On the overthrow or endurance of kings

See Congleton (2011) for an analysis of the “king-and-council” template further discussed in Sect. 3. Finer (1999) offers an authoritative historical account of the monarchy from ancient to modern times and the evolution of government from autocratic to democratic.

For example, the medieval Byzantine Empire lacked a fixed rule for succession and experienced a large turnover of imperial families. In England the monarchy became hereditary on the basis of primogeniture after the 1066 Norman Conquest. In France it became so in the 12th century with Philip–Augustus (1139–1223). On the other hand, in the Holy Roman Empire of Germany the king was elected by a seven-man electoral college of local princes.

For an economic analysis of the dictator–autocrat as a utility maximizing “state proprietor”, see Tullock (1987) and (2002), Grossman (2002), Grossman and Noh (1994), and McGuire and Olson (1996). In his influential work on dictatorship, Wintrobe (1998) distinguishes between different types of dictators–autocrats depending on their objectives (personal consumption and power) and the instruments used (repression and loyalty).

This was first articulated by the fourth century BCE Athenian orator Isocrates who wrote “…men permanently in charge are much better than others by experience even if less well-endowed by nature. Men who hold office for a year ignore many matters and pass the buck to others, while monarchs neglect nothing because they know that the responsibility for everything lies with them… But the greatest difference is this: men under other governments give attention to the affairs of state as if they were the concern of others; monarchs, as if they were their own concern. And … monarchies excel … in war.” Isocrates, Nicocles of Cyprus, 3.21–3.22. Available at http://​www.​perseus.​tufts.​edu/​hopper/​collection?​collection=​Perseus:​collection:​Greco-Roman.

This echoes earlier arguments of von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1956) that “If the regime of the tyrant becomes consolidated, restrictive measures can be relaxed in proportion as his rule gains security and even a semblance of legitimacy" (emphasis in the original).

There are a few contemporary examples of dynastic succession in dictatorships: North Korea since 1953 is a case of a three-generation dictatorship by the Kim family. Examples of two-generation dictatorships are the Somoza family in Nicaragua, 1937–1979 (father and then two sons); the Duvalier family in Haiti, 1956–1986; the current dictatorships of the Assad family in Syria (since 1970) and the Aliyev family in Azerbaijan (since 1993), while in Cuba Fidel Castro, dictator since 1959, transferred power to his brother Raul in 2008.

See Zhang (2011) for a recent discussion and an application to communist China.

Walter Bagehot (1873), the English constitutionalist and essayist, aptly captures the problem: “It is idle to expect an ordinary man born in the purple to have greater genius than an extraordinary man born out of the purple; to expect a man whose place has always been fixed to have a better judgment than one who has lived by his judgment; to expect a man whose career will be the same whether he is discreet or whether he is indiscreet to have the nice discretion of one who has risen by his wisdom, who will fall if he ceases to be wise. The characteristic advantage of a constitutional king is the permanence of his place. This gives him the opportunity of acquiring a consecutive knowledge of complex transactions, but it gives only an opportunity. The king must use it… Yet a constitutional prince is the man who is most tempted to pleasure, and the least forced to business… Why should he work?” (p.91).

The gains from division of labour were first pointed out by Bagehot (1873), who saw the constitution as having “… two parts … first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population—the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and next, the efficient parts—those by which it, in fact, works and rules” (p.44)…The Queen is only at the head of the dignified part of the constitution. The prime minister is at the head of the efficient part.” (p. 48). He famously identified three rights in the British monarchy: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect.” (p. 85).

When a single person combines both the positions of the head of state and head of government (as in the USA) he may no longer be able to represent all of the people, but only the section who support him politically. Other means, like the national flag, may then serve as symbols of the nation.

Contemporary advocates of monarchy, like von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1956), Hoppe (1995) and Yeager (2011), also claim that a monarch is insulated from the hustle and bustle of day-to-day politics, adopts a longer time horizon than elected politicians, can successfully resist demands by special interests, safeguards against abuses and protects minorities against majorities by retaining certain constitutional powers or denying them to others, and represents continuity. These authors argue that constitutional monarchy can better preserve people’s freedom and opportunities than democracy which has led to the increase in state power. However, such claims connote a monarch with political power instead of a neutral constitutional actor.

See Coll (2008) for an overview and synthesis.

For recent extensions and refinements of the thesis that democracy results from the conflict between the rich elite and disenfranchised groups of middle and poorer classes see Ansell and Samuels (2014) and Boix (2015).

North and Weingast (1989) provide a most-often quoted example of how after the 1688 Glorious Revolution, the British state made itself a perpetual organization when it provided secure credible commitments to repay debts by locating the liability for the debts in the “king-in-parliament.” The “king-in-parliament” is a perpetually lived organization that lives beyond the physical lives of the members of the royal dynasty.

In accordance with the logic of the gains from division of labour, Congleton (2013) shows that division of authority over policy between different government bodies (where more than one actor has influence over policy) is inevitable, because no single actor can carry out successfully the responsibilities of initiating, passing, enacting and enforcing legislation.

Demands for suffrage reform were pursued by interest groups engaging in franchise reform, by political groups expecting to gain the support of newly enfranchised voters, and industrialists and workers who were under-represented in the earlier parliaments.

As noted by an anonymous referee, a number of the monarchical states listed on the Table emerged as the result of “fusion” and further conquest of territories ruled by royal houses established as far back as the medieval times. The Habsburgs ruled over large swathes of territory covering modern Austria, Hungary, Czech, Slovak, and Polish and Balkan lands. Italy emerged in 1861 under the House of Savoy by including amongst others the kingdom of Piedmont–Sardinia (ruled by the Savoy dynasty), the kingdom of Naples and Sicily and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Imperial Germany–Prussia is even more complicated as in addition to Prussia it included the sovereign kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg, a number of duchies, principalities and free cities. Nor was this pattern of state formation a purely European phenomenon; for example Saudi Arabia was formed after successful conquests by the long-standing ruling dynasty. On the other hand, Poland is excluded from the list because, although it was a kingdom until the third partition in 1795, it was a republic in the post-1918 settlement on independence. So is Ireland, which was a part of the United Kingdom ruled from London until 1922 and became a fully independent republic in 1949. The analysis also excludes other medieval and early modern kingdoms, indigenous tribal kingdoms outside Europe pre-existing European colonial conquests and states that were founded as republics.

For an analysis of the economic forces behind the 1848 Revolutions and the nexus between revolution and the then political institutions in various countries, see Berger and Spoerer (2001)

See Grossman (1991) for a rational choice model of revolutions and Mueller (2003) for a review. Olsson-Yaouzis (2012) shows that revolutions are more likely to break out when a ruler has lost the opportunity to intervene against the revolutionaries at an early stage of the uprising before a critical mass of citizens has turned against him and/or when the ruler has failed to punish the revolutionaries severely.

See Wintrobe (1998) for a discussion of the “Dictator's Dilemma” facing any ruler, that is, to know how much support he has among the general population, and smaller groups with the ability to overthrow him.

For similar arguments that the crown may provide a degree of social stability, easing tensions, and offering a role model to the society see Bjørnskov (2006) and Bjørnskov and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2014).

Congleton (2015) examines the emergence of a new equilibrium where, instead of the king it was the elected chamber of parliament that controlled ministerial appointments, a change that took place gradually without formal constitutional reforms but built on earlier constitutional provisions.