Leonard Nelson: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

Excerpt

Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) is a fascinating but neglected figure. He represents a minority tradition within post-Kantian German philosophy that anticipates much later developments in Anglophone analytic philosophy. Specifically, Nelson saw himself as a posthumous disciple of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843). Almost alone amongst Kant’s nineteenth-century interpreters, Fries stressed the methodological aspects of Kant’s work over its metaphysical implications. Fries’s influence faded fast after his death, and his work was little known when Nelson encountered it as a student. Nelson made it his life’s work to remedy this oversight. Initially, this focus may have imperilled Nelson’s own career: he secured a position at Göttingen only with the intervention of the mathematician David Hilbert, and over the objections of Edmund Husserl and other members of the philosophy faculty (Reid 1970, p. 122). Nelson’s early death limited his direct influence—and frustratingly prevented what might have been a fruitful interaction with the pioneers of analytic philosophy. However, Nelson had a profound effect on his immediate circle amongst whom his posthumous influence was enduring. …