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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

13. International Financial Markets

verfasst von : Christian A. Conrad

Erschienen in: Political Economy

Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Abstract

The financial crisis led to the worst depression since 1929. Only by massive economic programs could worse be prevented. Here Keynesian theory came into play. Only through globally agreed massive credit-financed government spending increases could depression be prevented. The banks had to be saved with tax money, as many banks had invested in the government bonds of weak European countries whose solvency was called into question. The sovereign debt crisis has emerged from the financial crisis. Against this background, the question arises of state regulations that limit the risk of banks. Such regulation of the financial markets has been urged by politicians and economists since the onset of the 2007 financial crisis. What has happened in the meantime? Were the right reforms implemented or could there be another financial crisis? After analyzing the causes of the crisis, the main reforms are examined below.

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Fußnoten
1
“… the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on loans … The action … will encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is generally not good enough… Fannie Mae… has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits. In addition, banks, thrift institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help them make more loans to so-called subprime borrowers whose incomes, credit ratings and savings are not good enough for conventional loans… Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk… the government subsidized corporation may run into trouble… prompting a government rescue… the move is intended in part to increase the number of… home owners who tend to have worse credit ratings…” September 30, 1999 New York Times.
 
2
In 2000, warnings were issued as to the threat posed to the financial system due to the lack of regulation on Hedge Funds as counter-parties to derivative transactions. See Conrad, Christian/Stahl, Markus (2000).
 
3
See Mayr, Brigitte (2007); Handelsblatt 23.10.08 and 10.1.08, p. 30; Süddeutsche Zeitung 17.11.08, p. 22, Neue Zuricher Zeitung 7.02.08; Zeit Online, 26/2008, p. 24, Der Spiegel, No. 47 (2008), p. 46–79 and Conrad, Christian A. (2010), p. 21.
 
4
This income was exceeded by Goldman Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, who earned a bonus of $18.7 million along with realizing proceeds from the sale of $480 million in stock by exercising options issued prior to his becoming US secretary of the treasury. See Der Spiegel No. 8 (2009), p. 62.
 
5
See also Shiller, Robert (2007); Gold, Gerry/Feldmann, Paul (2007); Muolo, Paul/Padilla, Matthew (2008) and Woods, Thomas E. (2009).
 
6
See Shiller, Robert (2007); Gold, Gerry/Feldmann, Paul (2007); Muolo, Paul/Padilla, Matthew (2008); Woods, Thomas E. (2009); Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010), and Conrad, Christian A. (2010).
 
7
See Dahrendorf, Ralf, (2009).
 
8
See the film “Inside Job” of 2010 by Charles Ferguson (Sony Pictures) and Conrad, Christian, A./Stahl, Markus (2002).
 
9
In 1998 this hedge fund named Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) then lost the investors around 90% of the $4 billion invested, which threatened to trigger a chain reaction on the international finance markets. The issue here is not just the credit taken by LTCM, but also the derivative positions of LTCM as contracting party, with which other finance market actors had protected themselves. Only when the then US central bank president Alan Greenspan intervened personally and pulled together an emergency package of billions from several large banks could the capital market crisis be averted. See Conrad, Christian A. (2005).
 
10
“What we have found over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so.” “We think that it would be a mistake” to more regulate the contracts. Greenspan in front of the Banking Committee in 2003. New York Times, 20.10.2008.
 
11
The chief controller of the SEC later spoke at a conference when questioned about “the systematic elimination of personnel from the regulatory office, so that became impossible for the office to perform any regulation whatsoever.” Der Spiegel, No. 47 (2008), p. 78.
 
12
Empirical studies show that the spot prices follow the future prices. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2006), pp. 59.
 
13
For the discussion of the effects of food and commodity speculation see Conrad, Christian A. (2014).
 
14
Governments find themselves internationally in a dilemma, since the best outcome for a single state is if all other sates regulate their financial market and it is therefore with its unregulated market the most attractive location for financial institutions (Free-rider position). The worst result for the individual state is if it regulates its financial market while the others do not. Since everyone is subject to this situation of insecurity, everyone decides to behave uncooperatively, which provides the worst results for everyone, national and international not regulated financial markets. Such a dilemma is called in the Public Choice Theory “prisoner’s dilemma”. For the expression “prisoner´s dilemma” see Brennan, G./Buchanan, James (1985), p. 3.
 
15
See Conrad, Christian A. (2014).
 
17
Krugman, Paul (2009).
 
18
See Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2007) and Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2001).
 
19
See Fox, Justin (2009) und Conrad, Christian A. (2010), p. 56.
 
20
“The method of calculation is based upon historic volatility and does not take into account irrational human behaviour, such as panic,… .” Conrad, Christian A. (2005), p. 398.
 
21
See Conrad, Christian (2005) and Welt-Kompakt dated 08/22/06, p. 15.
 
22
See Chediak, Felipe/Escudero, Silvio (2004), p. 79 and Ogger, Günther (2001), pp. 103.
 
23
Quoted from Capital, 18/2005, p. 54.
 
24
See Wirtschaftswoche dated September, 01, 2005, p. 52–58 and Capital, No. 18, 2005, p. 54–56.
 
25
See Dahrendorf, Ralf, (2009).
 
26
See Ergenzinger, Rudolf/Krulis-Randa, Jan S. (2004), p. 4.
 
27
See Noll, Bernd (2002), p. 168.
 
28
See Ulrich, Peter (1993), pp. 1173.
 
29
See Noll, Bernd (2002), p. 168.
 
30
See Volk, Hartmut (2000), p. 57.
 
31
See Volk, Hartmut (2006).
 
32
See Sucharow, Labaton (2013).
 
33
See Conrad, Christian A. (2015).
 
34
See Conrad, Christian A. (2015).
 
35
See Conrad, Christian A. (2018), pp. 32–40.
 
36
See Pies, Ingo (2012a), pp. 3.
 
37
“This Report finds that there is significant and persuasive evidence to conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the major causes of “unwarranted changes”—here, increases—in the price of wheat futures contracts relative to the price of wheat in the cash market. The resulting unusual, persistent, and large disparities between wheat futures and cash prices impaired the ability of participants in the grain market to use the futures market to price their crops and hedge their price risks over time, and therefore constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce.“ Levin, Carl/Coburn, Tom et al. (2009), p 2.
 
38
See Stoll, Hans R. /Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p 65.
 
39
The objectivity of this study must be questioned, since financial positions in commodities are key business of Gresham: “Gresham offers several commodity investment programs. Our goal is to provide a responsible way to invest (as opposed to speculate) in the asset class, and to offer our clients the benefits of systematic exposure to a wide range of commodities and commodity groups through the use of commodity futures in Diversified Commodity Portfolios (DCP).” http://​greshamllc.​com/​en/​pages.​php?​s=​2 (02/10/2014).
 
40
See Stoll, Hans R./Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p 66.
 
41
See Irwin, Scott H./Sanders, Dwight R. (2010).
 
42
See Stoll, Hans R. /Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p 29 and 65.
 
43
See Tang, Ke/Xiong, Wei (2012), p 65.
 
44
See Tang, Ke/Xiong, Wei (2012), pp 55+ and 64+.
 
45
See Stoll, Hans R. /Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p 66.
 
46
See Bass, Hans-Heinrich (2011), p 45+.
 
47
See Stoll, Hans R. /Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p 67.
 
48
See Inamura, Yasunari et al. (2011), p 5.
 
49
See Irwin, Scott H./Sanders, Dwight R. (2010), p 4+.
 
50
See Frenk, David et al. (2011). p 45.
 
51
See Baffes, John/Haniotis, Tassos (2010). “The demand for grains and oilseeds as biofuel feedstocks has been cited as the main cause of the price rise, but there is little direct evidence for this contention. Instead, index-based investment in agricultural futures markets is seen as the major channel through which macroeconomic and monetary factors generated the 2007–2008 food price rises.” Lagi, M./Bar-Yam, Yavni/Betrand, K. Z./ Bar-Yarn (2011a).
 
52
See Inamura, Yasunari et al. (2011), p 3+.
 
53
See Masters, Michael W. (2009), p 4.
 
54
See Inamura, Yasunari et al. (2011), p 7.
 
55
Portfolio theory from Markowitz. See Markowitz, Harry (1952).
 
56
See Peck, Anne (1985), pp 44–45.
 
57
“If high futures prices induce increased storage, this reduces the quantity available to consumers, and it can raise the price. And you can, in fact, argue that something like this has been happening for cotton and copper, where there are apparently large and growing inventories. But for food, it’s just not happening: stocks are low and falling.” Krugman, Paul (2011).
 
58
For a critique of Irwin and Sanders see Frenk, David et al. (2011).
 
59
See Irwin, Scott H./Sanders, Dwight R. (2010), p 4+.
 
60
See Schulze, Peter M. (2004), p 17+ and Hassler, Uwe (2003), p 813.
 
61
See Pagan, A./Schwert, C. (1990); Phillips, P./Loretan, M. (1990); Frenk, David et al. (2011).
 
62
See Frenk, David et al. (2011). p 47.
 
63
See Frenk, David et al. (2011). p 47 and Masters, M.W./White, A.K. (2008), p 33.
 
64
“There have been ongoing complaints that the legacy COT trader designations may be inaccurate … As one example, speculators may have an incentive to self-classify their activity as commercial hedging to circumvent speculative position limits in some markets. But, the CFTC implements a fairly rigorous process—including statements of cash positions in the underlying commodity—to ensure that commercial traders have an underlying risk associated with futures positions. However, in recent years industry participants began to suspect that these data were contaminated because the underlying risk for many reporting commercials was not a position in the physical commodity… Rather, the reporting commercials were banks and other swap dealers hedging risk associated with over-the-counter (OTC) derivative positions.” Irwin, Scott H./ Sanders, Dwight R. (2012), p 258. See also Frenk’s critique of the Irwin and Sanders study from 2010. See Frenk, David et al. (2011). p 48.
 
65
See Conrad, Christian A. (2013).
 
66
“Ganz im Gegenteil kommt die weit überwiegende Mehrzahl der bis dato zu diesem Thema verfassten empirischen Arbeiten—allerdings ebenfalls auf dem Boden der suboptimalen Terminmarktdatensätze—zu dem Ergebnis, dass kein nachweisbare Kausalzusammenhang zwischen Anlagevolumina und Preisanstiegen besteht.” Translation: “Quite the opposite, the large majority of papers written on this topic to date—though also based on suboptimal futures market data sets—come to the conclusion that there no causal connection exists between stock volumes and price increases.” Petersen, Volker J./Herlinghaus, Axel/Menrad, Michael (2012), p 14.
 
68
See Will, Matthias Georg/Prehn, Sören/Pies, Ingo/Glauben, Thomas (2012).
 
69
See Henn, Markus (2013).
 
70
See Irwin, Scott H., p. 1.
 
71
See Irwin, Scott H./Sanders, Dwight R. (2012), p. 258.
 
72
See Pagan, A./Schwert, C. (1990); Phillips, P./Loretan, M. (1990); Frenk, David u.a., (2011).
 
73
See Frenk, David u.a. (2011), a.a.O. p. 47.
 
74
See Schulze, Peter M. (2004) and Hassler, Uwe (2003), p. 813.
 
75
See Frenk, David u.a. (2011), a.a.O., p. 47 and Masters, M.W./White, A.K. (2008), p. 33.
 
76
“There have been ongoing complaints that the legacy COT trader designations may be inaccurate … . As one example, speculators may have an incentive to self-classify their activity as commercial hedging to circumvent speculative position limits in some markets. But, the CFTC implements a fairly rigorous process—including statements of cash positions in the underlying commodity—to ensure that commercial traders have an underlying risk associated with futures positions. However, in recent years industry participants began to suspect that these data were contaminated because the underlying risk for many reporting commercials was not a position in the physical commodity… . Rather, the reporting commercials were banks and other swap dealers hedging risk associated with over-the-counter (OTC) derivative positions.” Irwin, Scott H./Sanders, Dwight R. (2012), a.a.O., p. 258. See also Frenk’s criticism of Irwin and Sanders’ 2010 study. See Frenk, David u.a. (2011), a.a.O. p. 48.
 
77
See Conrad, Christian A. (2013).
 
78
See Cohn, Gary, Co-President, Managing Director and COO of Goldman Sachs, New York, NY, in: U.p. Government Printing Office (2008), Senate Hearing 110-654, SUMMIT ON ENERGY.
 
79
“Traditional Speculators provide liquidity by both buying and selling futures. Index Speculators buy futures and then roll their positions by buying calendar spreads. They never sell. Therefore, they consume liquidity and provide zero benefit to the futures markets.” Masters, Michael W. (2009), p. 4.
 
80
See Cheng, Ing-Haw,/Kirilenko, Andrei/Xiong, Wie (2012).
 
81
See Krugman, Paul (2008).
 
82
Lagi, M./Bar-Yam, Yavni/Betrand, K. Z./ Bar-Yarn (2011a), p. 5.
 
83
See Pies, Ingo/Will, Matthias Georg Will (2013), p. 5+.
 
84
There are empirical studies for this as well, which prove a high degree of trade among finance investors. See Domanski, Dietrich/Heath, Alexandra (2007), p. 65. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0703g.pdf
 
85
See Stoll, Hans R. /Whaley, Robert E. (2009), p. 21.
 
86
See Masters, Michael W. (2009), p. 17.
 
87
See Gilbert, Christopher L. (2010), p. 10.
 
88
See Pies, Ingo (2012b).
 
89
See Conrad, Christian (2005).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
International Financial Markets
verfasst von
Christian A. Conrad
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30884-1_13

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