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Erschienen in: Quantitative Marketing and Economics 4/2008

01.12.2008

When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions

verfasst von: Xin Wang, Alan Montgomery, Kannan Srinivasan

Erschienen in: Quantitative Marketing and Economics | Ausgabe 4/2008

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Abstract

Recently fixed pricing and auctions have been brought together in a new pricing format that offers bidders the option of prematurely ending an auction at a fixed price. The growing popularity of auctions presents an interesting pricing decision for managers: whether to sell at a fixed price, in a regular auction, or through a buy-it-now auction. This paper studies eBay’s buy-it-now auction and answers the following research questions: why is fixed price used at traditional auctions, will buy-it-now increase the seller’s profit, how is an optimal price determined, and how is the buy-it-now decision influenced by key factors such as the customer’s cost of participating in the auction, the seller’s reserve price, and the number of potential customers. Our results show that when customers make endogenous participation decisions according to their participation costs, buy-it-now auctions can increase both customers’ utility and sellers’ profit. Endogenous participation has important implications for seller’s pricing decisions such as price formats and levels. Depending on the level of the posted price, the resulting price format could be either fixed price, buy-it-now auction or pure auction. Therefore, the seller needs to be careful and take into account market conditions when posting a price at auctions. We empirically test the model assumptions and predictions using data collected from eBay.

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Fußnoten
1
The previously derived conditional strategies (e.g. Hidvégi et al. 2006) assumed that all the potential bidders are present at the same time and monitoring the auction throughout the whole time while the auction is open and are able to revise their bids immediately once a certain bid level is reached.
 
2
Alternatively, one can model n as a random variable following a distribution, for example, Poisson. We expect that the model insights will remain the same.
 
3
For simplicity, uniform distribution assumption is adopted for analysis in this paper. The main results of the paper are general as shown in the “Appendix” by the generalized proofs and numerical analysis.
 
4
In our model, n potential customers arrive randomly at an auction. We do not consider the case where customers strategize concerning the sequence of entry in this paper.
 
5
We do not consider setting the optimal reserve price in this paper, but rather treat the reserve price as exogenous. We refer interested readers to Riley and Samuelson (1981) for more discussion on optimal auction design by setting the reserve price optimally.
 
Literatur
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Metadaten
Titel
When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions
verfasst von
Xin Wang
Alan Montgomery
Kannan Srinivasan
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2008
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Quantitative Marketing and Economics / Ausgabe 4/2008
Print ISSN: 1570-7156
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-711X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-008-9041-0