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Journal of Chinese Political Science

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31.08.2017 | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Political Incentives and Local Policy Innovations in China

verfasst von: Ciqi Mei, Xiaonan Wang

Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science | Ausgabe 4/2017

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Abstract

The government system of China has been well known for its ability to mobilize its local leaders through career incentives. Does this system also encourage local policy innovation? This paper tests the relation between career advancement and local policy innovation with a self-compiled dataset on local innovation and local leaders’ career paths in 16 deputy-provincial level municipalities. We find a strong positive relationship between reported local policy innovation concerning economic issues and local leaders’ career advancement from 1980 to 2008, while the relationship between the number of innovations in other policy areas and promotion is insignificant. This finding deepens our understanding of both the promotion system for Chinese local leaders and motivations for local policy innovation.

Vorheriger Artikel The Incentive to Innovate? The Behavior of Local Policymakers in China

Nächster Artikel Mission-Driven Agency and Local Policy Innovation: Empirical Analysis from Baoding, China

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Chongqing’s administrative rank was lifted up to ministry-provincial level in 1997. We exclude it from our sample since 1997.

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Titel: Political Incentives and Local Policy Innovations in China
verfasst von: Ciqi Mei
Xiaonan Wang
Publikationsdatum: 31.08.2017
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science / Ausgabe 4/2017
Print ISSN: 1080-6954
Elektronische ISSN: 1874-6357
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-017-9513-8

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