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Journal of Business Ethics

Erschienen in:

01.03.2011

Business Ethics as Self-Regulation: Why Principles that Ground Regulations Should Be Used to Ground Beyond-Compliance Norms as Well

verfasst von: Wayne Norman

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Sonderheft 1/2011

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Abstract

Theories of business ethics or corporate responsibility tend to focus on justifying obligations that go above and beyond what is required by law. This article examines the curious fact that most business ethics scholars use concepts, principles, and normative methods for identifying and justifying these beyond-compliance obligations that are very different from the ones that are used to set the levels of regulations themselves. Its modest proposal—a plea for a research agenda, really—is that we could reduce this normative asymmetry by borrowing from the normative framework of “regulation” to identify and justify an important range of beyond-compliance obligations. In short, we might think of “self-regulation” as a language and a normative framework with some distinct advantages over other frameworks like stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and the like. These other frameworks have been under attack in the business ethics literature of late, primarily for their vagueness and their disappointing inability to distinguish clearly between genuine beyond-compliance moral obligations, on the one hand, and charitable acts that are laudable but not morally obligatory, on the other.

Vorheriger Artikel Corporate Governance as Part of the Strategic Process: Rethinking the Role of the Board

Nächster Artikel Deconstructing the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance

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I hesitate to provide citations for this claim. Relatively little space in business ethics textbooks and articles is spent explaining why illegal activities like fraud or assassinating competitors are also unethical. Business ethicists tend to devote much more attention to identifying and criticizing the legal activities that seem unethical. But for explicit acknowledgment of (1), see e.g., Eberlein and Matten (2009, p. 242) and Carroll (1991).

For a rather broader sketch of different proposals for a “unified theory” of business ethics, see Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), Heath et al. (2010), and Norman (2012a).

Naturally, as with any normative theory of legal obligation, we would want to have room for the ethical disobeying of certain unjust laws. This may require transparently breaking a law as an act of civil disobedience (see Rawls 1971, pp. 363–368).

Among notable exceptions to this generalization are Heath (2006), McBarnet (2007), Boatright (2011), and Crane and Matten (2010).

See Stiglitz (2010).

Friedman (1962), Viscusi et al. (2005), Brander (1995), and Cowen and Crampton (2002).

For a brief standard economics textbook account, see e.g., Brander (1995, Chap. 3); for a canonical textbook on the economics of regulation, see Viscusi et al. (2005).

Other calls for regulations follow scandals involving corruption, fraud, theft, and other criminal activities by business people. There is probably no reason to draw a direct link between these things and market failures, though sometimes it makes sense.

This reliance on cost-benefit analysis was reiterated by the “regulations Czar” in the Obama administration, the renowned law professor Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein (2009). See also Sunstein (2002).

There are of course very noteworthy exceptions: in particular, Heath (2006), which sketches a novel and promising “market-failures approach to business ethics” that will be discussed at length in the “Self-Regulation as an Institutional Practice” section.

We hesitate to attach citations of particular business ethicists to each of the concepts in this long sentence, since it literally includes most of the approaches that are current in the scholarly field today. Works best exemplifying these approaches can be easily located in recent reference volumes in business ethics, such as Brenkert and Beauchamp (2010) or Bowie (2002), or in textbooks like May et al. (2007), Gibson (2006), or Crane and Matten (2010). Our point here is that each of these approaches has a rich vocabulary of normative and empirical concepts that one would not expect to see in, say, economics textbooks on regulation, such as Viscusi et al. (2005).

It is not clear that it makes sense to call it a “theory,” as even some of its most ardent supporters now seem to admit. In a survey article from 2002, Thomas Jones, Andrew Wicks, and Ed Freeman explicitly use the term “stakeholder theory” to denote not a theory per se, but “the body of research which has emerged in the last 15 years by scholars in management, business and society, and business ethics, in which the idea of ‘stakeholders’ plays a crucial role.” In Norman (2012b), I suggest that we think of “stakeholderism” as more of an ideology than a theory. Or as its proponents sometimes call it, a “mindset” or “attitude.”

For recent critiques, see e.g., Marcoux (2003), Heath and Norman (2004), Heath (2006), Boatright (2006), and Orts and Strudler (2009)—this last article, published in the Journal of Business Ethics by two senior professors at the Wharton School is entitled “Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory” and its first line declares that “Stakeholder theory has become a vampire in the field of business ethics….” (!). We have yet to see a spirited and rigorous defense of the theory to the kinds of critiques leveled in these articles, not even in the lengthiest restatement of the theory by its “father,” Edward Freeman and his co-authors in a book called Stakeholder Theory: State of the Art (2010). I discuss this restatement at some length in Norman (2012a, b).

See Evan and Freeman (1988) and Freeman and Evan (1990). The more recent restatements of the “theory,” such as Freeman et al. (2010), have dropped the more radical proposals.

See e.g., The Economist (2005) and Vogel (2005, p. 171).

For an emphasis on the political role of corporate citizens, see Néron and Norman (2008a, b), Crane and Matten (2008), Crane et al. (2008), and Néron (2010).

For an illustrative survey of when ethics does and does not pay, and in general for the reasons firms have been “turning to values,” see Paine (2003, Chaps. 1–3) and Reinhardt (2005).

For a fascinating “pre-history” of academic business ethics, see Abend (2011).

Many of the examples in the section have been drawn from, and are explained in fuller context in Balleisen’s (2010).

See e.g., Garvin (1983), Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Scherer et al. (2006), Barley (2007), McBarnet (2007), and Gond et al. (2011).

Ferrell et al. (1998), Paine (1994), and Ethics and Compliance Officer Association (2008).

Weaver et al. (1999).

Vogel (2005, Chap. 2) and Reinhardt (2005).

This list is adapted from Balleisen (2010).

Eberlein and Matten (2009, pp. 242–245) and Buthe and Mattli (2011).

Heath (2006, p. 550). In this discussion, Heath approvingly cites Arrow (1973, pp. 303–317) for a similar distinction and rationale.

These are the ideas in the passage involving the famous (and only) usage of the “invisible hand” metaphor in Smith’s Wealth of Nations, book IV, Chap. 2, paragraph 9.

As Tyler Cowen and Eric Crampton note, “The term ‘market failure’ is prejudicial—we cannot know whether markets fail before we actually examine them” (2002, p. 24). Put another way, markets with ‘market failures’ in them are not necessarily markets that are failing.

Abend, G. (2011). Historicizing business ethics: The origins of business ethics in American universities, 1902–1936. Unpublished manuscript. Department of Sociology, New York University.

Arrow, K. (1973). Social responsibility and economic efficiency. Public Policy, 21, 303–317.

Balleisen, E. (2010). The prospects for effective ‘co-regulation’ in the United States: An historian’s view from the early twenty-first century. In E. Balleisen & D. Moss (Eds.), Government and markets: Toward a new theory of economic regulation (pp. 443–481). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Titel: Business Ethics as Self-Regulation: Why Principles that Ground Regulations Should Be Used to Ground Beyond-Compliance Norms as Well
verfasst von: Wayne Norman
Publikationsdatum: 01.03.2011
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe Sonderheft 1/2011
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1193-2

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