Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and Authenticity

Carman criticizes early Dreyfus’ interpretation in Carman (2000) and Guignon’s interpretation in Carman 2000: 271–273. Later Dreyfus criticizes early Dreyfus’ interpretation in Dreyfus (2000). Individual criticisms of all five interpretations can be found in my Henschen (2010).

This view was probably first articulated by Tugendhat (1966: 309) and then adopted by Figal (1988: 260–261, 303–304).

Guignon himself acknowledges that his interpretation of authenticity is in conflict with this thesis. He states that his interpretation runs “counter to the awareness of wordliness and thrownness that is central to Being and Time” (Guignon 2000: 91). But instead of giving up on this interpretation, he believes the project of Being and Time to be defective in that it grounds “all ontology in something like the total transparency of self to self” (Guignon 2000: 91). It is well known that Heidegger himself regarded his project of Being and Time to be defective in a number of ways: one is with respect to its alleged anthropocentrism (cf. B 300f.), another is with respect to its concept of truth (cf. EPTT 446). It is questionable, however, whether it can be interpreted as being defective in the way envisaged by Guignon.

He suggests, for instance, that someone directs himself by a signpost “only in so far as there exists a regular use of signposts, a custom” (PI §198). He also repeatedly emphasizes the importance of training, drill and exercises in inculcating techniques within groups of people (PI §§189, 208). He, finally, explicitly mentions the social character of a language: the very possibility of a language, he says, rests on an agreement among speakers in definitions and judgements (PI §242).

As is well known from Baker and Hacker (1984), Baker and Hacker are quite critical of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. But even according to Kripke’s interpretation, we cannot say that Wittgenstein believed in the necessary publicness of understanding. Like Baker and Hacker Kripke examines the case of physically isolated individuals like Robinson Crusoe. The dire situation of this particular individual can easily be thought of as leading it to invent new ways of using tools or language to hunt or name species that had been unknown before. But when inventing new ways of using tools or language, Crusoe obviously introduces new rules of using tools or language. Accordingly, Kripke’s conclusion is not that he does not follow any rules when using tools or language in this newly invented way: “Does this mean that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow any rules, no matter what he does? I do not see that this follows” (Kripke 1982: 110). What Kripke’s conclusion states is that Crusoe cannot be said to be able to justify his belief (i.e. to know) that he follows any rules when using tools or language in a newly invented way. He cannot justify this belief unless he is included in some sort of community and able to teach his newly invented ways of using tools or language to other people who may then set up criteria for rule following which enable them to judge whether someone follows a rule or not: “What does follow is that if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him” (Kripke 1982: 110). Kripke also points out that the fact that physically isolated individuals do not know whether they follow any rules is no reason to panic:“[C]onsider what is true of one person considered in isolation. The most obvious fact is one that might have escaped us after long contemplation of the sceptical paradox. It holds no terrors in our daily lives; no one actually hesitates when asked to produce an answer to an addition problem! […] The entire point of the sceptical argument is that ultimately we reach a level where we act without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action. We act unhesitatingly but blindly” (Kripke 1982: 87).

For a detailed justification of this claim see my Henschen (2010: especially 96–97).

A similar interpretation can already be found in Dreyfus (1991: 208ff).

See my “Heidegger on Authenticity” (forthcoming).