nach oben

Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

28.08.2020 | Original Paper

Ordinal allocation

verfasst von: Christopher P. Chambers, Michael Richter

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 1-2/2023

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions–where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the \(m+1\)st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency.

Vorheriger Artikel Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark

Nächster Artikel Tailored recommendations

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

This mechanism is usually understood as a hybrid of a “rationing” mechanism and an auction; see, e.g., Parlour et al. (2007).

Aigner M (2012) Combinatorial theory. Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin

Ashlagi I, Serizawa S (2012) Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity. Soc Choice Welf 38(3):531–542CrossRef

Atlamaz M, Yengin D (2008) Fair groves mechanisms. Soc Choice Welf 31(4):573–587CrossRef

Bogomolnaia A, Moulin H (2001) A new solution to the random assignment problem. J Econ Theory 100(2):295–328CrossRef

Bordley R, Harstad R (1996) Lottery qualification auctions. Adv Appl Microeconomics 6:157–183

Carbajal JC, McLennan A, Tourky R (2013) Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains. J Econ Theory 148(3):1074–1101CrossRef

Chew SH, Serizawa S (2007) Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction. Econ Theory 33(2):393–406CrossRef

Clarke EH (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11(1):17–33CrossRef

Green J, Laffont J-J (1977) Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica 45(2):427–438CrossRef

Groves T (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4):617–631CrossRef

Holmström B (1979) Groves’ scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica 47(5):1137–1144CrossRef

Laffont J-J, Maskin E (1980) A differential approach to dominant strategy mechanisms. Econometrica 48:1507–1520CrossRef

Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math Oper Res 6(1):58–73CrossRef

Parlour CA, Prasnikar V, Rajan U (2007) Compensating for the winner’s curse: experimental evidence. Games Econ Behavior 60(2):339–356CrossRef

Roberts K (1979) The characterization of implementable choice rules. In: Laffont J-J (ed) Aggregation and revelation of preferences. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 321–348

Rockafellar RT (1970) Convex analysis. Princeton University Press, PrincetonCrossRef

Roth AE, Sönmez T, Ünver MU (2004) Kidney exchange. Q J Econ 119(2):457–488CrossRef

Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16(1):8–37CrossRef

Vohra RV (2011) Mechanism design: a linear programming approach, vol 47. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRef

Yengin D (2012) Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects. Soc Choice Welf 38(1):137–160CrossRef

Titel: Ordinal allocation
verfasst von: Christopher P. Chambers
Michael Richter
Publikationsdatum: 28.08.2020
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 1-2/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1-2/2023

Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations

A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism

Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems

Tailored recommendations

Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based

Premium Partner