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2023 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Literature on Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure

verfasst von : Giang Hoang, Kok Boon Oh

Erschienen in: An Empirical Study of SOE Corporate Governance Attributes for Emerging Markets

Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore

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Abstract

This chapter aims to provide an overview and insight into the concepts, aspects, and issues of corporate governance in general and the internal mechanisms of the board of directors and ownership structure in particular. It begins by discussing the concept throughout the historical development of the theory of the firm and postulates different approaches to corporate governance. It is then followed by how the concept of corporate governance has emerged and how governance mechanisms have been used as ways to solve agency problems.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Role of Vietnam in a Changing Global Economy

Nächstes Kapitel Vietnam’s Corporate Governance, Regulatory and Institutional Settings

There is an intensive amount of extant literature on the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. We only focus on reviewing the important articles.

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Titel: Literature on Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure
verfasst von: Giang Hoang
Kok Boon Oh
Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore
Buch: An Empirical Study of SOE Corporate Governance Attributes for Emerging Markets
Print ISBN: 978-981-9915-04-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-9915-05-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1505-7_3

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