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Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Erschienen in:

31.12.2022 | Original Research

Female CFOs and managerial opportunism

verfasst von: Dina El Mahdy, Fatima Alali

Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Ausgabe 3/2023

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Abstract

We employ the Self-Selection Theory and provide new evidence into earnings management practices by female Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Using 8,288 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2018, we find that female CFOs are positively associated with real earnings management (REM). To gain insights into documented female CFOs’ opportunism, we predict and find empirical evidence in line with the expectations that female CFOs facing pressure from age and lack of diversity are positively associated with REM. Likewise, the association between REM and female CFOs dissipates among firms with no pressures from wage, age, or lack of diversity. We further examine the moderating effect of institutional investors and female CFOs' managerial abilities on the association between REM and female CFOs. Our results suggest that the positive association between REM and female CFOs is observable only among firms with high institutional investors, signaling external pressure on female CFOs to manipulate earnings. Collectively, we refer to the pressure factors on female CFOs as the Glass Rock because they are invisible yet drive female CFOs to behave opportunistically. As expected, the positive association between REM and female CFOs is noticeable only among firms with high female CFOs’ managerial abilities. Our results are robust to multiple specifications such as using a two-stage regression model (instrumental variable), a propensity score matching sample, a robust standard regression clustered by firm, and a subsample of firms that switched from male-to-female CFOs versus male-to-male CFOs.

Vorheriger Artikel Option implied riskiness and risk-taking incentives of executive compensation

Nächster Artikel Trade-time clustering

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In September 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched the Earnings Per Share (EPS) initiative, which relies heavily on risk-based data analytics, to scrutinize public companies that manipulate earnings. SEC (2020) SEC Charges Companies, Former Executives as Part of Risk-Based Initiative. Press Release 2020–226. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-226.

The documented risk-taking attitudes among men are not only related to ethical decisions, but also to health-related beliefs, which negatively affect their health and longevity (Courtenay 2000). This argument is in line with the social constructionist perspective. On the contrary, women are more likely to adopt healthy lifestyle patterns than men are.

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Additional analyses (untabulated) of our study reveal a negative significant association between female CFOs and discretionary accruals.

For example, Adut et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that predictive earnings management using managerial discretion to enhance realized cash flow reduces the firm’s informational risk.

The glass ceiling is a phenomenon known in the literature to describe a vertical job separation for females (Hull and Umansky 1997). It has been variously explained by (1) the Person-Centered Theory, which states that women lack the necessary interpersonal skills to succeed in leadership positions; (2) the Structural-Centered Theory, which contends that in the work environment, ‘the practices in organizational power and control structure’ favor male supremacy over females; and (3) the Bias-Centered Theory, which claims that bias is the key factor behind the glass ceiling phenomenon. This bias is inherent in sex-characteristic stereotypes and sex-role stereotypes.

For example, Hull and Umansky (1997) argue that women have not been working long enough in the profession in order to reach out to the top management team, which is referred to as a pipeline problem.

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The ExecuComp database covers S&P 1000 firms. Data is available starting from the year 1992. However, data pertaining to CFOs appears incomplete from 1992 to 1996. The study starts the sample by 1996 to allow us to calculate new CFOs/CEOs but the final sample starts from 1996 to 2018. The study was stopped in 2018 because managerial ability data is unavailable post 2018.

The study focuses on the behavior of female CFOs, only one observation per firm-year is kept, provided that this observation had complete information about the characteristics of CFOs as well as CEOs that was necessary for the analysis, including age, tenure, and compensation data.

Prior research provides empirical evidence that executives who are about to terminate their tenure reduce R&D expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks (Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard 1991; Bushee 1998). Therefore, these executives are deleted from the sample to avoid confounding the results.

Regulated industries are firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999; financial services firms are firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999.

The missing values for Advertising and R&D expenses are replaced with zeros if General Selling and Administrative Expenses have values greater than zero in the Compustat database, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010).

All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their respective distributions.

High risk-litigation industries are firms with SIC codes between 2836-2833; 8734-8731; 7379-7371; 3577-3570; and 3600-3674, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010).

Variables’ definitions are in Appendix A.

Although we control for the industry- and year-fixed effects in all models, we further control for the firm- and year-fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effect in additional statistical analyses and the results are almost identical to our main results. For example, for the models that include the industry-year fixed effect as a control variable, we find significant positive associations at 5% level between CFO_FEM and REM1, REM2, & REM3 (β₁ in Model (1) = 0.011, β₁ in Model 2 = 0.008, and β₁ in Model 3 = 0.010, one-tailed test).

The one-tailed test is common in earnings management literature (e.g., Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000) and empirical accounting research, in general (e.g., Cho and Patten 2007). We utilize the one-tailed test based on our predetermined positive and direct association between female CFOs and REM. The one-tailed test gives us more power in detecting the directional hypothesis, (e.g., the expected positive association between female CFOs and REM).

We run model 6 using the natural log of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA) instead of REM and document a statistically significant negative association between ABSDA and female CFOs.

Krishnan and Parsons (2008) investigate whether gender diversity in top management affects earnings quality. They found that firms with more gender diversity are more profitable, have higher stock returns after the initial public offerings, report bad news quicker, have lower earnings smoothing, have a lower probability of loss avoidance, and have greater sustainability of earnings than those with low gender diversity.

Although we control for the industry- and year-fixed effects in all models, we further control for the firm- and year-fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effect in additional statistical analyses and the results remain constant. For example, we repeated the analysis in Panels A and B in Table 5 after controlling for the firm- and year-fixed effects in models. For the models with high pressure on female CFOs, we find significant positive associations at a 5% level between CFO_FEM and REM1, REM2, & REM3 (β₁ in Model (1) = 0.012, β₁ in Model 2 = 0.009, and β₁ in Model 3 = 0.09, one-tailed test). For the models with no pressure on female CFOs, we find significant negative associations at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level between CFO_FEM and REM1, REM2, & REM3_, respectively (β₁ in Model (1) =− 0.022, β₁ in Model 2 = − 0.040, and β₁ in Model 3 = − 0.031, one-tailed test).

We repeated the analysis in this section after controlling for the firm- and year-fixed effects and again after controlling for the industry-year fixed effect and the results remain the same. For example, the results of the regression Models in Panel A and E after controlling for the firm- and year-fixed effects are still showing a statistical and positive significant association between female CFOs and REM.

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Titel: Female CFOs and managerial opportunism
verfasst von: Dina El Mahdy
Fatima Alali
Publikationsdatum: 31.12.2022
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Ausgabe 3/2023
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-022-01124-1

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