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Small Business Economics

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10.09.2017

Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship

verfasst von: Christopher J. Boudreaux, Boris N. Nikolaev, Randall G. Holcombe

Erschienen in: Small Business Economics | Ausgabe 1/2018

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Abstract

The negative effects of corruption at the macro level are well-documented. Corruption reduces economic growth, lowers investment, and erodes trust in government officials, creating an institutional environment that pushes entrepreneurs from productive to destructive activities. Corruption also has effects at the micro level because some industries are better situated to profit from corruption than others. Corruption not only lowers economic output but also shifts resources toward some industries and away from others. Using federal convictions in the USA as a measure of corruption, regression results show that increased corruption shifts resources toward the construction industry and away from the education industry and professional, scientific, and technical service industry. The evidence also shows that the distance from state capitals and voter turnout moderate the relationship between corruption and firm concentrations.

Vorheriger Artikel Cooperative firms in hard times

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We collected these data from https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer2010.html.

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Titel: Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship
verfasst von: Christopher J. Boudreaux
Boris N. Nikolaev
Randall G. Holcombe
Publikationsdatum: 10.09.2017
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Small Business Economics / Ausgabe 1/2018
Print ISSN: 0921-898X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0913
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-017-9927-x

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