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Erschienen in: Theory of Computing Systems 4/2022

06.07.2022

Non-Existence of Stable Social Groups in Information-Driven Networks

verfasst von: Augustin Chaintreau, Guillaume Ducoffe, Dorian Mazauric

Erschienen in: Theory of Computing Systems | Ausgabe 4/2022

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Abstract

We study a group-formation game on an undirected complete graph G with all edge-weights in a set \(\mathcal { W} \subseteq \mathbb {R} \cup \{-\infty \}\). This work is motivated by a recent information-sharing model for social networks (Kleinberg and Ligett, Games Econ. Behav. 82, 702–716 2013). Specifically, we consider partitions of the vertex-set of G into groups. The individual utility of any vertex v is the sum of the weights on the edges uv between v and the other vertices u in her group. – Informally, u and v represent social users, and the weight of uv quantifies the extent to which u and v (dis)agree on some fixed topic. – For a fixed integer k ≥ 1, a k-stable partition is a partition in which no coalition of at most k vertices would increase their respective utilities by leaving their groups to join or create another common group. Before our work, it was known that such a partition always exists if k = 1 (Burani and Zwicker, Math. Soc. Sci. 45(1), 27–52 2003). We focus on the regime k ≥ 2.
  • Our first result is that when all the social users are either friends, enemies or indifferent to each other (i.e., \(\mathcal {W} = \{-\infty ,0,1\}\)), a partition as above always exists if k ≤ 2, but it may not exist if k ≥ 3. This is in sharp contrast with (Kleinberg and Ligett, Games Econ. Behav. 82, 702–716 2013) who proved that k-stable partitions always exist, for any k, if \(\mathcal {W} = \{-\infty ,1\}\).
  • We further study the intriguing relationship between the existence of k-stable partitions and the allowed set of edge-weights \(\mathcal {W}\). Specifically, we give sufficient conditions for the existence or the non existence of such partitions based on tools from Graph Theory. Doing so, we obtain for most sets \(\mathcal {W}\) the largest \(k(\mathcal {W})\) such that all graphs with edge-weights in \(\mathcal {W}\) admit a \(k(\mathcal {W})\)-stable partition.
  • From the computational point of view, we prove that for any \(\mathcal {W}\) containing \(-\infty \), the problem of deciding whether a k-stable partition exists is NP-complete for any \(k > k(\mathcal {W})\).
Our work hints that the emergence of stable communities in a social network requires a trade-off between the level of collusion between social users, and the diversity of their opinions.

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Fußnoten
1
See also [21], where similar results are proved for another Hedonic game (that is related to the one we study in this paper), but for a stronger notion of (core) stability.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Non-Existence of Stable Social Groups in Information-Driven Networks
verfasst von
Augustin Chaintreau
Guillaume Ducoffe
Dorian Mazauric
Publikationsdatum
06.07.2022
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Theory of Computing Systems / Ausgabe 4/2022
Print ISSN: 1432-4350
Elektronische ISSN: 1433-0490
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-022-10089-6

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