nach oben

Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

25.03.2023 | Original Paper

Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments

verfasst von: Michael Kurschilgen

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2023

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

How does moral awareness affect people’s fairness judgments? Using a simple model of identity utility, I predict that if individuals differ in their personal fairness ideals (equality versus efficiency), reflecting over what one thinks is right should not only make people’s choices less selfish but also more polarized. On the other hand, people’s desire for conforming with the behavior of their peers could help mitigate polarization. I test these conjectures in a laboratory experiment, in which participants can pursue different fairness ideals. I exogenously vary (i) whether participants are prompted to state their moral opinions behind the veil of ignorance, and (ii) whether they are informed about the behavior of their peers. I find that moral introspection makes choices more polarized, reflecting even more divergent moral opinions. The increase in polarization coincides largely with a widening of revealed gender differences as introspection makes men’s choices more efficiency-oriented and women’s more egalitarian. Disclosing the descriptive norm of the situation is not capable of mitigating the polarization.

Vorheriger Artikel Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy

Nächster Artikel Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

In recent years, an increasing number of companies has been encouraging their employees to actively think about the moral implications of their behavior (Kaptein 2015). Coca-Cola (2018) for instance urges employees to “do what is right”. Google (2018) appeals to “identifying the right thing to do", acknowledging that it is “impossible to spell out every possible ethical scenario we might face. Instead, we rely on one another’s good judgment [...]”.

A notable exception is the theoretical work of te Velde (2020).

More broadly, conceptions of morality have been shown to differ between liberals and conservatives (Haidt and Graham 2007; Graham et al. 2009), men and women (Friesdorf et al. 2015), and across cultures (Graham et al. 2016).

Following the taxonomy of Bicchieri and Dimant (2019), my two treatment dimensions represent two dichotomous interventions into the choice architecture. Whereas moral introspection aims at influencing behavior by appealing to people’s unconditional preferences for adhering to an injunctive norm, providing social information seeks to affect behavior by appealing to people’s conditional preferences for complying with a descriptive norm. By independently quantifying the effectiveness of both interventions, we can therefore diagnose the nature of the targeted behavior (Bicchieri 2016; Bicchieri and Dimant 2019).

Potentially, social information may not only homogenize people’s behavior but even their moral opinions. Studying situations without normative ambivalence, Lindström et al. (2018) report evidence suggesting that the commonness of behavior influences people’s moral judgments.

For similar approaches, see for instance Brekke et al. (2003); Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005); Levitt and List (2007); Kessler and Milkman (2018); Burks and Krupka (2012); Krupka et al. (2017). For a recent review, see Vostroknutov (2020). Another large strand of literature models the effect of (moral) identity on people’s behavior as a Bayesian preference-signaling game (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, 2011; Grossman and van der Weele 2017; Kurschilgen and Marcin 2019).

See Benjamin et al. (2010) for a related discussion.

The design of the MDG aims for subjects to make deliberate, well-thought choices in the spirit of the Holt and Laury (2002) test for risk attitudes. For that purpose, I deviate from the MDG of Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) in two respects: First, I let dictators choose between two options (Option A: selfish, Option B: destroy or create) instead of three (Option A: selfish, Option B: create, Option C: destroy). Second, instead of presenting the individual tasks randomly, I classify them into four panels and sort them within every panel by the relative price of creating/destroying.

The term “consistent" refers to the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP). For further elaboration on GARP-consistency and on the type space, please see Appendix A.6.

Other moral goals are also possible in the MDG. Since the aim of this paper is not to advance another test of distributional preferences but to examine how moral awareness affects behaviour in situations with divergent moral goals, I concentrate on the categories that have been found to be empirically most relevant in similar environments. For a very comprehensive and systematic overview of distributional archetypes see Kerschbamer (2015).

Since the action space of the MDG is discrete, I interpret distance in the Cartesian sense. All results are robust to using Euclidean distance instead.

I deliberately do not incentivize the moral opinion questions. For a methodological discussion see Appendix A.7.

In fact, the idea of moral introspection can be traced back to Adam Smith’s, who called for strengthening one’s moral self by becoming “the impartial spectator of one’s own character and conduct” Smith (1790).

For a similar implementation of social information, see Engel et al. (2021)

I only consider the results of dictators whose choice behavior in the MDG was consistent with GARP. For the uninformed players, the percentage of consistent dictators is virtually identical (Probit regression, p=.73) in Baseline-u (79%) and Introspect-u (81%). Also for the informed players, the share of consistent dictators does not vary significantly (Probit regression, p=.472) across treatments: 88 in Baseline-i and 92 in Introspect-i. Including inconsistent dictators would require additional assumptions about the interpretation of dictators’ “errors”. For further explanation of GARP-consistency in the MDG, see Appendix A.6. For a similar procedure, see for instance Sutter et al. (2013).

For a similar procedure, see for instance Hamman et al. (2010). All reported results also hold if I do not pool the data but rather analyze separately for informed and uniformed dictators. But pooling increases the statistical power.

Remember that at this point, the players did not know whether they would be a dictator or a recipient in the subsequent MDG.

For the importance of surprisingness moderating the effect of social information, see Engel et al. (2021).

Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2000) Economics and identity. Q J Econ 115(3):715–753

Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2005) Identity and the economics of organizations. J Econ Perspect 19(1):9–32

Alesina A, Ferrara EL (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. J Public Econ 89(5):897–931

Andreoni J, Vesterlund L (2001) Which is the fair sex? gender differences in altruism. Q J Econ 116(1):293–312

Bartling B, Fischbacher U (2011) Shifting the blame: On delegation and responsibility. Rev Econ Stud 79(1):67–87

Bartling B, Weber RA, Yao L (2014) Do markets erode social responsibility? Q J Econ 130(1):219–266

Bašić, Z. and E. Verrina (2020). Personal norms-and not only social norms-shape economic behavior. MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper (2020/25)

Bénabou R, Falk A, Tirole J (2019) Narratives, imperatives, and moral persuasion. NBER working paper

Bénabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and prosocial behavior. Am Econ Rev 96(5):1652–1678

Bénabou R, Tirole J (2011) Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets. Q J Econ 126(2):805–855

Bénabou R, Tirole J (2016) Mindful economics: The production, consumption, and value of beliefs. J Econ Perspect 30(3):141–64

Benjamin DJ, Choi JJ, Strickland AJ (2010) Social identity and preferences. Am Econ Rev 100(4):1913–28

Benjamin DJ, Choi JJ, Fisher G (2016) Religious identity and economic behavior. Rev Econ Stat 98(4):617–637

Bernheim BD (1994) A theory of conformity. J Polit Econ 102(5):841–877

Bicchieri C (2016) Norms in the wild: How to diagnose, measure, and change social norms. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Bicchieri C, Dimant E (2019) Nudging with care: The risks and benefits of social information. Public Choice 1–22

Bicchieri C, Xiao E (2009) Do the right thing: but only if others do so. J Behav Decis Mak 22(2):191–208

Bolton GE, Katok E, Zwick R (1998) Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness. Internat J Game Theory 27(2):269–299

Brekke KA, Kverndokk S, Nyborg K (2003) An economic model of moral motivation. J Public Econ 87(9–10):1967–1983

Burks SV, Krupka EL (2012) A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy: Evidence from the financial services industry. Manage Sci 58(1):203–217

Canen N, Kendall C, Trebbi F (2020) Unbundling polarization. Econometrica 88(3):1197–1233

Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q J Econ 117(3):817–869

Cialdini RB, Reno RR, Kallgren CA (1990) A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. J Pers Soc Psychol 58(6):1015

Coca-Cola (2018) Code of business conduct. https://www.cocacolacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/fileassets/pdf/2018/Coca-ColaCOC-External.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2023

Corneo G, Grüner HP (2002) Individual preferences for political redistribution. J Public Econ 83(1):83–107

Dal Bó E, Dal Bó P (2014) “Do the right thing:” the effects of moral suasion on cooperation. J Public Econ 117:28–38

Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang JX (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Econ Theor 33(1):67–80

Di Tella R, Perez-Truglia R, Babino A, Sigman M (2015) Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others’ altruism. Am Econ Rev 105(11):3416–42

Dimant, E. (2021). Hate trumps love: The impact of political polarization on social preferences. mimeo

Eckel CC, Grossman PJ (1998) Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence from dictator experiments. Econ J 108(448):726–735

Ellertson CF, Ingerson M-C, Williams RN (2016) Behavioral ethics: A critique and a proposal. J Bus Ethics 138(1):145–159

Engel C, Kurschilgen M (2020) The fragility of a nudge: the power of self-set norms to contain a social dilemma. J Econ Psychol 81:102293

Engel C, Kube S, Kurschilgen M (2021) Managing expectations: How selective information affects cooperation and punishment in social dilemma games. J Econ Behav Org 187:111–136

Espín AM, Capraro V, Corgnet B, Gächter S, Hernán-González R, Kujal P, Rassenti S (2021) Differences in cognitive reflection mediate gender differences in social preferences. ESI Working Paper, pp 21–22. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/359/

Falk A, Szech N (2013) Morals and markets. Science 340(6133):707–711

Feldman Y, Halali E (2019) Regulating “good” people in subtle conflicts of interest situations. J Bus Ethics 154:65–83

Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp Econ 10(2):171–178

Fisman R, Kariv S, Markovits D (2007) Individual preferences for giving. Am Econ Rev 97(5):1858–1876

Fong C (2001) Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. J Public Econ 82(2):225–246

Frey BS, Meier S (2004) Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: testing “ conditional cooperation” in a field experiment. Am Econ Rev 94(5):1717–1722

Friesdorf R, Conway P, Gawronski B (2015) Gender differences in responses to moral dilemmas. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 41(5):696–713

Fryer RG Jr, Harms P, Jackson MO (2019) Updating beliefs when evidence is open to interpretation: Implications for bias and polarization. J Eur Econ Assoc 17(5):1470–1501

Gächter S, Riedl A (2005) Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims. Manage Sci 51(2):249–263

Gentzkow M, Shapiro JM, Taddy M (2019) Measuring group differences in high-dimensional choices: Method and application to congressional speech. Econometrica 87(4):1307–1340

Gino F, Schweitzer ME, Mead NL, Ariely D (2011) Unable to resist temptation: How self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 115(2):191–203

Google (2018) Code of conduct. https://abc.xyz/investor/other/google-code-of-conduct.html. Accessed 1 Mar 2023

Graham MH, Svolik MW (2020) Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the united states. Am Political Sci Rev 114(2):392–409

Graham J, Haidt J, Nosek BA (2009) Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. J Pers Soc Psychol 96(5):1029–1046

Graham J, Meindl P, Beall E, Johnson KM, Zhang L (2016) Cultural differences in moral judgment and behavior, across and within societies. Curr Opin Psychol 8:125–130

Greene JD (2013) Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. Penguin

Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with orsee. J Econ Sci Assoc 1(1):114–125

Grossman Z, Van Der Weele JJ (2017) Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. J Eur Econ Assoc 15(1):173–217

Haidt J, Graham J (2007) When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Soc Justice Res 20(1):98–116

Hamman JR, Loewenstein G, Weber RA (2010) Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship. Am Econ Rev 100(4):1826–46

Holt CA, Laury SK (2002) Risk aversion and incentive effects. Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655

Iriberri N, Rey-Biel P (2011) The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games. Exp Econ 14(2):160–180

Iriberri N, Rey-Biel P (2013) Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do? Quant Econ 4(3):515–547

Kahan DM (2013) Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection: An experimental study. Judgm Decis Mak 8:407–24

Kamas L, Preston A (2015) Can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior? J Econ Behav Org 116:525–539

Kaptein M (2015) The effectiveness of ethics programs: The role of scope, composition, and sequence. J Bus Ethics 132(2):415–431

Kerschbamer R (2015) The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric identification approach: The equality equivalence test. Eur Econ Rev 76:85–103

Kessler JB, Milkman KL (2018) Identity in charitable giving. Manage Sci 64(2):845–859

Kouchaki M, Smith IH (2014) The morning morality effect: The influence of time of day on unethical behavior. Psychol Sci 25(1):95–102

Krawczyk M (2010) A glimpse through the veil of ignorance: Equality of opportunity and support for redistribution. J Public Econ 94(1–2):131–141

Krupka E, Weber RA (2009) The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior. J Econ Psychol 30(3):307–320

Krupka EL, Weber RA (2013) Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524

Krupka EL, Leider S, Jiang M (2017) A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms. Manage Sci 63(6):1708–1729

Kurschilgen M, Marcin I (2019) Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge. Games Econom Behav 113:651–672

Levitt SD, List JA (2007) What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? J Econ Perspect 21(2):153–174

Lindström B, Jangard S, Selbing I, Olsson A (2018) The role of a “common is moral” heuristic in the stability and change of moral norms. J Experimental Psychol 147(2):228

Michaeli M, Spiro D (2015) Norm conformity across societies. J Public Econ 132:51–65

Müller D, Renes S (2021) Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a large and heterogeneous sample. Soc Choice Welfare 56(4):679–711

Rammstedt B, John OP (2007) Measuring personality in one minute or less: A 10-item short version of the big five inventory in english and german. J Res Pers 41(1):203–212

Rapp C (2016) Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust. Soc Sci Res 58:34–45

Ravallion M, Lokshin M (2000) Who wants to redistribute?: The tunnel effect in 1990s russia. J Public Econ 76(1):87–104

Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Rest JR (1986) Moral development: advances in research and theory. Praeger, New York

Schildberg-Hörisch H (2010) Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? an experiment. J Public Econ 94(11–12):1062–1066

Schram A, Charness G (2015) Inducing social norms in laboratory allocation choices. Manage Sci 61(7):1531–1546

Shang J, Croson R (2009) A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. Econ J 119(540):1422–1439

Smith A (1790) The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, An Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men Naturally Judge... To which is Added a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages, Vol 1. Strahan

Sutter M, Kocher MG, Glätzle-Rüetzler D, Trautmann ST (2013) Impatience and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict adolescents’ field behavior. Am Econ Rev 103(1):510–31

Svolik MW et al (2020) When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents. Q J Political Sci 15(1):3–31

te Velde VL (2022) Heterogeneous norms: social image and social pressure when people disagree. J Econ Behav Organ 194:319–340

Vostroknutov A (2020) Social norms in experimental economics: Towards a unified theory of normative decision making. Analyse & Kritik 42(1):3–39

Welsh DT, Ordóñez LD (2014) Conscience without cognition: The effects of subconscious priming on ethical behavior. Acad Manag J 57(3):723–742

Zimmermann F (2020) The dynamics of motivated beliefs. Am Econ Rev 110(2):337–61

Titel: Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments
verfasst von: Michael Kurschilgen
Publikationsdatum: 25.03.2023
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01454-6

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2023

Mechanism design with model specification

Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures

Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions

Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option

Centrality measures in networks

Premium Partner