Introduction
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Downsizing and Family Firms
Author | Country | Regional/local level of analysis | Theoretical framework | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Amato et al. (2020) | Spain | Local | Embeddedness | More than 2 family members involved in managerial positions | Employment growth | Municipality size positively impacts on the employment growth of family-managed firms. While both types of firms experienced a negative employment growth during the early stage of the global financial crisis (2007–08), family-managed firms located in small municipalities showed a higher employment growth than their non-family counterparts |
Backman et al. (2015) | Sweden | Local | Embeddedness | Family ownership (one or more family members own the majority of shares) and management (one or more family members are in managerial positions) | Employment growth | The spatial context affects family firms’ performance, with family-owned businesses in rural areas exhibiting higher employment growth than non-family firms |
Bassanini et al. (2013) | France | – | – | Family ownership (shareholders are either a family or an individual) | Wages level—Downsizing | While family-owned businesses pay lower wages to employees than non-family businesses on average, they ensure higher job security |
Bjuggren (2015) | Sweden | – | – | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity) | Downsizing | Employment in family-owned businesses is less sensitive to unanticipated sales and value-added shocks at the industrial level than in non-family ones |
Block (2010) | USA | – | Social identity and agency theory | Family ownership and management (CEO or Chairman is from family) | Downsizing | Family ownership reduces the likelihood of downsizing because of reputational concerns, while family management does not have any effect |
Chen et al. (2014) | Multiple countries | – | SEW approach | Family control | Employment growth | Family-controlled firms show higher employment growth than non-family-controlled firms. The impact of a poorer regulatory environment on the reduction of workforce growth rate is higher in family firms than in their non-family counterparts |
Diwisch et al. (2009) | Austria | – | – | Generation transfer | Employment growth | Family firms that have either planned or already transferred ownership and control show a significant positive impact on employment growth |
Greenwood et al. (2010) | Spain | Regional | Institutional theory | Family ownership and management (owner and his/her family work in the top management team) | Downsizing | Family firms are less likely to downsize than non-family firms. Size has an impact on downsizing decisions with larger family firms downsizing more than smaller ones. Family firms are not influenced by regional pressures |
Kappes and Schmid (2013) | Germany | – | Agency theory | Family ownership (at least 25% of firms' voting rights) and management (one member of the founding family in managerial positions) | Downsizing | Family firms actively managed by their founder and/or the founder’s family show longer time horizons— reflected in employee-related investments—than non-family firms |
Kim et al. (2019) | USA | – | Place-based perspective and RBV | Family ownership (at least 5% of firm’s outstanding equity) | Downsizing | Family firms are less likely to downsize than non-family firms. This tendency is
stronger when firms are located in less densely populated areas |
Lee (2006) | USA | – | – | Family ownership (founding family members or descendants hold shares) and management (founding family members or descendants are present in the board of directors) | Employment growth | Family-owned businesses have higher employment rates than their non-family counterparts. Family management is shown to foster employment stability during economic slowdowns |
Sanchez-Bueno et al. (2019) | Spain | – | SEW approach | More than 1 family member involved in managerial positions | Downsizing | There is a negative association between family firms and downsizing. Moreover, R&D influences this relationship with innovative family firms less likely to downsize than non-innovative ones |
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) | France | – | – | Family ownership (more than 20% of firms' voting rights) | Wages level—Downsizing | On average, family firms pay lower wages to employees than non-family firms. In contrast, the lower reactivity of family firms’ employment levels to industry shocks suggests that family firms provide greater job security to their workforce |
Stavrou et al. (2007) | USA | – | Stakeholder theory | Family ownership (at least 5% of firms' voting rights) and management (at least two directors have a family relationship) | Downsizing | Family firms are less likely to downsize than their non-family counterparts and this choice is irrespective of financial performance considerations |
Van Essen et al. (2015) | Multiple countries | – | Institutional theory | Family ownership (at least 5% of firms' voting rights and is the largest owner) | Wages level—Downsizing | Family firms are more resilient than non-family firms, which is reflected in the lower probability to downsize or decrease wages in both crisis and pre-crisis periods |
P: The propensity to downsizing is lower for family firms than for non-family counterparts.
Territorial Embeddedness, Family Firms and Downsizing
H1: Territorially embedded firms exhibit a lower downsizing propensity than non-embedded firms.
H2: Territorial embeddedness influences the relationships between family firm status and downsizing propensity in such a way that the propensity to downsize is lower for territorially embedded family firms than for territorially embedded non-family firms.
Global Financial Crisis, Family Firms and Downsizing
H3: During the global financial crisis the propensity to downsize is lower for family firms than non-family counterparts.
Territorial Embeddedness, the Global Financial Crisis and Downsizing in Family Firms
H4: The moderating effect of territorial embeddedness on the relationships between family firm status and downsizing is higher in crisis periods than in periods of economic stability.
Data Sources and Variables
Sample and Data
Variables and Measures
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Family Firm
Territorial Embeddedness
Global Financial Crisis
Control Variables
Empirical model
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Panel 2A: summary statistics for whole sample | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
N | Mean | St. dev | Min | p25 | Median | p75 | Max | |
Downsizing | 21,643 | 0.327 | 0.469 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Family firm | 21,643 | 0.489 | 0.499 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Territorial embeddedness | 21,643 | 0.060 | 0.237 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
R&D intensity | 21,643 | 0.773 | 2.554 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.397 | 98.924 |
Product innovation | 21,643 | 0.192 | 0.394 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Process innovation | 21,643 | 0.317 | 0.465 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Export intensity | 21,643 | 22.032 | 28.406 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 39 | 100 |
Age | 21,643 | 29.135 | 20.238 | 0 | 15 | 24 | 38 | 175 |
SizeL | 21,643 | 15.871 | 2.065 | 8.478 | 14.207 | 15.757 | 17.378 | 23.965 |
Financial constraints | 21,643 | 54.09 | 23.653 | 0 | 35.626 | 55.363 | 72.601 | 99.979 |
ProfitabilityW | 21,643 | 7.297 | 12.549 | − 50.5 | 2.4 | 7.3 | 13.3 | 40.1 |
Listed | 21,643 | 0.020 | 0.142 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Group | 21,643 | 0.364 | 0.481 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Labour cost ratioW | 21,643 | 27.742 | 16.898 | 3.901 | 15.784 | 23.965 | 35.859 | 94.394 |
Employees T&DW | 21,643 | 0.201 | 0.349 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 2 |
Temporary workers ratio | 21,643 | 11.332 | 16.658 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 15.449 | 100 |
Part-time workers ratio | 21,643 | 2.682 | 6.212 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2.837 | 100 |
Competitors | 21,643 | 2.027 | 1.255 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
Rural | 21,643 | 0.620 | 0.485 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Panel 2B: Difference of means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Non-family firms | Family firms | Test for difference of means | Wilcoxon rank-sum testa | |
Difference of means | t-statistics | z-statistics | |||
Downsizing | 0.321 | 0.333 | − .011 | − 1.876+ | − 1.876+ |
Territorial embeddedness | 0.053 | 0.066 | − 0.010 | − 3.864*** | − 3.863*** |
R&D intensity | 0.937 | 0.600 | 0.337 | 9.728 *** | 34.150 *** |
Product innovation | 0.232 | 0.150 | 0.082 | 15.499*** | 15.414*** |
Process innovation | 0.360 | 0.271 | 0.089 | 14.159 *** | 14.095 *** |
Export intensity | 28.624 | 15.140 | 13.484 | 35.935*** | 37.921*** |
Age | 31.346 | 26.823 | 4.523 | 16.539*** | 13.288*** |
SizeL | 16.741 | 14.961 | 1.780 | 70.284*** | 64.279*** |
Financial constraints | 53.920 | 54.267 | − 0.346 | − 1.078 | − 1.533 |
ProfitabilityW | 7.498 | 7.087 | 0.175 | 2.409* | 2.030* |
Listed | 0.034 | 0.005 | 0.028 | 15.115*** | 15.036*** |
Group | 0.590 | 0.127 | 0.363 | 80.724*** | 70.771*** |
Labour cost ratioW | 25.529 | 30.054 | − 4.525 | − 19.873*** | − 23.755*** |
Employees T&DW | 0.263 | 0.134 | 0.128 | 27.595*** | 37.327*** |
Temporary workers ratio | 10.755 | 11.935 | − 1.179 | − 5.212*** | 8.988*** |
Part-time workers ratio | 2.149 | 3.238 | − 1.088 | − 12.936*** | − 4.633*** |
Competitors | 1.836 | 2.226 | − 0.389 | − 23.123*** | − 23.573*** |
Rural | 0.588 | 0.653 | − 0.065 | − 9.961*** | − 9.939*** |
Observations | 11,062 | 10,581 |
VIF | Downsizing | Family firm | Territorial embeddedness | GFC | R&D intensity | Product innovation | Process innovation | Export intensity | Age | Size | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Downsizing | – | 1 | |||||||||
Family firm | 1.44 | 0.0128 | 1 | ||||||||
Territorial embeddedness | 1.13 | 0.0268*** | 0.0263*** | 1 | |||||||
GFC | 1.02 | 0.116*** | 0.0395*** | − 0.00294 | 1 | ||||||
R&D intensity | 1.22 | − 0.0311*** | − 0.0660*** | − 0.0507*** | 0.00274 | 1 | |||||
Product innovation | 1.28 | − 0.0345*** | − 0.105*** | − 0.0886*** | − 0.0221** | 0.254*** | 1 | ||||
Process innovation | 1.26 | − 0.0847*** | − 0.0958*** | − 0.0869*** | 0.0205** | 0.157*** | 0.358*** | 1 | |||
Export intensity | 1.45 | − 0.0601*** | − 0.237*** | − 0.162*** | − 0.00589 | 0.162*** | 0.182*** | 0.182*** | 1 | ||
Age | 1.27 | − 0.0404*** | − 0.112*** | − 0.0605*** | 0.0257*** | 0.0754*** | 0.103*** | 0.0869*** | 0.168*** | 1 | |
Size | 2.97 | − 0.107*** | − 0.431*** | − 0.192*** | 0.00510 | 0.179*** | 0.267*** | 0.305*** | 0.427*** | 0.334*** | 1 |
Financial constraints | 1.11 | 0.0265*** | 0.00733 | − 0.0336*** | − 0.00672 | 0.0112 | 0.00146 | 0.0157* | − 0.0297*** | − 0.142*** | − 0.00318 |
Profitability | 1.26 | − 0.126*** | − 0.0164* | 0.00246 | − 0.0379*** | − 0.0328*** | 0.0380*** | 0.0962*** | 0.0471*** | 0.00951 | 0.143*** |
Listed | 1.06 | − 0.0188** | − 0.102*** | − 0.0214** | − 0.0212** | 0.0321*** | 0.0354*** | 0.0544*** | 0.0934*** | 0.0669*** | 0.186*** |
Group | 1.86 | − 0.0477*** | − 0.481*** | − 0.0808*** | − 0.0127 | 0.140*** | 0.173*** | 0.199*** | 0.328*** | 0.165*** | 0.622*** |
Labour cost ratio | 1.80 | 0.159*** | 0.134*** | 0.169*** | 0.0267*** | 0.0183** | − 0.120*** | − 0.173*** | − 0.200*** | − 0.106*** | − 0.499*** |
Employee T&D | 1.22 | − 0.0742*** | − 0.184*** | − 0.0695*** | 0.00275 | 0.212*** | 0.192*** | 0.213*** | 0.199*** | 0.139*** | 0.339*** |
Temporary workers ratio | 1.17 | − 0.0847*** | 0.0354*** | 0.0283*** | − 0.0500*** | − 0.0424*** | − 0.0205** | 0.0160* | − 0.0507*** | − 0.149*** | − 0.0334*** |
Part-time workers ratio | 1.08 | 0.00664 | 0.0876*** | 0.0735*** | 0.0363*** | − 0.0302*** | − 0.0214** | − 0.0448*** | − 0.0521*** | − 0.0181** | − 0.149*** |
Competitors | 1.13 | 0.0251*** | 0.155*** | 0.0351*** | 0.0143* | − 0.0503*** | − 0.131*** | − 0.112*** | − 0.0957*** | − 0.106*** | − 0.299*** |
Rural | 1.17 | 0.00278 | 0.0676*** | − 0.0514*** | 0.0261*** | − 0.0516*** | − 0.0375*** | 0.00814 | 0.0102 | − 0.141*** | − 0.0660*** |
VIF | Financial constraints | Profitability | Listed | Group | Labour cost ratio | Employee T&D | Temporary workers ratio | Part-time workers ratio | Competitors | Rural | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Financial constraints | – | 1 | |||||||||
Profitability | – | − 0.131*** | 1 | ||||||||
Listed | – | 0.00244 | 0.00894 | 1 | |||||||
Group | – | 0.00641 | 0.0527*** | 0.124*** | 1 | ||||||
Labour cost ratio | – | − 0.0661*** | − 0.371*** | − 0.0653*** | − 0.276*** | 1 | |||||
Employee T&D | – | 0.000173 | 0.0760*** | 0.0658*** | 0.270*** | − 0.168*** | 1 | ||||
Temporary workers ratio | – | 0.131*** | 0.0630*** | − 0.0153* | − 0.0647*** | − 0.0364*** | − 0.0366*** | 1 | |||
Part-time workers ratio | – | 0.000278 | − 0.0453*** | − 0.0142* | − 0.0941*** | 0.0569*** | − 0.0253*** | − 0.0800*** | 1 | ||
Competitors | – | 0.00369 | − 0.0562*** | − 0.0569*** | − 0.211*** | 0.194*** | − 0.108*** | − 0.00145 | 0.0578*** | 1 | |
Rural | – | 0.0402*** | − 0.00177 | − 0.0443*** | − 0.0603*** | − 0.0227*** | − 0.0442*** | 0.0801*** | 0.01000 | 0.0245*** | 1 |
Regression Results
Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Product innovation | 0.022* | 0.017+ | 0.017+ | 0.017+ | 0.017+ |
(0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | |
Process innovation | − 0.047*** | − 0.041*** | − 0.041*** | − 0.041*** | − 0.041*** |
(0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
R&D intensity | − 0.536*** | − 0.565*** | − 0.571*** | − 0.565*** | − 0.570*** |
(0.157) | (0.161) | (0.161) | (0.161) | (0.161) | |
Export intensity | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Age | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Size | − 0.005 | − 0.005 | − 0.005 | − 0.005 | − 0.005 |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |
Financial constraints | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.001*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Profitability | − 0.002*** | − 0.002*** | − 0.002*** | − 0.002*** | − 0.002*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Listed | − 0.022 | − 0.026 | − 0.026 | − 0.027 | − 0.026 |
(0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | |
Group | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
(0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | |
Labour cost ratio | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Employee T&D | − 0.023* | − 0.021* | − 0.021+ | − 0.021* | − 0.021+ |
(0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | |
Temporary workers ratio | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Part-time workers ratio | 0.002** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Competitors | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 | − 0.000 |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |
Rural | − 0.009 | − 0.008 | − 0.009 | − 0.008 | − 0.009 |
(0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
Family firm | − 0.032*** | − 0.034*** | |||
(0.008) | (0.008) | ||||
Territorial embeddedness (H1) | 0.003 | 0.003 | |||
(0.017) | (0.017) | ||||
GFC | 0.134*** | 0.134*** | |||
(0.007) | (0.007) | ||||
Family firm*Territorial embeddedness as reference group | |||||
Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness | 0.054* | ||||
(0.021) | |||||
Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness (H2) | 0.088** | ||||
(0.029) | |||||
Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness | 0.023 | ||||
(0.021) | |||||
Family firm*GFC as reference group | |||||
Non-family firm*Non-GFC | − 0.100*** | ||||
(0.010) | |||||
Non-family firm*GFC (H3) | 0.030** | ||||
(0.011) | |||||
Family firm*Non-GFC | − 0.138*** | ||||
(0.010) | |||||
Family firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC as reference group | |||||
Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC | − 0.062* | ||||
(0.027) | |||||
Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*GFC | 0.066* | ||||
(0.028) | |||||
Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC | − 0.044 | ||||
(0.039) | |||||
Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC (H4) | 0.117** | ||||
(0.039) | |||||
Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC | − 0.099*** | ||||
(0.027) | |||||
Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*GFC | 0.042 | ||||
(0.027) | |||||
Family firm*Territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC | − 0.101** | ||||
(0.032) | |||||
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | No | No | No | No |
Constant | 0.222*** | 0.213*** | 0.190** | 0.349*** | 0.309*** |
(0.059) | (0.057) | (0.060) | (0.057) | (0.062) | |
WaldChi2 | 1688.94 | 1182.97 | 1185.82 | 1182.93 | 1187.13 |
Prob > Chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Number of firms | 3,063 | 3,063 | 3,063 | 3,063 | 3,063 |
Observations | 20,251 | 20,251 | 20,251 | 20,251 | 20,251 |