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Journal of Business Ethics
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics 1/2023

17.02.2022 | Original Paper

To Punish or Not to Punish? The Impact of Tax Fraud Punishment on Observers’ Tax Compliance

verfasst von: Jonathan Farrar, Tisha King

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 1/2023

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Abstract

This article synthesizes insights from deterrence theory and social psychology literature on retributive justice to develop and test a theoretical model which predicts how and why observers’ tax compliance intentions are influenced by knowledge of the punitive outcomes faced by individuals found guilty of tax fraud. We test our model experimentally on a sample of Canadian taxpayers and manipulate perceived responsibility for a fraud and whether a fraud perpetrator is punished. We show that observers’ tax compliance increases when a fraud perpetrator is punished only when the perpetrator is perceived as blameworthy. The psychological process through which this positive influence operates is relatively complex, as it includes perceptions of punishment deservingness and affect. We also find that tax compliance decreases when a tax fraud perpetrator is unpunished, regardless of perceived blameworthiness. Our results are robust when we control for economic determinants known to influence fraud. The article concludes by discussing our findings’ implications for fraud research and policy.
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Fußnoten
1
One of these is the KPMG-Isle of Man tax scheme in Canada, which we adapt in our experimental setting.
 
2
Anand et al. (2015) similarly observe that much research examines fraud occurring within an organization, focusing on fraud perpetration and prevention.
 
3
In Feather’s (1998) model, seriousness of offense is endogenous to responsibility and harshness of penalty is endogenous to punishment deservingness. In our study, we control for these variables.
 
4
We examine affect as a positive (pleasure) or negative (displeasure) response related to an event. This is consistent with similar research examining the role of affect in judgment and decision making (e.g., Mercer, 2005).
 
5
The Investigative Consortium of Investigate Journalists documents that some, but not all, tax authorities punished parties identified in the Panama Papers (Wilson-Chapman et al., 2019).
 
6
We do not expect the presence or absence of a retributive outcome to moderate the association between responsibility and deservingness. Feather (1996, p. 273) notes that deservingness affects judgments about a penalty, which implies that a penalty (punishment) occurs after deservingness perceptions are formed. As shown in our supplemental analysis, there is no significant interaction effect of punishment occurrence and responsibility on deservingness.
 
7
Tax compliance intentions are a proxy for tax behavior. As Bobek et al. (2013, p. 458) state, “Concerns that behavioral intentions might not map directly to taxpayers’ actual behavior in a situation are partially mitigated by the fact that a joint investigation of actual and hypothetical tax evaders (Webley et al., 2001) indicated that both groups had similar attitudes and motivations”. As well, there is strong empirical support (Sheeran, 2002) for several psychological models, including the theory of planned behavior (Carpenter & Reimers, 2005), that affirm that an individual’s intention is the strongest predictor of their behavior. In the tax compliance literature, it is common to measure tax compliance intentions rather than actual tax behavior due to social desirability bias (e.g., Blanthorne & Kaplan, 2008; Bobek et al., 2013; Farrar et al., 2019; Verboon & Van Dijke, 2007).
 
8
These aforementioned streams of literature do not enable us to predict direct effects of responsibility, punishment occurrence, or punishment deservingness on tax compliance intentions, nor do they allow us to predict a direct effect of responsibility on affective reactions. Nevertheless, we investigate non-hypothesized effects in a subsequent supplemental analysis.
 
9
Sample sizes per cell varied from 97 to 102. Our Qualtrics software indicated that the quotas had been reached when the total participants were at 399 rather than 400.
 
10
Our sample appears reasonably representative of the Canadian population with respect to age and income. According to Statistics Canada (2021a, 2021b), the median age for all Canadians in 2020 was 40.9. The median age of our sample is 32.0, but includes individuals ages 20–70. In 2019, the median income in Canada by age group was $41,700 (ages 25–34), $51,500 (ages 35–44), $54,200 (ages 45–54), $42,800 (ages 55–64), and $30,400 (age 65 and over) (Statistics Canada 2021a, 2021b). When we compared our data segmented similarly by age group, the median score for income category was 3 ($50,000–$74,999) for all age categories except age 65 and over, which had a median score of 2 ($25,000–$49,999).
 
11
In our experimental design, we decided not to manipulate the magnitude of the dollars evaded. This design choice was made as we are more interested in whether or not a punishment occurs. Furthermore, not manipulating the magnitude of dollars allows for a cleaner experimental design that reduces a possible confound between magnitude of dollars and punishment.
 
12
Except for the four tax compliance statements and attention-check and manipulation check questions, all other questionnaire items prior to the demographic measures were presented in random order across several screens. Across the entire instrument, for any measures with multiple items, the groups of items were presented in random order.
 
13
Responsibility is manipulated as an ex-ante construct, as opposed to ex-post. Particularly, offenders are perceived as being responsible for the tax fraud ex-ante, whether or not the offender accepts this responsibility ex-post. In the statistical analysis, the higher responsibility condition is coded as ‘ + 1’, whereas the lower responsibility condition is coded as ‘0’.
 
14
A news story (Cashore, 2015) reports that one of KPMGs clients who invested in the Isle of Man tax scheme said that he was unaware of Canadian tax laws when he emigrated from South Africa in the mid-1990s. The taxpayer said, “I went to the best people in the country. I’m being drawn into this, and I don’t think I should have been in the first place.” It is unclear whether an observer would perceive that a client in this type of situation is responsible for the tax fraud, or not.
 
15
In subsection 239(1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 1 (5th Supp.), and subsection 380(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46.
 
16
In the statistical analysis, the condition where punishment occurred is coded as ‘ + 1’, whereas the condition where punishment did not occur is coded as ‘0’.
 
17
This manipulation intentionally does not make clear whether the tax authority chose not to prosecute the tax evaders, or chose to prosecute the tax evaders but was unsuccessful in the prosecution attempt, as doing so could limit the generalizability of our findings. Thus, the manipulation allows for both possibilities. In the Isle of Man tax dodge, the Canadian tax authority chose not to prosecute the tax evaders. We discuss this issue further in the final section of the manuscript.
 
18
In Feather (1996, 1998), participants rated the extent to which punishment was deserving using a 7-point scale with endpoints of ‘doesn’t deserve it at all’ (1) and ‘deserves it a lot’ (7).
 
19
The tax compliance statements were solicited from a third-person perspective, which is common in tax compliance research, as it minimizes participant discomfort and reduces the risk that social desirability bias would contaminate the results (Armacost et al., 1991). Similarly, respondents were told to imagine that they were Chris when responding to all other questions.
 
20
Given that the Isle of Man tax dodge was publicized in 2017, and participants completed this survey in 2020, it is reasonable that few participants were aware of it. As well, given the robustness of our subsequent results, it is likely that the results would be even stronger if the research were conducted while a media story about a tax dodge was publicized.
 
21
As reported in Panel B of Table 3, the index of moderated mediation when all ten covariates are present is 0.049 and is significant, as a bootstrap confidence interval is entirely above zero (0.002–0.1283). The index of moderated mediation when no covariates are present is 0.101, and is also significant, as a bootstrap confidence interval is entirely above zero (0.013–0.239).
 
22
If participants answered the attention check question incorrectly, they are prompted that the response is incorrect, and are provided with a hint. Thus, participants have another opportunity to answer the attention check question and continue with the experiment (c.f. Berger et al., 2020). Among participants, 2.3% (or 9) of them fail this attention check question once. As analyses yield identical statistical inferences if these responses are excluded, we include all responses in our analyses.
 
23
In an ANCOVA with the ten significant covariates, the main effect of punishment occurrence on tax compliance intentions remains significant (F = 4.06, p = .045). The adjusted R-squared of the ANOVA (ANCOVA) is 0.025 (0.319).
 
24
Our model corresponds to Hayes’ Model 91 except that we also have a direct path from the moderator to the dependent variable. We use cmatrix syntax to test our model (Hayes, 2018a, p. 653).
 
25
This model corresponds to Hayes (2018a) Model 92.
 
26
Government of Canada, Finance Committee meeting May 5, 2016. Online: https://​openparliament.​ca/​committees/​finance/​42-1/​18/​.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
To Punish or Not to Punish? The Impact of Tax Fraud Punishment on Observers’ Tax Compliance
verfasst von
Jonathan Farrar
Tisha King
Publikationsdatum
17.02.2022
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 1/2023
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05061-w

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