8. We Want Our Freedom: Slavery and Public Reason

‘Free’: ‘Like the Greek and the Latin words, this originally refers to legal status. The opposite is slave’ (Lewis 2013, p. 114).

See the historical Chap. 2, which also discusses the rise of liberalism and colonialism.

Also see Chap. 2 on the two strands in Locke’s epistemology: on the one hand, empiricism, in consonance with the modern scientific worldview; on the other hand, rationalistic proofs of God’s existence and an appeal to Christian revelation of religious truth.

Rawls developed his idea of Public Reason in Political Liberalism (1993), Lecture VI; elaborating it further in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997 and 1999).

However, see Gaus (1995) who argues that political liberalism also requires ‘epistemic rationality’, so as to exclude irrational beliefs from the reasonable debate.

Also see Cohen (2009), who argues that public reason requires a thin concept of truth (in opposition to falsehood), while abstaining from controversial deeper theories of truth.

However, as discussed in Chap. 2, one may doubt Waldron’s rejection of a rational reconstruction of Locke’s political philosophy that dissociates it from this religious framework.

However, see Chap. 2.14. As to the equality of the sexes, Waldron points to Locke’s argument that both Adam and Eve were created in God’s image. Waldron concedes it is a flaw in Locke’s egalitarianism that he appoints the husband as head of the family because he is ‘abler and the stronger’ than his wife (Tr II, 82; Locke 1988, II, 82).

Each component of Waldron’s political thought does not necessarily entail the other.

In his earlier essay Rights and Majorities, Waldron (1993) contrasts two ideal-types of democracy. Democratic majority decisions in Bentham’s sense represent aggregates of individual preferences that may neglect the individual rights of others. This opens up the possibility of tyrannical majorities. Waldron opposes Benthamite democracy with democracy à la Rousseau. Here a citizen’s vote is determined by his opinion of what the common good of society requires. In the Rousseauian model, the majority will give fair weight to individual rights in its decisions. There is no need for institutional constraints like a Bill of Rights or judicial review. Waldron denies that this model is too optimistic, since ‘We know anyway, from our own experience of politics, that (…) [p]eople often vote on the basis of what they think is the general good of society’ (p. 408). Even then, they will disagree about what the right solution is, so that the majority has to cut the knot.

Rawls acknowledges that his egalitarian difference principle, although reasonable, is too controversial; therefore he recedes to the less contested social minimum. He considers libertarianism to be unreasonable (and controversial), because its rejection of a social minimum does not meet the requirement of reciprocity—there is no guarantee that the citizens can make effective use of their liberties.

Rawls comments that his ‘moral psychology of the person’ is philosophical, and does not originate in the science of human nature. Yet, he ‘tries to specify the most reasonable conception of the person that the general facts about human nature and society seem to allow’. He relies on the lessons of historical experience, while recognizing that history is full of surprises (Rawls 1996, pp. 86–87). Larmore, who maintains that equal respect is the proper basis of political liberalism, admits that he would not know how to justify this basic norm to people who do not already accept it. But he regards this ‘as less a philosophical defect than a sign that this ideal has come to belong to our very sense of what we are as moral beings. (…) If we cannot see how to justify it, that is because it defines the framework of what we understand moral argument to be’ (Larmore 1996, p. 150).

Audi mentions three special reasons for excluding religious arguments. First, religious groups have a relatively strong motive for dominating other groups: they want to save their souls. Moreover, the dictates of religion often extend to secular conduct. Lastly, it is hard to reach an agreement to disagree because religious beliefs claim special authority. See Audi (2000), p. 68–69.

See Davis (1986), p. 32 ff.

For more about the Curaçaoan slave revolt, see Klooster and Oostindie (2011).

See Oostindie (2000), p. 68 ff.

Also see Paula (1967).

For an extensive overview, see Davis (1966). The problems concerning the definition of slavery are discussed in Davis (1984), p. 8 ff.

For Aristotle on freaks, see Chap. 7 on Freaky Justice.

However, Genesis does indicate that Ham was the ancestor of the Kush, that is, the black Nubians. But then again, Genesis continues that the Kush brought forth Nimrod, who was ‘the first ruler on earth’ and certainly not a slave. Moreover, Ham also was the forefather of the Canaanites and other light-skinned peoples.

See Postma (1990), Emmer (2006), Flinkenflögel (1994).

Albeit often in combination with racist views. In Essai sur les moeurs (1756), Voltaire pointed to the inferior intelligence of the round-eyed, flat-nosed, thick-lipped, woolly-haired Negroes.

See for instance Weichman (1995), p. 68–69.

Paulus maintained that slaves first needed education on living in an autonomous way. His early death in 1796 prevented him from having a further impact on Dutch politics.

See Alofs (2010), p. 112–128; Alofs (2009). For a contemporary pictorial representation of Virginia by the Aruban painter Vanessa Paulina, see http://​www.​vanessapaulina.​com.

In later centuries the reception was more critical: Capitein is then seen as an intellectual slave of the Dutch, or as a deeply tragic figure. See Kpobi (1993), Van der Zee (2000), Parker (2001), Hondius (2010).

Moreover, many African parents did not like the strict rules of Christian marriage; it was more advantageous if their daughters entered into cohabitation arrangements with Europeans.

This fictional trial has also been elaborated upon in the drama We Want Our Freedom! (see Chap. 1.8, Chap. 2.15 and Chap. 2, note 9). It will be clear that, as dramatic characters, Locke, Capitein and Virginia do not truthfully and accurately represent the historical persons on whom they are modelled. The role of ‘John Locke’ as Virginia’s lawyer is largely determined by the inner logic of the play in which he appears.