Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies 2/2014

01.06.2014

Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes

verfasst von: Heng An, Yul W. Lee, Ting Zhang

Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies | Ausgabe 2/2014

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

A significantly larger number of firms increase the expected rate of return on pension plan assets (ERR) to make their reported earnings meet/exceed analyst forecasts than would be expected by chance. In the short run, the stock market reacts positively to these firms’ earnings announcements, suggesting that investors fail to recognize that earnings benchmarks are achieved through ERR manipulation. In the long run, however, firms that employ this earnings management strategy significantly underperform control firms in both stock returns and operating performance.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
See Degeorge et al. (1999); Bartov et al. (2002); and Kasznik and McNichols (2002). Managerial reputation, favorable compensation contracts, and building credibility with the capital markets are also incentives for managers to report earnings that meet/exceed analyst forecasts (Healy and Wahlen 1999). In addition, previous studies find that pressure on managers to avoid missing analyst forecasts has intensified in recent years (e.g., Barth et al. 1999).
 
2
This example is given by Bebchuk and Fried (2004, pp. 125–126). The analyst EPS forecast number for Verizon is obtained from the I/B/E/S file (both the mean and median earnings forecasts for Verizon were $3.01 in 2000).
 
3
Another example is IBM. According to Revell (2002), IBM reported $11.5 billion in pretax earnings in 2000, to which its pension plan contributed $1.2 billion, accounting for 10 % of total pretax earnings. Further analysis shows that about $200 million in earnings were due to an increase in ERR (from 9.5 to 10 %). In 2000 IBM’s actual return on plan assets was 3.06 %. In 2001 IBM used 10 % for its ERR and reported $904 million in pension income, representing 13.2 % of total pretax earnings. Given the large size of IBM’s pension plan assets (about $50 billion), a small increase in ERR would have a significant effect on its earnings. For instance, a 10 basis point increase in ERR would raise IBM’s expected pension income by $500 million. Thanks largely to ERR increases, IBM’s reported EPS exceeded analyst forecasts in both 2000 and 2001. This example is also cited by Bergstresser et al. (2006).
 
4
We note, however, that several recent studies provide evidence that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect the effect of pension-related information (i.e., Picconi 2006; Coronado et al. 2008). After interviewing analysts about their information-gathering process and physically inspecting 49 analyst spreadsheets, Døskeland and Kinserdal (2010) report that analysts do not incorporate relevant pension information into their valuation models.
 
5
“Increasingly, we have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding common business practices” (Arthur Levitt, speaking at the New York University Center for Law and Business, September 28, 1998).
 
6
According to Bergstresser et al. (2006, p. 7), firms with larger pension assets relative to operating assets are more sensitive to ERR changes. Suppose two firms both have $100 in operating assets, where Firm A has $20 in pension assets and Firm B has $60. Both firms earn a 4 %, or $4, return on their operating assets. If both firms change ERR from 10 to 11 %, Firm A will increase its net income by $0.20, or 5 % ($0.20/$4), and Firm B will increase its net income by $0.60, or 15 % ($0.60/$4).
 
7
The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) view on the ERR timing issue is vague, if not absent. The following paragraph of SFAS 132 appears to provide a relevant discussion: “The Board observed that disclosures about certain key assumptions would be more useful if those disclosures followed consistent conventions. For example, some entities’ disclosures under Statement 132 indicate that the disclosed key assumptions are as of the latest measurement date even though the expected long-term rate-of-return-on-assets assumption is as of an earlier date used to determine current-period assumed investment earnings” (SFAS 132, p.25, paragraph A36).
 
8
We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for pointing out this ERR timing issue. .
 
9
For example, according to a report from finance.yahoo, after filing the 2011 annual report, the CEO of McDermott International Inc. said at a conference on February 29, 2012, “we do view the current range of analyst estimates for the full year as reasonable bookends at this time, based on our current 2012 forecast and expected business conditions.”
 
10
According to the cash flow statement method (e.g., Collins and Hribar 2002), accruals can be measured as Accruals = EBXI – CFO, where EBXI are earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and CFO is net cash flow from operating activities. From the equation above, an increase in the ERR inflates accruals through an increase in firm earnings (as discussed in the “Appendix”). However, the effect of a change in the ERR would not be incorporated into working capital accruals in the balance sheet method (Sloan 1996), because the prepaid/accrued pension cost affected by an ERR change is classified as a long-term asset/liability. If the balance sheet method is to be used, one would have to use an extended definition of accruals that incorporates changes in noncurrent assets/liabilities. We are grateful to the editor for making this point.
 
11
Other variables used for scaling the difference between the FVPA and PBO include total assets, operating income, number of employees, and the PBO. See Franzoni and Marín (2006) for the rationale for using the market value of equity as a scalar.
 
12
Historically, the I/B/E/S earnings data have been adjusted for stock splits and rounded to the nearest cent. Therefore, using adjusted I/B/E/S data would result in a disproportionate proportion of firms that exactly meet analyst forecasts. For example, an EPS estimate of $0.10 and a reported EPS of $0.11 would both be recorded as $0.02 after a 5-to-1 split. In addition, because firms splitting their stock tend to have good performance, they also have an ex post performance bias. Diether et al. (2002) are the first to identify these issues related to the adjusted I/B/E/S data.
 
13
Other pension assumptions, such as the pension liabilities discount rate, could be changed simultaneously with the ERR change. We discuss this issue in Sect. 4.5 on robustness.
 
15
Note that ∆ERR becomes negative for ERR-decreasing firms. Thus the pre-managed EPS is estimated by adding back the ERR earnings impact to the reported EPS.
 
16
Panel A of Table 3 reveals that ERR-increasing firms tend to underperform control firms as the event window is extended to 10 to 40 days. This suggests that investors may slowly digest announced earnings and recognize the earnings impact of an ERR increase.
 
17
When the four-factor alpha is used as the dependent variable, we do not include Beta, LogMKV, LogBM, or MOM as independent variables.
 
18
The information on the managerial decision on the ERR may not be available to analysts until the annual report is released. According to current pension accounting standards, firms are not required to report the ERR information on the quarterly report. However, analysts could infer an ERR change from management earnings guidance. To investigate such a possibility, we checked First Call Management Earning Guidance Database maintained by I/B/E/S. We searched key words such as “pension,” “pension assumption,” “ERR,” “expected rate of return of pension,” and “pension asset return.” We could not find any evidence of management guidance on ERR changes. In addition, we randomly selected 20 ERR-increasing firms from our sample and reviewed the notes of the quarterly report. We did not detect any discussion on ERR changes in the notes. We also used a key word search to see whether managers disclose ERR changes in the earnings conference calls and did not discover any discussion about ERR changes, although managers occasionally discuss the pension funding status and pension liability discount rate. It is still possible, however, that shrewd analysts could infer ERR changes from the publicly available information or obtain the ERR information through other possible channels. Our regression tests using ESurprise do not completely exclude such a possibility.
 
19
Monthly returns in the WLS model are weighted by the square root of the number of sample firms included in the monthly portfolio.
 
20
We obtain consistent results when using the BHAR method. In particular, we use two groups of control firms to estimate the BHAR: (1) firms that maintain/decrease the ERR and report earnings that marginally miss analyst forecasts and (2) firms that increase the ERR but do not change their missing or exceeding status. For each group of control firms, we construct size-, size/industry-, and size/book-to-market-matched control firms, according to Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Hertzel et al. (2002). We find that ERR-increasing firms earn significantly negative BHARs in the subsequent five years compared to control firms. These results are available from the authors upon request.
 
21
There were 369 S&P 500 firms and 627 Fortune 1,000 firms sponsoring DB pension plans at the end of 2005.
 
22
This part of the discussion is based on Kieso et al. (2011), Ch. 20.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Asthana, S. (2008). Earnings management, expected returns on pension assets, and resource allocation decisions. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 7, 199–220.CrossRef Asthana, S. (2008). Earnings management, expected returns on pension assets, and resource allocation decisions. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 7, 199–220.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Baber, W., & Kang, S. (2002). The impact of split adjusting and rounding on analysts’ forecast error calculations. Accounting Horizons, 16(4), 277–289.CrossRef Baber, W., & Kang, S. (2002). The impact of split adjusting and rounding on analysts’ forecast error calculations. Accounting Horizons, 16(4), 277–289.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Banz, R., & Breen, W. J. (1986). Sample-dependent results using accounting and market data: Some evidence. Journal of Finance, 41, 779–793.CrossRef Banz, R., & Breen, W. J. (1986). Sample-dependent results using accounting and market data: Some evidence. Journal of Finance, 41, 779–793.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test-statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 341–372.CrossRef Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test-statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 341–372.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Barth, M., Elliott, J., & Finn, M. (1999). Market rewards associated with patterns of increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(2), 387–413.CrossRef Barth, M., Elliott, J., & Finn, M. (1999). Market rewards associated with patterns of increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(2), 387–413.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bartov, E., Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 173–204.CrossRef Bartov, E., Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 173–204.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press, pp 125–126. Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press, pp 125–126.
Zurück zum Zitat Bergstresser, D., Desai, M., & Rauh, J. (2006). Earnings manipulation, pension assumptions and managerial investment decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), 157–195.CrossRef Bergstresser, D., Desai, M., & Rauh, J. (2006). Earnings manipulation, pension assumptions and managerial investment decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), 157–195.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bernard, V., & Thomas, J. (1990). Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13, 305–340.CrossRef Bernard, V., & Thomas, J. (1990). Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13, 305–340.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bhojraj, S., Hribar, S., Picconi, M., & McInnis, J. (2009). Making sense of cents: An examination of firms that marginally miss or beat analyst forecasts. Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2361–2388.CrossRef Bhojraj, S., Hribar, S., Picconi, M., & McInnis, J. (2009). Making sense of cents: An examination of firms that marginally miss or beat analyst forecasts. Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2361–2388.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.CrossRef Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Burgstahler, D., & Eames, M. (2006). Management of earnings and analysts’ forecast to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(5–6), 633–652.CrossRef Burgstahler, D., & Eames, M. (2006). Management of earnings and analysts’ forecast to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(5–6), 633–652.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Collins, D., & Hribar, P. (2002). Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 105–134.CrossRef Collins, D., & Hribar, P. (2002). Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 105–134.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Coronado, J. L., Mitchell, O. S., Sharpe, S. A., & Nesbitt, S. B. (2008). Footnotes aren’t enough: The impact of pension accounting on stock values. Journal of Pension Accounting and Finance, 70, 257–276.CrossRef Coronado, J. L., Mitchell, O. S., Sharpe, S. A., & Nesbitt, S. B. (2008). Footnotes aren’t enough: The impact of pension accounting on stock values. Journal of Pension Accounting and Finance, 70, 257–276.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Coronado, J., & Sharpe, S. (2003). Did pension plan accounting contribute to a stock market bubble? Brookings Paper on Economy Activity, pp 323–359. Coronado, J., & Sharpe, S. (2003). Did pension plan accounting contribute to a stock market bubble? Brookings Paper on Economy Activity, pp 323–359.
Zurück zum Zitat Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999). Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business, 72(1), 1–33.CrossRef Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999). Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business, 72(1), 1–33.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Dichev, I. D., & Piotroski, J. D. (2001). The long-run stock returns following bond ratings changes. Journal of Finance, 56, 173–203.CrossRef Dichev, I. D., & Piotroski, J. D. (2001). The long-run stock returns following bond ratings changes. Journal of Finance, 56, 173–203.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Diether, K. B., Malloy, C. J., & Scherbina, A. (2002). Differences in opinion and the cross section of stock returns. Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2113–2141.CrossRef Diether, K. B., Malloy, C. J., & Scherbina, A. (2002). Differences in opinion and the cross section of stock returns. Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2113–2141.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Donelson, D., McInnis, J., & Mergenthaler, R. (2012). Discontinuities and earnings management: Evidence from restatements related to securities litigation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 242–268.CrossRef Donelson, D., McInnis, J., & Mergenthaler, R. (2012). Discontinuities and earnings management: Evidence from restatements related to securities litigation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 242–268.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Doyle, J., Lundholm, R., & Soliman, M. (2006). The extreme future stock returns following I/B/E/S earnings surprises. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 849–887.CrossRef Doyle, J., Lundholm, R., & Soliman, M. (2006). The extreme future stock returns following I/B/E/S earnings surprises. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 849–887.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Elgers, P., Pfeiffer, R., & Porter, S. (2003). Anticipatory income smoothing: A re-examination. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(3), 405–422.CrossRef Elgers, P., Pfeiffer, R., & Porter, S. (2003). Anticipatory income smoothing: A re-examination. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(3), 405–422.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 283–306.CrossRef Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 283–306.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3–56.CrossRef Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3–56.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Franzoni, F., & Marín, J. (2006). Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 61, 921–956.CrossRef Franzoni, F., & Marín, J. (2006). Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 61, 921–956.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Graham, J., Harvey, C., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1–3), 3–73.CrossRef Graham, J., Harvey, C., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1–3), 3–73.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hayn, C. (1995). The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(2), 125–153.CrossRef Hayn, C. (1995). The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(2), 125–153.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standards setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365–383.CrossRef Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standards setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365–383.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hertzel, M., Lemmon, M., Linck, J. S., & Rees, L. (2002). Long-run performance following private placements of equity. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2595–2617.CrossRef Hertzel, M., Lemmon, M., Linck, J. S., & Rees, L. (2002). Long-run performance following private placements of equity. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2595–2617.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Holden, C. W., & Lundstrum, L. L. (2009). Costly trading, managerial myopia, and long-term investment. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16(1), 126–135.CrossRef Holden, C. W., & Lundstrum, L. L. (2009). Costly trading, managerial myopia, and long-term investment. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16(1), 126–135.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hribar, P., Jenkins, N., & Johnson, W. (2006). Stock repurchase as an earnings management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41, 3–27.CrossRef Hribar, P., Jenkins, N., & Johnson, W. (2006). Stock repurchase as an earnings management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41, 3–27.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jin, L., Merton, R. C., & Bodie, Z. (2006). Do a firm’s equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan? Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 1–26.CrossRef Jin, L., Merton, R. C., & Bodie, Z. (2006). Do a firm’s equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan? Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 1–26.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193–228.CrossRef Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193–228.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. F. (2002). Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 727–759.CrossRef Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. F. (2002). Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 727–759.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kieso, D., Weygandt, J., & Warfield, T. (2011). Intermediate Accounting (14th ed.). Hoboken: Wiley. Kieso, D., Weygandt, J., & Warfield, T. (2011). Intermediate Accounting (14th ed.). Hoboken: Wiley.
Zurück zum Zitat Kothari, S. P., & Warner, J. B. A. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 301–339.CrossRef Kothari, S. P., & Warner, J. B. A. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 301–339.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lee, I., & Loughran, T. (1998). Performance following convertible bond issuance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4, 185–207.CrossRef Lee, I., & Loughran, T. (1998). Performance following convertible bond issuance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4, 185–207.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Levitt, A. (1998). The numbers game. Speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business on September 28, 1998. Levitt, A. (1998). The numbers game. Speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business on September 28, 1998.
Zurück zum Zitat Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. (1995). The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50(1), 23–51.CrossRef Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. (1995). The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50(1), 23–51.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Matsunaga, S., & Park, C. (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review, 76(3), 313–332.CrossRef Matsunaga, S., & Park, C. (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review, 76(3), 313–332.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mendenhall, R. (2004). Arbitrage risk and post-earnings-announcement drift. Journal of Business, 77, 875–894.CrossRef Mendenhall, R. (2004). Arbitrage risk and post-earnings-announcement drift. Journal of Business, 77, 875–894.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mitchell, M. L., & Stafford, E. (2000). Managerial decisions and long-run stock price performance. Journal of Business, 73, 287–320.CrossRef Mitchell, M. L., & Stafford, E. (2000). Managerial decisions and long-run stock price performance. Journal of Business, 73, 287–320.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Payne, J., & Thomas, W. (2003). The implication of using stock-split adjusted I/B/E/S data in empirical research. Accounting Review, 78(4), 1049–1067.CrossRef Payne, J., & Thomas, W. (2003). The implication of using stock-split adjusted I/B/E/S data in empirical research. Accounting Review, 78(4), 1049–1067.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Picconi, M. (2006). The perils of pensions: Does pension accounting lead investors and analysts astray? Accounting Review, 81, 925–955.CrossRef Picconi, M. (2006). The perils of pensions: Does pension accounting lead investors and analysts astray? Accounting Review, 81, 925–955.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rauh, J. D. (2006). Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans. Journal of Finance, 61, 33–71.CrossRef Rauh, J. D. (2006). Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans. Journal of Finance, 61, 33–71.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Revell, J. (2002). Beware the pension monster. Fortune, 9 December 2002. Revell, J. (2002). Beware the pension monster. Fortune, 9 December 2002.
Zurück zum Zitat Skinner, D. J., & Sloan, R. G. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2–3), 289–312.CrossRef Skinner, D. J., & Sloan, R. G. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2–3), 289–312.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sloan, R. G. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? Accounting Review, 71, 289–315. Sloan, R. G. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? Accounting Review, 71, 289–315.
Zurück zum Zitat Solomon, D., & Hawkins, L., Jr. (2005). Pension inquiry shines spotlight on assumptions. The Wall Street Journal, 25 November 2005. Solomon, D., & Hawkins, L., Jr. (2005). Pension inquiry shines spotlight on assumptions. The Wall Street Journal, 25 November 2005.
Zurück zum Zitat Spiess, D. K., & Affleck-Graves, J. (1995). Underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 243–267.CrossRef Spiess, D. K., & Affleck-Graves, J. (1995). Underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 243–267.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998a). Earnings management the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 63–99.CrossRef Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998a). Earnings management the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 63–99.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998b). Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935–1974.CrossRef Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998b). Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935–1974.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes
verfasst von
Heng An
Yul W. Lee
Ting Zhang
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2014
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Accounting Studies / Ausgabe 2/2014
Print ISSN: 1380-6653
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7136
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9261-8

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2014

Review of Accounting Studies 2/2014 Zur Ausgabe