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The Review of International Organizations
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 3/2010

01.09.2010

Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping

verfasst von: Michael Lipson

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 3/2010

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Abstract

This article argues that ambiguity—indeterminacy between alternative interpretations of a phenomenon—is inherent in the peace operations field, and makes defining and assessing the UN’s performance problematic. Applying Gutner and Thompson’s framework for international organization performance (IOP) research to UN peacekeeping, it argues further that the relationship between process performance and outcomes in peacekeeping is irreducibly ambiguous, and that ambiguity has significant implications for efforts to measure and improve peacekeeping performance. To demonstrate this, the article reviews methods employed by the UN to measure its peacekeeping performance, arguing that the primary method employed—results-based budgeting (RBB)—is inherently unable to cope with the challenges of performance ambiguity. Its adoption and continued use despite its evident shortcomings are due to RBB’s legitimacy in the wider organizational field of international public management in which the UN Secretariat, and UN peacekeeping, perform. Finally, the article considers recent efforts to improve process performance in UN peacekeeping, and discuss the ways in which so-called ‘integration’ reforms central to such efforts are a means of reducing and managing the ambiguity inherent in peacekeeping.
Vorheriger Artikel The politics of IO performance: A framework
Nächster Artikel Mainstreaming international governance: The environment, gender, and IO performance in the European Union

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Fußnoten
1
The Department of Field Support (DFS) was created in 2007, combining the former Office of Mission Support in DPKO with units devoted to peacekeeping support formerly in the Department of Management. References in this article to DPKO should be understood as shorthand for DPKO and DFS, unless otherwise noted.
 
2
On the Brahimi Report and Peace Operations 2010, see respectively Durch et al. (2003) and Guéhenno (2005).
 
3
Terminological confusion regarding peace operations manifests what I refer to below as “constitutive ambiguity.” I use the terms peacekeeping and peace operations interchangeably to refer to what the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000b: 12 [para. 3]) calls “complex peace operations,” combining both multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The above figures on peace operations costs and deployments include traditional missions deployed to interstate conflicts, but this article focuses on operations involving multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding following intrastate conflicts.
 
4
Feldman (1989: 5) defines ambiguity as “the state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena.” Ambuigity may be a pervasive issue in IOP generally. Weaver (2010) notes similar issues regarding the IMF. Fukuyama (2004) argues that ambiguity regarding organizational design is a generic characteristic of public administration. This contrasts with private sector consensus on creation of shareholder value indicated by share price as both the purpose of organizational activity and the measure of performance (Scott and Davis 2007: 328–333).
 
5
Gutner and Thompson’s (2010) distinctions between process, outputs, and outcomes correspond to Underdal’s (2002: 5-6) trinity of outputs, outcomes, and impact, though the terms output and outcome are transposed one level up from Underdal’s usage. Underdal adapts the trichotomy from Easton’s (1965: 351–352) output-outcome distinction. However, Gutner and Thompson use “output” to refer to what Easton calls “outcomes,” and “outcomes” to refer to Easton’s “impact.”
 
6
The General Assembly approved tens of millions of dollars of funding in 2001 and 2002 to implement recommendations of the Brahimi report alone. It appropriated 25 million dollars in funding for new posts and other costs in Resolutions 55/238 (8 February 2001) and 56/241 (1 February 2002). Resolution 56/292 (18 July 2002) appropriated 141.5 million dollars to establish strategic deployment stocks, an outgrowth of Brahimi recommendations regarding rapid deployment. On the New Horizon initiative, see United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (2009).
 
7
For critiques of this premise, see Radin (2006) and Moynihan (2008).
 
8
See: March and Olsen (1976a), Reed and DiFillippi (1990), Simonin (1995), Zahariadis (2003), Fukuyama (2004), Best (2005), and Powell et al. (2006).
 
9
The second dimension—causation and organization technology—is closely related to uncertainty.
 
10
The term “output” in the UN’s usage refers to activities at the process level in Fig. 1.
 
11
I adapt March and Olsen’s (1976b) categories of ambiguity of intention, understanding, history, and organization by renaming ambiguity of intention as goal ambiguity, and ambiguity of organization as institutional ambiguity. I further divide ambiguity of understanding into constitutive and causal ambiguity, and subsume ambiguity of history under these two.
 
12
The term performance has an alternative meaning (as in the performance of a play), of enactment (Weick 1979). Such a conception of performance need not be goal-oriented, and may regard goals as byproducts of enactment.
 
13
Gutner and Thompson (2010) distinguish effectiveness from performance. An alternative conceptualization of performance might treat effectiveness as a dimension of performance, allowing for the possibility that performance could be high on the effort, skill, and efficiency dimensions, but low on the effectiveness dimension.
 
14
For example, Seashore and Yuchtman (1967: 393) define an organization’s effectiveness as “its ability to exploit its environments in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources to sustain its functioning.”
 
15
Perrow (1961) distinguishes official and operative goals.
 
16
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 35-36), Downs and Stedman (2002: 45-46), and Fearon and Laitin (2004: 17) have pointed to member states’ use of the UN as a scapegoat; Brunsson (1989: 205) notes that the failure of reforms to increase efficiency may be necessary for political organizations to function.
 
17
I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting these difficulties.
 
18
See also Boschken (1994).
 
19
Member states are principals within the UN (i.e., on the Security Council) and externally (as voluntary donors to UN agencies). Thus, UN peacekeeping exhibits a form of “complex agency” similar to that described by Elsig (2010) in the World Trade Organization.
 
20
Cyert and March (1992) propose a coalitional understanding of organizational goals as part of a theory of decision-making in business firms. However, they write (1992: 198) that, “Our reading of the literature on political institutions suggests that the concepts needed for a theory of decision making by political organizations are not strikingly different from those needed in dealing with the firm.”
 
21
A polity score of 3 is used as the measure for minimum level of democracy. For a critique of Doyle and Sambanis’s methodology, and their response, see King and Zheng (2007) and Sambanis and Doyle (2007).
 
22
The UN does not appear to have tackled the problem of controlling for the difficulty of peacekeeping in its evaluations. However, DPKO’s “Capstone Doctrine” document, noting that “the Secretariat has a responsibility to provide the Security Council with an accurate assessment of the risks associated with its decision to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation,” identifies four conditions without which a peacekeeping mission is “unlikely to succeed”—a “peace to keep,” support from regional actors, unified Security Council backing, and clear and realistic mandates accompanied by needed resources (United Nations 2008h: 49–51).
 
23
These are: “the number of warring parties; the lack of either a peace agreement before intervention or a coerced peace agreement; the likelihood of spoilers; a collapsed state; the number of soldiers; the presence of disposable natural resources; the presence of hostile neighboring states or networks; and demands for secession.” Fortna (2004a: 286-87) did not find significant effects for some of the variables included in Downs and Stedman’s difficulty score (more parties to conflict, presence of treaty). Presence of lootable commodities was not significant after the Cold War in Fortna’s analysis. She finds additional variables not included in the Downs and Stedman difficulty score significant (lack of decisive victory, more deaths from war, low economic development). Fortna (2004b) presents comparable findings for peacekeeping in interstate conflicts.
 
24
She qualifies this by noting that, “In sum, the answer to the question where do peacekeepers get sent is quite complicated. It depends on whether we are talking about UN peacekeeping or missions by other actors, and it depends on what type of peacekeeping we are interested in.” The finding that peacekeepers are sent to harder cases is based on data that includes both UN and non-UN peacekeeping, but holds for “consent-based” peacekeeping missions (Fortna 2004a: 281). For an updated analysis, supplemented with case studies, see Fortna (2008).
 
25
The five ecologies are: first ecology—factions are few, semi-reconciled, and coherent (e.g., Namibia, El Salvador)—in which local capacities (LC) are not critical if external assistance is available; second ecology— factions are few, reconciled, and incoherent (Guatemala, Mozambique)—in which low LC must be offset by external assistance for peacebuilding to work; third ecology—factions are few, hostile, and coherent (Cambodia, Bosnia, Angola)—in which PB prospects are poor with low LC, and large external assistance is needed; fourth ecology—few, incoherent, and hostile factions (Eastern Slavonia, Brcko, Rwanda), with very poor prospects for peacebuilding; and the fifth ecology, where factions are many, incoherent, and hostile (Somalia), the worst case.
 
26
They did not find non-UN peacekeeping to cause sustainable peace (measured as lack of renewed fighting two years after departure of peacekeepers), but did find indications that a UN presence may enhance the success of non-UN peacekeeping.
 
27
They also find (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 132) that peacekeeping is more effective if deployed early.
 
28
A partial exception is Doyle and Sambanis’s (2006: 303–319) discussion of the importance of well-managed mandates to peacebuilding success. They call for “dynamic peacekeeping, a flexible and proactive political management of peacekeeping,” (310) and “a combined portfolio” of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and—where necessary—limited enforcement (318-19). However, this discussion focuses on political strategy to the exclusion of other aspects of organizational performance.
 
29
See Durch (2006), chapters 1 and 8 for a review of the state of knowledge on the subject.
 
30
Similarly, the behavior of the Security Council as a collective principal undermined UN arms inspections in Iraq (Thompson 2009: 86–132).
 
31
Abbott and Snidal’s (2010) discussion of IO “orchestration” in international standards regulation addresses coordination among IGOs, NGOs, and private firms. On coordination involving the UN and external partners, see Biermann (2008).
 
32
Recent peacekeeping mandates have requested that the Secretary-General provide benchmarks on mandate fulfillment in subsequent reports to the Council. A UK-French initiative to improve Security Council oversight of peacekeeping called for mandates to specify benchmarks (United Nations 2009a). A handbook titled “Monitoring Peace Consolidation—UN Practitioner’s Guide to Benchmarking” is forthcoming.
 
33
Performance measurement of peacekeeping is addressed within this two-year process through program performance reports, though the peacekeeping budget operates on a one-year calendar. Other performance reports address the peacekeeping support account and individual mission budgets.
 
34
OIOS defines results-based management as “A management strategy by which the Secretariat ensures that its processes, outputs and services contribute to the achievement of clearly stated expected accomplishments and objectives. It is focused on achieving results and improving performance, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and monitoring of and reporting on performance.” Results-based budgeting is defined as a “programme budget process in which (a) programme formulation revolves around a set of predefined objectives and expected results, (b) expected results justify the resource requirements which are derived from and linked to outputs required to achieve such results and (c) in which actual performance in achieving results is measured by objective performance indicators” (United Nations 2008f: 5).
 
35
In the terminology of organizational sociology, these sources represent “coercive” and “normative” isomorphism, respectively. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
 
36
Such compacts are to be extended to SRSGs and heads of mission in peacekeeping and political missions (United Nations 2010a: 11-12, para. 35).
 
37
In 2000 (United Nations 2000c: 10, para. 34), the ACABQ called for both output and results-based data to be presented in the program performance report for 2002-2003.
 
38
Outputs are defined as: “final products or services delivered by a programme or subprogramme to end-users, such as reports, publications, training, servicing of meetings, or advisory, editorial, translation or security services, which an activity is expected to produce in order to achieve its objectives” (United Nations 2000a: 17.) Outcomes are the extent to which the objectives are achieved.
 
39
According to one UN report (United Nations 2005a: 12, para. 23), “The results-based budgeting frameworks incorporate a higher percentage of clearly measurable indicators than in the three previous financial periods. The number of clearly measurable indicators as a percentage of the total has increased from 21 per cent in 2002/03, to 47 per cent in 2003/04, to 70 per cent in 2004/05 and to 85 per cent in 2005/06. The percentage of indicators with baselines has also increased: from 18 per cent in 2004/05 to 27 per cent in 2005/06.”
 
40
The finding that “results-based management has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making,” is printed as a subtitle on the cover of the report. Results-based management includes RBB. RBM employs RBB as a planning and performance measurement tool to improve management.
 
41
Similar language is found in OIOS’s review of RBB in the UN Mission in Liberia (United Nations 2007c: 5-6, para. 6).
 
42
OIOS’s management audit of DPKO argued that the results-based budgeting framework does not properly measure in particular the effectiveness of coordination and integration by DPKO’s Office of Operations (United Nations 2007b: 10, para. 25).
 
43
The JIU report (United Nations 2006a: 19, para. 87) notes, however, that views of RBB are more favorable in field operations than at headquarters.
 
44
Moynihan (2008: 10-11) refers to a “doctrine of performance management.” Radin (2006: 12-33) writes (critically) of a widespread “performance mindset.”
 
45
For similar critiques of performance measurement, see Radin (2006) and Moynihan (2008).
 
46
Thus, ambiguity represents an integration barrier (Campbell and Kasperson 2008).
 
47
Dobbins et al. (2005: 248) argue that UN peacekeeping was highly cost-effective. Durch (with Berkman 2006: 26-7) argues that this finding is dependent on case selection.
 
48
This complaint highlights the importance to IO performance of getting incentives for bureaucratic staff right, an issue discussed by Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2010).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping
verfasst von
Michael Lipson
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2010
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 3/2010
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-010-9090-5

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