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International Journal of Information Security
Erschienen in: International Journal of Information Security 3/2017

30.03.2016 | Regular Contribution

Linkable message tagging: solving the key distribution problem of signature schemes

verfasst von: Felix Günther, Bertram Poettering

Erschienen in: International Journal of Information Security | Ausgabe 3/2017

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Abstract

Digital signatures guarantee practical security only if the corresponding verification keys are distributed authentically; however, arguably, satisfying solutions for the latter have not been found yet. This paper introduces a novel approach for cryptographic message authentication where this problem does not arise: A linkable message tagging scheme (LMT) identifies pairs of messages and accompanying authentication tags as related if and only if these tags were created using the same secret key. Importantly, our primitive fully avoids public keys and hence elegantly sidesteps the key distribution problem of signature schemes. As an application of LMT we envision an email authentication system with minimal user interaction. Email clients could routinely equip all outgoing messages with corresponding tags and verify for incoming messages whether they indeed originate from the same entity as previously or subsequently received messages with identical sender address. As technical contributions we formalize the notions of LMT and its (more efficient) variant CMT (classifiable message tagging), including corresponding notions of unforgeability. For both variants we propose a range of provably secure constructions, basing on different hardness assumptions, with and without requiring random oracles. This article extends prior work of the same authors that appeared in the proceedings of ACISP 2015 (Günther and Poettering in 2015).
Vorheriger Artikel A key management scheme evaluation using Markov processes
Nächster Artikel Efficient identity-based online/offline encryption and signcryption with short ciphertext

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Fußnoten
1
We note that recently introduced techniques like Certificate Transparency [32] do not resolve the described issues, but aim at making deficits visible.
 
2
Note that the \(\mathsf {BLS}\) signature scheme can be seen as the result of applying this technique to the LMT scheme \(\mathsf {BLS\text { -}{}LMT}\). The reference tag is \(X=g^x\) and (virtually) corresponds to a message in \(H^{-1}(g)\).
 
3
Note that, in a different context, a similar approach is discussed by Katz [30, Section 2.4.2]. However, our construction is more efficient than his as our signatures do not need to explicitly carry the verification key.
 
4
Although the statement proved by Pointcheval and Stern [41] considers only \({\mathsf {euf\text { -}{}cma}}\) security, their results can readily be extended to also cover the \({\mathsf {suf}\text {-}\mathsf {cma}}\) notion.
 
5
 
6
Observe that inverting \(\varphi \) would be possible if the index of \(\mathbb {G}\) in \(\mathbb {Z}_p^*\) was small (e.g., in the ‘safe prime’ setting where \(p=2q+1\)); however, the \(\mathsf {DSA}\) standard requires \(|\mathbb {Z}_p^*|/|\mathbb {G}|\) to be large (e.g., \(|\mathbb {Z}_p^*|\approx 2^{1024}\) and \(|\mathbb {G}|\approx 2^{160}\)).
 
7
A similar technique is proposed in [11, Section 4.1.6].
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Linkable message tagging: solving the key distribution problem of signature schemes
verfasst von
Felix Günther
Bertram Poettering
Publikationsdatum
30.03.2016
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
International Journal of Information Security / Ausgabe 3/2017
Print ISSN: 1615-5262
Elektronische ISSN: 1615-5270
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-016-0327-z

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