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Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research 2-3/2008

01.12.2008

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

verfasst von: Elijah Brewer III, George G. Kaufman, Larry D. Wall

Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research | Ausgabe 2-3/2008

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Abstract

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.

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Fußnoten
1
Book value equity includes common stock, preferred stock and retained earnings. Tier 1 capital includes book equity and a few additions, such as for trust preferred securities, and a few deductions, most notably goodwill. Thus, the equity leverage ratios can be greater or smaller than the tier 1 ratios.
 
2
See Fama and French (2002) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of corporate capital structure.
 
3
See Myers and Majluf (1984).
 
4
See Berger et al. (1995) for a review of the literature on the determinants of bank capital structure.
 
5
Marshall and Prescott (2001) provide a model with mispriced deposit insurance in which banks with sufficiently high franchise value maintain capital ratios near the social optimum but banks with lower franchise values must be constrained by regulation.
 
6
Wall and Peterson (1987) conjecture the existence of a buffer in their empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory factors on bank capital determination. Barrios and Blanco (2003), Ayuso et al. (2004), and Peura and Keppo (2006) provide formal models of the determination of such a buffer.
 
7
The tradeoff hypothesis with binding regulation is also testable in principle in the USA provided one recognizes that only one of the two capital ratios, leverage or tier 1, need be binding for any given bank. We do not verify this for the USA as the Federal Reserve’s definition of primary capital includes items that are not a part of equity such as mandatory convertible instrument, perpetual debt and allowances for loan and lease losses.
 
8
See Jackson et al. (1999) for a survey of empirical analysis of papers examining the relative roles of the supervisors and the regulators.
 
9
The European Central Bank (2007) has also recently analyzed the capital ratios of large banks in the EU and the USA. However, its focus was on the market determinants of banks’ capital ratios and it only had one regulatory variable. The implication of the study’s primary finding, that capital ratios are determined by market forces, for the role of regulatory forces is hard to interpret for two reasons. First, the pecking order theory with binding regulation assigns an important role to market forces. Second, the study’s sole regulatory variable, whether the supervisors in each country said its capital standards were risk-based is hard to interpret given that both the EU and USA had implemented Basel I at the start of this study’s sample period.
 
10
To the extent that most of the banking organizations in our sample also have branches or subsidiaries in countries other than the one in which they are headquartered, this specification fails to capture all the relevant effects. But for most banking organizations, activities in its headquartered country may be expected to be the most important.
 
11
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (1998) gives the 1988 Basel I standards updated to include revisions through 1998.
 
12
South Korea was also included in the initial sample selection. However, the one private bank from South Korea that ranked in the top 150 in TB was dropped because BBS lacked the information to calculate its ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets.
 
13
Book value data are used for all banks because regulatory requirements are specified in these terms.
 
14
See Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000).
 
15
Beck et al. (2003) find that an independent supervisory agency reduces political capture of the regulatory authority. Caprio, Laeven, and Levine find that the independence of the supervisory authority does not influence bank valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q and the market-to-book ratio.
 
16
Except for the coefficient on lagged capital, α which measures the rate adjustment towards the target.
 
17
The country coefficients are measured relative to the omitted country of Japan. The coefficient estimates are not reported in Table 5, but are available from the authors upon request.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?
verfasst von
Elijah Brewer III
George G. Kaufman
Larry D. Wall
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2008
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Journal of Financial Services Research / Ausgabe 2-3/2008
Print ISSN: 0920-8550
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0735
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-008-0040-9

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