Differential cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like cipher

In 2011, Borghoff et al. introduced a slender-set differential cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like ciphers with key-dependent S-boxes. Borghoff’s differential attack mainly divides into two parts: data collection phase and S-box recovery phase. In this paper, we investigate different attacks on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes and public S-boxes. For PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes, we introduce two new cryptanalytic techniques, and use them to recover the secret S-boxes more efficiently. Our first new idea is that we present a new method of data collection based on the method of optimal distinguisher for collecting information efficiently. Another new technique is that we propose a method of constructing the entire correct slender-sets instead of checking the correctness of slender-sets in the S-box recovery phase. In particular, we implemented a successful attack on the cipher Maya in practice. In our experiments, the correct S-boxes can be recovered with \(2^{26}\) data complexity and \(2^{22.4}\) time complexity at a success rate of 100 % based on 200 independent trials. Furthermore, we propose a new method of recovering the secret key of PRESENT-like cipher with public S-boxes with lower data and time complexity. To the 12-round PRESENT-80, the experiments show that we can recover the entire 80-bit secret key with \(2^{34.9}\) data and \(2^{38.9}\) time complexity. To the 22-round \(\mathrm{PRINT}_\mathrm{CIPHER}\), experiments show that we can recover the entire 80-bit secret key with \(2^{37.5}\) data complexity and \(2^{41.5}\) time complexity. To the best of our knowledge, our attack is the best known differential attacks on PRESENT and \(\mathrm{PRINT}_\mathrm{CIPHER}\) in practice.