), 818–849.CrossRef

Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 87(4), 856–869.CrossRef

Norman, P. (2002). Legislative bargaining and coalition formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 102(2), 322–353.CrossRef

Olver, F. W. J., Lozier, D. W., Boisvert, R. F., & Clark, C. W. (Eds.). (2010). NIST handbook of mathematical functions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Pardalos, P. M. (2009). Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions. In C. A. Floudas & P. M. Pardalos (Eds.), Encyclopedia of optimization (2nd ed., pp. 1794–1797). New York, NY: Springer.CrossRef

Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. F. (2009). Lobbying and taxes. American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), 893–909.CrossRef

Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. London: Yale University Press.

Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice, 33(4), 27–43.CrossRef

Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1979). Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), 563–587.CrossRef

Saiegh, S. M. (2011). Ruling by statute: How uncertainty and vote buying shape lawmaking. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Saiegh, S. M. (2014). Lawmaking. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strom (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of legislative studies (pp. 481–513). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Seidmann, D. J. (2011). A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees. Social Choice and Welfare, 36(1), 49–74.CrossRef

Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981). Political preferences for the pork barrel: A generalization. American Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 96–111.CrossRef

Snyder, J. M. (1991). On buying legislatures. Economics & Politics, 3(2), 93–109.CrossRef

Tsai, T. S., & Yang, C. C. (2010a). Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: The role of uncertainty. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(2), 345–361.CrossRef

Tsai, T. S., & Yang, C. C. (2010b). On majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. International Economic Review, 51(4), 959–979.CrossRef

Tyutin, A., & Zaporozhets, V. (2017). On legislative lobbying under political uncertainty. TSE Working Paper Series No. 17-807

Volden, C., & Wiseman, A. E. (2007). Bargaining in legislatures over particularistic and collective goods. American Political Science Review, 101(1), 79–92.CrossRef

Weingast, B. R. (1979). A rational choice perspective on congressional norms. American Journal of Political Science, 23(2), 245–262.CrossRef

Wiseman, A. E. (2004). Tests of vote-buyer theories of coalition formation in legislatures. Political Research Quarterly, 57(3), 441–450.CrossRef

Titel: Crafting consensus
verfasst von: Jan Zápal
Publikationsdatum: 10.08.2017
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 1-2/2017
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1-2/2017

Ian Kumekawa: The first serious optimist: A. C. Pigou and the birth of welfare economics

Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates

Richard E. Wagner: Liberal political economy: a rational reconstruction

Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?

Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency

Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

Premium Partner