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Theory and Decision
Erschienen in: Theory and Decision 1/2019

06.03.2019

Is knowledge curse or blessing in pure coordination problems?

verfasst von: Swee-Hoon Chuah, Robert Hoffmann, Jeremy Larner

Erschienen in: Theory and Decision | Ausgabe 1/2019

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Abstract

Does greater knowledge help or hinder one’s ability to coordinate with others? While individual expertise can reveal a suitable focal point to converge on, ‘blissful’ ignorance may systematically bias decisions towards it through mere recognition. Our experiment finds in favour of the former possibility. Both specific and general knowledge are significantly associated with success in four of five coordination problems as well as over all. Our analysis suggests that more knowledgeable participants are better able to identify focal decision alternatives because (1) they are aware of more such alternatives and (2) possess more relevant information about each.
Vorheriger Artikel Individual vs. group decision-making: an experiment on dynamic choice under risk and ambiguity

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Fußnoten
1
Mehta et al. (1994, p. 666, 671) call these “one-ended questions”.
 
2
Note that knowledge over imputation may instead be the product of rational Bayesian analysis to the extent that experts draw inferences about the knowledge of others from what they themselves know (see Dawes 1989). We thank the editor for pointing out this alternative account.
 
3
The reason is that we wanted to test the effects of different individual knowledge rather than learning in the participant group as a whole. Matching of co-participants’ final answers introduces a confounding element of renewed second guessing that we wanted to avoid.
 
4
Selected instructions are provided in the appendix.
 
5
At the time of the experiment £1 Sterling traded at 1.65 US$.
 
6
These correlations are robust to using only native British or non-British participants.
 
7
Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests for category coordination in each of the five categories have p ≤ 0.000.
 
8
As explained, we used focal category as the dependent variable because of the bimodal distribution of category coordination. To assess whether these results are sensitive for our chosen approach we also performed ordinary least squares regressions for each of the categories with category coordination as the dependent variable. The results also confirm that category knowledge is significant at the 95% level or higher for every category but EUROPE.
 
9
We use 20 as a conservative test, thereby excluding roughly one-third of observations. The same results apply for lower values such as 10 and 5. Higher values reduce the sample size too much for meaningful analysis.
 
10
Our experiment was not designed to examine the particular considerations participants engage in when trying to coordinate.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Is knowledge curse or blessing in pure coordination problems?
verfasst von
Swee-Hoon Chuah
Robert Hoffmann
Jeremy Larner
Publikationsdatum
06.03.2019
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Theory and Decision / Ausgabe 1/2019
Print ISSN: 0040-5833
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7187
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09692-w

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