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Cognitive Processing
Erschienen in: Cognitive Processing 2/2012

01.10.2012 | Research Report

Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip

verfasst von: Francesca Giardini

Erschienen in: Cognitive Processing | Sonderheft 2/2012

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Abstract

Spreading information about the members of one’s group is one of the most universal human behaviors. Thanks to gossip, individuals can acquire the information about their peers without sustaining the burden of costly interactions with cheaters, but they can also create and revise social bonds. Gossip has also several positive functions at the group level, promoting cohesion and norm compliance. However, gossip can be unreliable, and can be used to damage others’ reputation or to circulate false information, thus becoming detrimental to people involved and useless for the group. In this work, we propose a theoretical model in which reliability of gossip depends on the joint functioning of two distinct mechanisms. Thanks to the first, i.e., deterrence, individuals tend to avoid informational cheating because they fear punishment and the disruption of social bonds. On the other hand, transmission provides humans with the opportunity of reducing the consequences of cheating through a manipulation of the source of gossip.
Vorheriger Artikel Imagination and society: the role of visual sociology
Nächster Artikel Observing social signals in scaffolding interactions: how to detect when a helping intention risks falling short

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Fußnoten
1
Transmission is specific as long as we accept that “reputation” is an evaluation in which the source is hidden.
 
2
I acknowledge that belief revision is more complex than it is stated in the example.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip
verfasst von
Francesca Giardini
Publikationsdatum
01.10.2012
Verlag
Springer-Verlag
Erschienen in
Cognitive Processing / Ausgabe Sonderheft 2/2012
Print ISSN: 1612-4782
Elektronische ISSN: 1612-4790
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-011-0421-0

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