2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced \(\mathtt{LED}\)
verfasst von : Ivica Nikolić, Lei Wang, Shuang Wu
Erschienen in: Fast Software Encryption
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Abstract
LED-64
and LED-128
. We show that with an application of the recently proposed slidex attacks [5], one immediately improves the complexity of the previous single-key 4-step attack on LED-128
. Further, we explore the possibility of multicollisions and show single-key attacks on 6 steps of LED-128
. A generalization of our multicollision attack leads to the statement that no 6-round cipher with two subkeys that alternate, or 2-round cipher with linearly dependent subkeys, is secure in the single-key model. Next, we exploit the possibility of finding pairs of inputs that follow a certain differential rather than a differential characteristic, and obtain chosen-key differential distinguishers for 5-step LED-64
, as well as 8-step and 9-step LED-128
. We provide examples of inputs that follow the 8-step differential, i.e. we are able to practically confirm our results on 2/3 of the steps of LED-128
. We introduce a new type of chosen-key differential distinguisher, called random-difference distinguisher, and successfully penetrate 10 of the total 12 steps of LED-128
. We show that this type of attack is generic in the chosen-key model, and can be applied to any 10-round cipher with two alternating subkeys.