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Constitutional Political Economy
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 4/2011

01.12.2011 | Original Paper

Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China

verfasst von: Eric C. Ip, Michael K. H. Law

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 4/2011

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Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the rules that govern central-local government relations in the Chinese political economy. Although the federalism that accompanied China’s market reforms has substantially facilitated economic growth, it has also created powerful incentives for local authorities to abuse their powers, significantly increasing the agency costs to the central government of maintaining political stability and creating a national market. This article analyzes the institutional design of the nascent Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), known to officials and academics as China’s new “Economic Constitution”. It demonstrates that the major purpose of the AML is to break up the so-called “administrative monopolies”, or bureaucratic fiefdoms over local economies. In contrast to existing academic treatment, it will study the AML in the framework of competition for influence over economic policy between rent-seeking central and local actors. It argues that the AML, despite its stated purposes, is indeed designed to reduce the policy-making powers of the regions to the comparative advantage of the central government. The AML can thus be modeled as a new constitutional contract that the center wishes to enter into with the localities in order to repeal the existing rules of decentralization. It will be further shown that the AML, reflecting the allocation of power in the Chinese state, prioritizes the political imperatives of recentralization over the facilitation of competitive markets.
Vorheriger Artikel The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
Nächster Artikel Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment

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Metadaten
Titel
Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China
verfasst von
Eric C. Ip
Michael K. H. Law
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2011
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 4/2011
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-011-9110-3

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