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Theory and Decision

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01.10.2013

Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness

verfasst von: Marc Pauly

Erschienen in: Theory and Decision | Ausgabe 4/2013

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Abstract

The paper works with a formal model of referenda, where a finite number of voters can choose between two options and abstention. A referendum will be invalid if too many voters abstain, otherwise the referendum will return one of the two options. We consider quorum rules where an option is chosen if it is preferred by the majority of voters and if at least a certain number of voters (the quorum) votes for the alternative. The paper characterizes these rules as the only referenda which are strategy-proof over certain preferences.

Vorheriger Artikel Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness

Nächster Artikel Market failure in light of non-expected utility

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While local referenda in the Netherlands are always non-binding to the city council, the city council will usually self-bind itself to the referendum outcome provided the quorum is met.

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Titel: Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
verfasst von: Marc Pauly
Publikationsdatum: 01.10.2013
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Theory and Decision / Ausgabe 4/2013
Print ISSN: 0040-5833
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7187
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9358-3

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