Skip to main content

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Case Study II: Climate Change

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio, Brazil in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The Kyoto Protocol, which sets out more detailed policies and measures that may be implemented by each party to achieve their commitments, was adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP 3 1997) to the UNFCCC in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan (see Annex G to this book for the list of COPs to the UNFCCC and MOPs to the Kyoto Protocol).

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
See Werksman (2005) for details of the negotiation of the Kyoto compliance system.
 
2
See Savaşan (2012) for a comparative analysis of reporting under the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols.
 
3
See Decisions 9, 10 (COP 2 1996) and Decisions 3, 4 (COP 5 1999) for more extensive guidelines relating to country reports.
 
5
See Herold (2012) for a detailed analysis of the experiences with Articles 5, 7 and 8 defining the monitoring, reporting and verification system under the Kyoto Protocol.
 
6
e.g. the MOP 1 (2005a, b) adopted the following decisions relating to articles 5, 7 and 8, KP (Decisions 13–15, 19–25, 27).
 
7
The rules of procedure of the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol (RoP) were adopted by Decision 4 (MOP 2, 2006), and then amended by Decision 4 (MOP 4, 2008).
 
8
The same approach adopted for the relationship between the COP and MOP is used for the subsidiary bodies as well. As in the case of the relationship between the COP and the MOP, the subsidiary bodies of the Protocol are independent of those of the Convention.
 
10
See also Dannenmaier (2012) for a detailed analysis of the role of non-state actors in climate compliance.
 
11
Recalling its COP 1/Decisions 11, COP 2/Decision 7, COP 3/Decision 9, COP 4/Decision 4, COP 5/Decision 9 and the relevant provisions of its COP 4/Decision 1 on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, and its COP 6/Decision 5, containing the Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, in COP 7/Decision 4, the COP establishes an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) to facilitate and advance technology transfer activities (Decision 4/COP 7 2001: 22, para. 2). It also sets out a number of technology transfer activities involving five key themes for meaningful actions: technology needs and needs assessments, technology information, enabling environments, capacity-building, and mechanisms for technology transfer (Annex, COP 7, Decision 4 2001: 24–30). Further, it requests the secretariat to develop an information clearing house, including a network of technology information centres, to facilitate the flow of, and access to, information on developing and transferring safe technologies (COP 7, Decision 4 2001: 26, para. 10(c, d)).
 
12
Article 4.3, in line with Art. 11.2(a, b), KP: developed country parties have to provide financial resources and the transfer of technology to developing countries. Art. 4.4: developed country parties have to assist developing countries. Art. 4.5: developed country parties have to promote, facilitate and finance the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties.
 
13
See also Goldberg et al. (1998) for the same view on the binding status of the measure requiring the suspension of eligibility.
 
14
For a general analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of the current system, see Savaşan (2015c).
 
15
For the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AAWG-KP), see http://​unfccc.​int/​bodies/​body/​6409.​php.
 
16
For the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), see: http://​unfccc.​int/​bodies/​body/​6431.​php.
 
18
See also Morgan (2012) for a detailed analysis on the emerging post-Cancun climate regime.
 
19
For the activities of the AWG-DP, see: http://​unfccc.​int/​bodies/​body/​6645.​php.
 
20
In the COP 20/MOP 10 negotiations held in Lima in 2014, invitations made to the state parties at the Warsaw meeting in 2013 for the presentation of their INDCs were repeated (COP 20, Decision 1 2014: paras. 8–10, 13–16). In addition, the draft negotiating text developed by the Durban Platform in Lima confirmed that the AWG-DP should complete its work at the COP 21 to adopt an instrument legally binding under the Convention, applicable to all parties, on the basis of the principle of CBDR in the light of different national circumstances (COP 20, Decision 1 2014: paras. 1–3, 5–7 and Annex).
 
21
(Information obtained on 10 June 2018). See the status of ratification of the Paris Agreement at: http://​unfccc.​int/​paris_​agreement/​items/​9444.​php.
 
22
New research reveals that all countries currently signed up to the Paris Agreement now have at least one national climate law or piece of legislation or national climate policy in place. See Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (2018) for details.
 
26
For details of the US Climate Alliance see: https://​www.​usclimateallianc​e.​org/​.
 
29
See Machado-Filho (2012) for a detailed analysis of the financial mechanisms under the climate regime.
 
30
For guidance on the determination of INDCs, see International Law Association (2014). Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Washington Conference. https://​papers.​ssrn.​com/​sol3/​papers.​cfm?​abstract_​id=​2461556. See also Oslo Principles on Global Obligations to Reduce Climate Change, adopted on 1 March 2015: https://​law.​yale.​edu/​system/​files/​area/​center/​schell/​oslo_​principles.​pdf.
 
31
For a detailed analysis of Article 13, see Dagnet/Levin (2017).
 
32
Communication of the parties’ first NDCs (COP 21, Decision 1 2015: para. 22) was undertaken during the ratification process. For INDCs as communicated by Parties, see: http://​www4.​unfccc.​int/​submissions/​indc/​Submission%20​Pages/​submissions.​aspx.
For an online climate data platform bringing together national climate pledges under the Paris Agreement and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions datasets, see: http://​cait.​wri.​org/​.
For another online platform to explore and visualize the most up-to-date data on carbon fluxes, see: http://​www.​globalcarbonatla​s.​org/​en/​CO2-emissions.
For an up-to-date assessment of individual country assessments by the Climate Action Tracker, see: http://​climateactiontra​cker.​org/​.
 
33
See the forthcoming sections for further discussions on this issue.
 
35
See also Oberthür (2014) for a detailed debate on the options for a compliance mechanism in the 2015 Climate Agreement.
 
36
Sands (2016) also addresses the potential role of international adjudication in the form of an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ or ITLOS.
 
37
Based on these provisions, the KP’s non-compliance procedure was established by a decision of the COP (COP 7, Decision 24) Marrakesh, Morocco (the so-called ‘Marrakesh Accords’) in 2001, and then approved by the MOP (MOP 1, Decision 27) in Montreal, Canada in 2005; and the MP’s procedure was finalized by the MOP 4 (Decision IV/5) held in Copenhagen on 23–25 December 1992. See supra Sect. 6.1: The 1997 Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism.
 
38
See Moosmann et al. (2017) for an overall and specific analysis, including the process leading to the COP 23 and the international developments and the challenges related to that meeting.
 
39
The progress of the negotiations relating to the Paris Agreement is summarised in the Progress Tracker document updated regularly by the UNFCCC secretariat. See: http://​unfccc.​int/​files/​paris_​agreement/​application/​pdf/​pa_​progress_​tracker_​200617.​pdf.
 
40
Under the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement on the first part of its first session (APA 1.1 2016), to assist parties to develop their consideration on the elements of the compliance committee, the details of which were left to be negotiated to the CMA 1, it was also decided to ask for the preparation of guiding questions from its Co-Chairs by 30 August 2016 (APA 1.1 2016: para. 9.7–25; COP 21, Decision 1 2015: para. 103).
 
41
See Savaşan (2012) for a comparative analysis of reporting under both the MP and KP.
 
42
For details of the challenges regarding gathering information under CMs, see Savaşan (2015b).
 
43
See Savaşan (2017a) for a general analysis of the weaknesses of the CMs.
 
44
Under the MP, if the relevant party invites the ImplCom to gather information in its territory, site visits can already be done. Under the KP they are conducted as part of the in-depth reviews with the approval of the relevant party (COP 1, Decision 2 1995: para. 2c), or it may be stipulated that if the party does not submit its data properly and on time, the competent body of the Agreement can benefit from other sources, or specifically from its own investigation/estimation etc. (for a similar view see Sachariew 1991).
 
45
See also the document released on 13 November 2017 concerning parties’ positions on the information they need to communicate about their national contributions, showing the differences in the organization, delivery and update systems of parties. Available at: http://​unfccc.​int/​files/​meetings/​bonn_​nov_​2017/​in-session/​application/​pdf/​apa_​3_​informal_​note_​final_​version.​pdf.
 
46
See Oberthür/Lefeber (2010: 150) for the view stating that the deduction approach does not form a ‘penalty’ or suitable way of ‘penalizing’ the party concerned.
 
47
Due to the fact that the parties that have withheld their consent to consequences adopted by decisions of COP/MOP can argue that they are not bound by these deductions (COP 7, Decision 24; MOP 1/Decision 27).
 
48
On the issue of clustering, the Second Consultative Meeting of MEAs on IEG agreed that the clustering of MEAs for promoting collaboration and coordination should be carried out at the sectoral level (e.g. biodiversity-related conventions, land conventions, chemicals and hazardous wastes conventions, atmosphere conventions and regional seas conventions and related agreements), the functional level (e.g. trade-related MEAs, conventions with prior-informed consent procedures, and conventions with customs procedures) and the regional level (e.g. capacity-building, enforcement and compliance etc.) (UNEP 2001: para. 12). See also Oberthür (2002) for the details of clustering.
 
50
In recent years, China has started crucial projects to improve environmental protection in the country and has also taken a leading role in the process of the PCA. See Doğan (2017: 193–194) on China’s improvement in environmental issues.
 
52
See supra, Chap. 4 for details.
 
53
See supra, Chap. 4 for details.
 
54
See ELI (2015) for a “Model Law Implementing the Nationally Determined Contributions Submitted Under the Paris Agreement”, designed to help countries construct a law-based system for meeting their NDCs under the Paris Agreement.
 
55
See Mehling (2012) for the view that the inclusion of weaker commitments in terms of their enforceability results in “a certain risk for the future of international climate cooperation” (Mehling 2012: 214).
 
56
See supra, Chap. 4, at Sect. 4.​2.​2.​1.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Andresen, S. (2001). Global Environmental Governance: UN Fragmentation and Co-ordination. Stokke, O.S. and Thommessen, Ø.B. (Eds.), Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002 (19–26). London: Earthscan Publications. Andresen, S. (2001). Global Environmental Governance: UN Fragmentation and Co-ordination. Stokke, O.S. and Thommessen, Ø.B. (Eds.), Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002 (19–26). London: Earthscan Publications.
Zurück zum Zitat Andresen, S. and Gulbrandsen, L.H. (2005). The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (169–186). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Andresen, S. and Gulbrandsen, L.H. (2005). The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (169–186). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Batagodal, B.M.S., Perera, B.R.L. and De Alwis, J.M.D.D.J. (2004). A New Strategy for Centralized Information Management on (MEAs) in Developing Countries. International Environmental Governance Conference, Paris, 15 & 16 March 2004. Batagodal, B.M.S., Perera, B.R.L. and De Alwis, J.M.D.D.J. (2004). A New Strategy for Centralized Information Management on (MEAs) in Developing Countries. International Environmental Governance Conference, Paris, 15 & 16 March 2004.
Zurück zum Zitat Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (2006). Conclusions from MEA Compliance. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T., Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Academic Analysis and Views from Practice (359–369). The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (2006). Conclusions from MEA Compliance. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T., Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Academic Analysis and Views from Practice (359–369). The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Zurück zum Zitat Bodansky, D. (2016a). The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope? American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 110, 2, 288–319. Bodansky, D. (2016a). The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope? American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 110, 2, 288–319.
Zurück zum Zitat Bodle, R. and Oberthür, S. (2017). Legal Form of the Paris Agreement and Nature of Its Obligations. Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (91–106). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bodle, R. and Oberthür, S. (2017). Legal Form of the Paris Agreement and Nature of Its Obligations. Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (91–106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2006). Technical and Financial Assistance and Compliance: The Interplay. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (273–300). The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV. Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2006). Technical and Financial Assistance and Compliance: The Interplay. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (273–300). The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Zurück zum Zitat Breitmeier, H., Young, O.R. and Zürn, M. (2006). Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: From Case Study to Database. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Breitmeier, H., Young, O.R. and Zürn, M. (2006). Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: From Case Study to Database. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Brunnée, J. (2012). Promoting Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (38–54). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Brunnée, J. (2012). Promoting Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (38–54). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Carazo, M. and Klein, D. (2017). Implications for Public International Law: Initial Considerations, Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (389–412). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carazo, M. and Klein, D. (2017). Implications for Public International Law: Initial Considerations, Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (389–412). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Chambers, B.W. (2008). Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of MEAs. Tokyo, New York: UN University Press. Chambers, B.W. (2008). Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of MEAs. Tokyo, New York: UN University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Chasek, P.S., Downie, D.L. and Brown, J.W. (2006). Global Environmental Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chasek, P.S., Downie, D.L. and Brown, J.W. (2006). Global Environmental Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Crossen, T.E. (2004). The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Regime: Origins, Outcomes and the Amendment Dilemma. Official Journal of the Resource Management Law Association of New Zealand Inc., I, XII, 1–6. Crossen, T.E. (2004). The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Regime: Origins, Outcomes and the Amendment Dilemma. Official Journal of the Resource Management Law Association of New Zealand Inc., I, XII, 1–6.
Zurück zum Zitat Dagnet, Y. and Levin, K. (2017). Transparency (Article 13), Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds) The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (301–318). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagnet, Y. and Levin, K. (2017). Transparency (Article 13), Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds) The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (301–318). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Dagnet, Y. and Northrop, E. (2017). Facilitating Implementation and Promoting Compliance (Article 15), Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds,), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (338–351). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagnet, Y. and Northrop, E. (2017). Facilitating Implementation and Promoting Compliance (Article 15), Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds,), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (338–351). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Dannenmaier, E. (2012). The Role of Non-State Actors in Climate Compliance, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (149–176). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Dannenmaier, E. (2012). The Role of Non-State Actors in Climate Compliance, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (149–176). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Dimitrov, R.S. (2010). Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference, Review of Policy Research, 27, 6, 795–821. Dimitrov, R.S. (2010). Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference, Review of Policy Research, 27, 6, 795–821.
Zurück zum Zitat Doelle, M. (2017). Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds) The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (375–388). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Doelle, M. (2017). Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, Klein, D., Carazo, M.P., Doelle, M., Andrew, J.B. (Eds) The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, (375–388). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Doelle, M. (2012). Experience with the Facilitative and Enforcement Branches of the Kyoto Compliance System, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (102–121). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Doelle, M. (2012). Experience with the Facilitative and Enforcement Branches of the Kyoto Compliance System, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (102–121). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Doğan, F. (2017). Çin’in Hegemonik Yükselişi: Pax Americana’dan Pax Sinica’ya, Ankara: Orion Kitabevi. Doğan, F. (2017). Çin’in Hegemonik Yükselişi: Pax Americana’dan Pax Sinica’ya, Ankara: Orion Kitabevi.
Zurück zum Zitat Ehrmann, M. (2002). Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 13, 2, 377–444. Ehrmann, M. (2002). Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 13, 2, 377–444.
Zurück zum Zitat Epiney, A. (2006). The Role of NGOs in the Process of Ensuring compliance with MEAs. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (273–300). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. Epiney, A. (2006). The Role of NGOs in the Process of Ensuring compliance with MEAs. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (273–300). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Zurück zum Zitat Eritja, M.C., Pons, X.F. and Sancho, L.H. (2004). Compliance Mechanisms in the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Revue Generale de Droit, 34, 51–105. Eritja, M.C., Pons, X.F. and Sancho, L.H. (2004). Compliance Mechanisms in the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Revue Generale de Droit, 34, 51–105.
Zurück zum Zitat Faure, M.G. and Lefevere, J. (1999). Compliance with International Environmental Agreements. Vig, N.J. and Axelrod, R.S. (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (138–156). Washington: CQ Press. Faure, M.G. and Lefevere, J. (1999). Compliance with International Environmental Agreements. Vig, N.J. and Axelrod, R.S. (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (138–156). Washington: CQ Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Fodella, A. (2009). Structural and Institutional Aspects of NCMs. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (355–372). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Fodella, A. (2009). Structural and Institutional Aspects of NCMs. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (355–372). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Hagem, C. and Westskog, H. (2005). Effective Enforcement and Double-edged Deterrents: How the Impacts of Sanctions also Affect Complying Parties. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (107–128). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Hagem, C. and Westskog, H. (2005). Effective Enforcement and Double-edged Deterrents: How the Impacts of Sanctions also Affect Complying Parties. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (107–128). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Handl, G. (1997). Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 5, 29–51. Handl, G. (1997). Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 5, 29–51.
Zurück zum Zitat Herold, A. (2012). Experiences with Articles 5, 7, and 8 defining the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System under the Kyoto Protocol. Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (122–146). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Herold, A. (2012). Experiences with Articles 5, 7, and 8 defining the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System under the Kyoto Protocol. Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (122–146). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Hovi, J., Froyn, C.B. and Bang, G. (2007). Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Can Punitive Consequences Restore Compliance? Review of International Studies, 33, 435–449. Hovi, J., Froyn, C.B. and Bang, G. (2007). Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Can Punitive Consequences Restore Compliance? Review of International Studies, 33, 435–449.
Zurück zum Zitat Hovi J., Stokke, O.S. and Ulfstein, G. (2005). Introduction and Main Findings. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (1–16). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Hovi J., Stokke, O.S. and Ulfstein, G. (2005). Introduction and Main Findings. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (1–16). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Hovi, J. (2005). The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (129–146). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Hovi, J. (2005). The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (129–146). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Hunter, D., Salzman, J. and Zaelke, D. (2002). International Environmental Law and Policy. New York: Foundation Press. Hunter, D., Salzman, J. and Zaelke, D. (2002). International Environmental Law and Policy. New York: Foundation Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Jacobson, H.K. and Weiss, E.B. (2001). Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords. Diehl, P.F. (Eds.), The Politics of Global Governance, International Organizations in an Interdependent World (2nd Ed.) (406–435). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Jacobson, H.K. and Weiss, E.B. (2001). Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords. Diehl, P.F. (Eds.), The Politics of Global Governance, International Organizations in an Interdependent World (2nd Ed.) (406–435). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Zurück zum Zitat Kolari, T. (2003). Constructing Non-Compliance Systems into International Environmental Agreements – A Rise of Enforcement Doctrine with Credible Sanctions Needed? Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XIV, 205–232. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Kolari, T. (2003). Constructing Non-Compliance Systems into International Environmental Agreements – A Rise of Enforcement Doctrine with Credible Sanctions Needed? Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XIV, 205–232. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Zurück zum Zitat Lefeber, R. and Oberthür, S. (2012). Key Features of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (77–101). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Lefeber, R. and Oberthür, S. (2012). Key Features of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (77–101). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Levy, M.A., Young O.R. and Zürn M. (1995). The Study of International Regimes. European Journal of International Relations, 1, 3, 267–330. Levy, M.A., Young O.R. and Zürn M. (1995). The Study of International Regimes. European Journal of International Relations, 1, 3, 267–330.
Zurück zum Zitat Machado-Filho, H. (2012). Financial Mechanisms under the Climate Regime, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (216–239). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Machado-Filho, H. (2012). Financial Mechanisms under the Climate Regime, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (216–239). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Mehling, M. (2012). Enforcing Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (194–215). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Mehling, M. (2012). Enforcing Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime, Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (194–215). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Mitchell, R.B. (2007). Compliance Theory, Effectiveness, and Behaviour Change in International Environmental Law. Bodansky, B., Brunnée, J. and Hey, E. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (893–921). New York: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, R.B. (2007). Compliance Theory, Effectiveness, and Behaviour Change in International Environmental Law. Bodansky, B., Brunnée, J. and Hey, E. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (893–921). New York: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Mitchell, R.B. (2005). Flexibility, Compliance and Norm Development in the Climate Regime. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (65–84). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Mitchell, R.B. (2005). Flexibility, Compliance and Norm Development in the Climate Regime. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (65–84). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Montini, M. (2017). Riflessioni Critiche Sull’accordo Di Parigi Sui Cambiamenti Climatici (Some Critical Reflections on the Paris Agreement on Climatic Changes), Rivista Di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. C, Fasc. 3, 719–755. Montini, M. (2017). Riflessioni Critiche Sull’accordo Di Parigi Sui Cambiamenti Climatici (Some Critical Reflections on the Paris Agreement on Climatic Changes), Rivista Di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. C, Fasc. 3, 719–755.
Zurück zum Zitat Montini, M. (2009). Procedural Guarantees in NCMs. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (389–406). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Montini, M. (2009). Procedural Guarantees in NCMs. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (389–406). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Morgan, J. (2012). The Emerging Post-Cancun Climate Regime. Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (17–37). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Morgan, J. (2012). The Emerging Post-Cancun Climate Regime. Brunnée, J., Doelle, M. and Rajamani, L. (Eds). Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (17–37). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Mrema, E.M. (2006). Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Ensuring Compliance with MEAs. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (201–228). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. Mrema, E.M. (2006). Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Ensuring Compliance with MEAs. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (201–228). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. (2014). Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement, Working Paper, September 2014, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels. Oberthür, S. (2014). Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement, Working Paper, September 2014, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. and Lefeber, R. (2010). Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revisited After Four Years of Experience. Climate Law, 1, 1, 133–158. Oberthür, S. and Lefeber, R. (2010). Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revisited After Four Years of Experience. Climate Law, 1, 1, 133–158.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (2006). Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction. Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (Eds.), Institutional Interaction in GEG, Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (19–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (2006). Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction. Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (Eds.), Institutional Interaction in GEG, Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (19–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. (2006). The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO and the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement. Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (Eds.), Institutional Interaction in GEG, Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (53–72). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Oberthür, S. (2006). The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO and the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement. Oberthür, S. and Gebring, T. (Eds.), Institutional Interaction in GEG, Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (53–72). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. (2002). Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2, 317–340. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Oberthür, S. (2002). Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2, 317–340. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür S. (2001). Linkages between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, Enhancing Synergies between Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 1, 3, 357–377. Oberthür S. (2001). Linkages between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, Enhancing Synergies between Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 1, 3, 357–377.
Zurück zum Zitat Oberthür, S. and Ott, H. (1999). The Kyoto Protocol, International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. New York, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Oberthür, S. and Ott, H. (1999). The Kyoto Protocol, International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. New York, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Zurück zum Zitat Ozone Secretariat (2015). Montreal Protocol-Achievements to Date and Challenges Ahead. Ozone Secretariat (2015). Montreal Protocol-Achievements to Date and Challenges Ahead.
Zurück zum Zitat Pitea, C. (2009). Multiplication and Overlap of NCPs and Mechanisms: Towards Better Coordination? Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (439–452). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Pitea, C. (2009). Multiplication and Overlap of NCPs and Mechanisms: Towards Better Coordination? Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (439–452). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Romanin Jacur, F. (2009). Controlling and Assisting Compliance: Financial Aspects. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Ed.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (419–438). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Romanin Jacur, F. (2009). Controlling and Assisting Compliance: Financial Aspects. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Ed.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (419–438). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Savaşan, Z. (2015a). The Role of Networks in Ensuring Compliance And Strengthening Coordination: A Comparative Analysis on INECE, ECENA, RENA and REC Turkey. Faure, M., Smedt, P., Stas, A. (Eds). Environmental Enforcement Networks: Concepts, Implementation and Effectiveness (68–104). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Savaşan, Z. (2015a). The Role of Networks in Ensuring Compliance And Strengthening Coordination: A Comparative Analysis on INECE, ECENA, RENA and REC Turkey. Faure, M., Smedt, P., Stas, A. (Eds). Environmental Enforcement Networks: Concepts, Implementation and Effectiveness (68–104). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Zurück zum Zitat Savaşan, Z. (2015b). Gathering Information under Compliance Mechanisms: Potential New Ways for Current Challenges. De Bree, M. and Ruessink, H. (Eds.), Innovating Environmental Compliance Assurance (171–194). The Netherlands: INECE. Savaşan, Z. (2015b). Gathering Information under Compliance Mechanisms: Potential New Ways for Current Challenges. De Bree, M. and Ruessink, H. (Eds.), Innovating Environmental Compliance Assurance (171–194). The Netherlands: INECE.
Zurück zum Zitat Savaşan, Z. (2017a). Coping with Global Warming: Compliance Issue Compliance Mechanisms Under MEAs. Zhang, XinRong, Dincer, Ibrahim (Eds.), Energy Solutions to Combat Global Warming, Lecture Notes on Energy, 33, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. Savaşan, Z. (2017a). Coping with Global Warming: Compliance Issue Compliance Mechanisms Under MEAs. Zhang, XinRong, Dincer, Ibrahim (Eds.), Energy Solutions to Combat Global Warming, Lecture Notes on Energy, 33, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
Zurück zum Zitat Savaşan, Z. (2017b). A Brief Assessment on the Paris Climate Agreement and Compliance Issue. Uluslararasi İlişkiler, 14, 54, 107–125. Savaşan, Z. (2017b). A Brief Assessment on the Paris Climate Agreement and Compliance Issue. Uluslararasi İlişkiler, 14, 54, 107–125.
Zurück zum Zitat Ulfstein, G. and Werksman, J. (2005). The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (39–64). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Ulfstein, G. and Werksman, J. (2005). The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (39–64). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Urbinati, S. (2009). Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (63–84). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Urbinati, S. (2009). Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Treves, T., Tanzi, A., Pineschi, L., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (Eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (63–84). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Voigt, C. and Ferreira, F. (2016). ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement. Transnational Environmental Law, 5, 2, 285–303. Voigt, C. and Ferreira, F. (2016). ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement. Transnational Environmental Law, 5, 2, 285–303.
Zurück zum Zitat Voigt, C. (2016b). Operationalizing the Implementation and Compliance Mechanism in the Paris Agreement, Conversations with Climate Experts Series. Voigt, C. (2016b). Operationalizing the Implementation and Compliance Mechanism in the Paris Agreement, Conversations with Climate Experts Series.
Zurück zum Zitat Wang, X. and Wiser, G. (2002). The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate Change Convention and Its Kyoto Protocol. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 11, 2, 181–198. Wang, X. and Wiser, G. (2002). The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate Change Convention and Its Kyoto Protocol. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 11, 2, 181–198.
Zurück zum Zitat Werksman, J.D. (2005). The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (17–38). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Werksman, J.D. (2005). The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System. Stokke, O.S., Hovi J. and Ulfstein, G. (Eds.), Implementing the Climate Regime, International Compliance (17–38). Sterling, VA: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Zurück zum Zitat Wolfrum, R. and Friedrich, J. (2006). The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T., Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Academic Analysis and Views from Practice (53–68). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. Wolfrum, R. and Friedrich, J. (2006). The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T., Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Academic Analysis and Views from Practice (53–68). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Zurück zum Zitat Wolfrum, R. and Matz, N. (2003). Conflicts in International Environmental Law. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Wolfrum, R. and Matz, N. (2003). Conflicts in International Environmental Law. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Zurück zum Zitat Wolfrum, R. (1999). Recueil des cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 272 (1998). The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Wolfrum, R. (1999). Recueil des cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 272 (1998). The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Zurück zum Zitat Young, O.R. (2002). Matching Institutions and Ecosystems: The Problem of Fit. Les seminaires de l’Iddri, No. 2, Iddri. Young, O.R. (2002). Matching Institutions and Ecosystems: The Problem of Fit. Les seminaires de l’Iddri, No. 2, Iddri.
Zurück zum Zitat COP 16 (2010). Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Decision 1/COP 16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, Cancun, 29 November–10 December 2010. Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. COP 16 (2010). Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Decision 1/COP 16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, Cancun, 29 November–10 December 2010. Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. Available at: http://​unfccc.​int/​resource/​docs/​2010/​cop16/​eng/​07a01.​pdf.
Zurück zum Zitat FB Reports to the Compliance Committee on the Deliberations in the Facilitative Branch relating to the Submission entitled “Compliance with Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol.” (Parties concerned: Austria; CC-2006-1-2/FB, Bulgaria, CC-2006-2-3/FB; Canada, CC-2006-3-3/FB; France, CC-2006-4-3/FB; Germany, CC-2006-5-2/FB; Ireland, CC-2006-6-2/FB; Italy, CC-2006-7-2/FB; Latvia, CC-2006-8-4/FB, Liechtenstein, CC-2006-9-2/FB; Luxembourg, CC-2006-10-2/FB; Poland, CC-2006-11-3/FB; Portugal, CC-2006-12-3/FB; Russian Federation, CC-2006-13-2/FB; Slovenia, CC-2006-14-3/FB; Ukraine, CC-2006-15-2/FB). Available at: https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/compliance-committee-cc/questions-of-implementation/question-of-implementation-numerous-annex-1-party. FB Reports to the Compliance Committee on the Deliberations in the Facilitative Branch relating to the Submission entitled “Compliance with Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol.” (Parties concerned: Austria; CC-2006-1-2/FB, Bulgaria, CC-2006-2-3/FB; Canada, CC-2006-3-3/FB; France, CC-2006-4-3/FB; Germany, CC-2006-5-2/FB; Ireland, CC-2006-6-2/FB; Italy, CC-2006-7-2/FB; Latvia, CC-2006-8-4/FB, Liechtenstein, CC-2006-9-2/FB; Luxembourg, CC-2006-10-2/FB; Poland, CC-2006-11-3/FB; Portugal, CC-2006-12-3/FB; Russian Federation, CC-2006-13-2/FB; Slovenia, CC-2006-14-3/FB; Ukraine, CC-2006-15-2/FB). Available at: https://​unfccc.​int/​process/​bodies/​constituted-bodies/​compliance-committee-cc/​questions-of-implementation/​question-of-implementation-numerous-annex-1-party.
Zurück zum Zitat Ad Hoc WG (1989). Report of the 1st Meeting of the Ad Hoc WG. Geneva, 14 July 1989. UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3. Ad Hoc WG (1989). Report of the 1st Meeting of the Ad Hoc WG. Geneva, 14 July 1989. UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3.
Zurück zum Zitat Ad Hoc WG (1998). Report on the Work of the Ad Hoc WG of Legal and Technical Experts on Non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol. Geneva, 3–4 July 1998 and Cairo, 17–18 November 1998. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/1. Ad Hoc WG (1998). Report on the Work of the Ad Hoc WG of Legal and Technical Experts on Non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol. Geneva, 3–4 July 1998 and Cairo, 17–18 November 1998. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/1.
Zurück zum Zitat Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the Montreal Protocol (NCP) (2006). Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (419–421). Nairobi: UNEP. Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the Montreal Protocol (NCP) (2006). Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (419–421). Nairobi: UNEP.
Metadaten
Titel
Case Study II: Climate Change
verfasst von
Zerrin Savaşan
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14313-8_6